מפת הסוגיא — חולין פ״אSugya map — Chullin 81

רב המנונא: ר׳ שמעון היה אומר שאיסור ״אותו ואת בנו״ אינו נוהג בקדשים. הטעם: כיוון שלר׳ שמעון שחיטה שאינה ראויה (להתיר אכילה) אינה נחשבת שחיטה, אף שחיטת קדשים אינה ראויה — שהבשר אסור עד זריקת הדם.

§ The Gemara returns to discussing Rabbi Shimon’s opinion with regard to slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. Rav Hamnuna says that Rabbi Shimon would say: The prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring does not apply to sacrificial animals. What is the reason? The reason is that since Rabbi Shimon says that an act of slaughter that is unfit to permit consumption is not considered to have the halakhic status of an act of slaughter, the prohibition will not apply here. This case of slaughtering sacrificial animals is also considered slaughter that is unfit, in that the flesh may not be burned upon the altar or eaten until the blood has been presented.

רבא מקשה מברייתא: ״אותו ואת בנו״ של קדשים שנשחטו בחוץ (מחוץ לעזרה) — ר׳ שמעון אומר שעל השני יש לאו, שהיה אומר: כל הראוי לקרב לאחר זמן ושחטו בחוץ קודם זמנו — יש בו לאו ואין בו כרת; וחכמים אומרים: כל שאין בו כרת — אין בו אף לאו.

Rava raises an objection from a baraita: If one slaughtered an animal itself and its offspring and both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon says: For slaughtering the second animal he transgresses a prohibition in slaughtering it outside the Temple, as Rabbi Shimon would say: With regard to any offering that is fit to come to the altar after a certain amount of time and is offered outside the Temple before that time, he who slaughters it transgresses a prohibition, but there is no liability to receive karet. And the Rabbis say: With regard to any offering slaughtered outside of the Temple for which there is no liability to receive karet because it is unfit to be an offering at that time, he who sacrifices it also does not transgress a prohibition.

וקשה לנו: קדשים בחוץ — מדוע על השני רק לאו? הרי לר׳ שמעון שחיטת הראשון (שאינה ראויה) כמי שהרגו בלא שחיטה, ונמצא שהשני ראוי להתקבל בפנים על המזבח — אם כן יתחייב אף כרת על שחיטתו בחוץ!

And this statement in the baraita is difficult for us: If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, Rabbi Shimon says: For slaughtering the second animal he transgresses a prohibition for slaughtering outside the Temple. According to Rabbi Shimon, slaughter that is unfit for consumption is not considered slaughter. Therefore, with regard to the first animal, it is as if he has killed it without ritual slaughter, since its slaughter was unfit, and the second animal would be accepted inside the Temple upon the altar. Therefore, let one who slaughters it outside of the Temple be liable to receive karet as well.

רבא (ויש אומרים בלא שם): הברייתא חסרה וכך יש לקרוא — קדשים ששניהם נשחטו בחוץ: לדעת חכמים, הראשון ענוש כרת, והשני פסול (שעדיין לא הגיע זמנו) ולכן פטור מלאו של שחוטי חוץ.

And Rava said, and some say it unattributed: The baraita is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: If one slaughters an animal and its offspring that are both sacrificial animals, and both of them are slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the slaughter of the first animal is punishable by karet, while the second animal is disqualified as its time has not yet arrived, and therefore, for its slaughter one is exempt from punishment for violating the prohibition of offerings slaughtered outside the Temple.

ולדעת ר׳ שמעון — שניהם ענושים כרת, שהרי לדידו שחיטת הראשון אינה שחיטה ואינה פוסלת את השני משום ״אותו ואת בנו״, ונמצא השני ראוי ושחיטתו בחוץ בכרת.

According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the slaughter of both of them, including the second one alone, is punishable by karet. This is because the slaughter of the first is not considered slaughter, and therefore it does not disqualify the second through the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.

שחט אחד בחוץ ואחד בפנים: לחכמים — הראשון (שבחוץ) ענוש כרת, והשני פסול ופטור; לר׳ שמעון — השני כשר וקרב, שהרי שחיטת הראשון אינה שחיטה ואינה פוסלת את השני.

If an animal and its offspring that are sacrificial animals are slaughtered, the first one outside the Temple courtyard, and the second one inside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the slaughter of the first is punishable by karet, while the second animal is disqualified as its time has not yet arrived, and its slaughterer is exempt from punishment for its slaughter outside the Temple, because he slaughtered it inside the Temple. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the second animal is fit for the altar, and it is sacrificed, as the slaughter of the first animal is not considered slaughter, and therefore the slaughter of the second does not violate the prohibition of a mother and its offspring.

שחט אחד בפנים ואחד בחוץ: לחכמים — הראשון כשר ופטור, והשני פסול ופטור; לר׳ שמעון — על השני יש לאו, שדבר הראוי לבוא לאחר זמן ושחטו בחוץ — בלא תעשה.

If an animal and its offspring that are sacrificial animals are slaughtered, the first one inside the Temple courtyard and the second one outside the Temple courtyard, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, the first animal is fit for the altar, and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment, as its slaughter is perfectly legitimate. The second is unfit for the altar, as it was slaughtered outside the Temple, but its slaughterer is exempt from punishment for its slaughter outside the Temple because it is unfit for the altar, as its time has not yet arrived. According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, for slaughtering the second animal outside the Temple one transgresses a prohibition, as he holds that an offering whose time has not yet arrived that was slaughtered outside the Temple violates a prohibition.

כאן מתבררת קושיית רבא: ואם תעלה בדעתך ש״אותו ואת בנו״ אינו נוהג בקדשים — מדוע על השני (בחוץ) רק לאו ותו לא? יתחייב אף כרת, שהרי אם אין פסול של ״אותו ואת בנו״, השני ראוי לפנים! מכאן שהאיסור כן נוהג בקדשים.

Rava now explains his objection: And if it enters your mind that the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does not apply to sacrificial animals, then with regard to slaughtering the second animal outside the Temple, why does one transgress only a prohibition and nothing more? Let him be liable to receive karet as well, as since its slaughter does not violate the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it would fit to be sacrificed inside the Temple. Therefore, it is clear that the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does apply to sacrificial animals.

אלא אמר רבא: כך כוונת רב המנונא — האיסור כן נוהג, אבל אין מלקות של ״אותו ואת בנו״ נוהגות בקדשים.

Rather, Rava said: This is what Rav Hamnuna is saying: Though the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does apply to sacrificial animals, the administering of lashes for violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, does not apply to sacrificial animals.

הטעם שאין מלקות: כיוון שכל עוד לא נזרק הדם אין הבשר מותר, הרי בשעת השחיטה ההתראה היא ספק (שמא לא ייזרק הדם והשחיטה לא תתיר) — והתראת ספק אינה נחשבת התראה לעניין מלקות.

The reason is that since as long as one has not sprinkled the blood, the flesh is not permitted to be burned on the altar or eaten, at the time that one slaughters the second animal, when he receives a forewarning that his action violates the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it is an uncertain forewarning, because if the blood will not be sprinkled, the flesh will not be permitted, sparing him from violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring. And an uncertain forewarning is not considered a valid forewarning that renders one liable to receive lashes.

ורבא הולך לשיטתו, שאמר: היא (האם) חולין ובנה שלמים — שחט תחילה את החולין ואחר כך את השלמים: פטור, שהתראת השני ספק (שמא לא ייזרק דם השלמים).

And Rava follows his line of reasoning, as Rava says: According to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one does not incur punishment for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, for a slaughtering that is unfit, if she, the mother, is non-sacred, and her offspring is a peace offering, and one slaughtered the non-sacred mother, and afterward one slaughtered her offspring that is a peace offering on the same day, he is exempt for slaughtering the offspring. This is because the forewarning for slaughtering the offspring is uncertain as its blood might not be sprinkled, rendering the slaughter unfit.

שחט תחילה את השלמים (וזרק דמם) ואחר כך את החולין — חייב, שכבר הותר הבשר וההתראה ודאית. ועוד אמר רבא: היא חולין ובנה עולה — לא רק ששחט חולין ואז עולה פטור,

But if one slaughtered the offspring that is a peace offering first and sprinkled its blood, and afterward he slaughtered the non-sacred mother, he is liable to receive lashes for slaughtering the mother. Once the non-sacred mother is slaughtered, the meat is fit; therefore, the forewarning is definite. And Rava says: If she, the mother, is non-sacred, and her offspring is sacrificed as a burnt offering, and both are slaughtered on the same day, it is not necessary to state that if one slaughtered the non-sacred mother, and afterward he slaughtered her offspring as a burnt offering, that he is exempt.

אלא אפילו שחט את העולה תחילה (וזרק דמה) ואחר כך את החולין — פטור, שהרי שחיטת העולה אינה שחיטה הראויה לאכילה (העולה כולה נשרפת), ולר׳ שמעון שחיטה שאינה ראויה אינה שחיטה.

But even if one slaughtered the offspring as a burnt offering and sprinkled its blood, and afterward slaughtered the non-sacred mother, he is exempt. The reason is that the slaughter of the first animal is not an act of slaughter subject to consumption, as a burnt offering is entirely burned upon the altar, and according to Rabbi Shimon, it is an act of slaughter that is improper, in that it does not render the meat fit to be eaten, is not considered slaughter.

דעה חולקת: ר׳ יעקב בשם ר׳ יוחנן — אכילת מזבח (הקרבת קרבן) נחשבת אכילה. הטעם: הכתוב כפל ״האכל יאכל מבשר זבח שלמיו״ — לרבות אכילת מזבח.

And Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Consumption by the altar is considered consumption. What is the reason? The reason is that the verse states with regard to an offering that was sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its designated time [piggul]: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings be at all eaten [he’akhol ye’akhel] on the third day, it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 7:18).

כפל הלשון ״האכל יאכל״ מלמד שהכתוב מדבר בשתי אכילות: אחת אכילת אדם ואחת אכילת מזבח — ושתיהן ״אכילה״. לפיכך שחיטת עולה ראויה היא, ואף לר׳ שמעון לוקה על ״אותו ואת בנו״.

The repetitive expression “he’akhol ye’akhel” teaches that the verse is speaking of two types of consumption: One is human consumption, and the other one is consumption by the altar, and both are considered consumption with regard to piggul and other matters. Therefore, the slaughter of a burnt offering is considered slaughter that is fit for consumption, and the slaughter of a mother animal and its offspring, one of which is sacrificed as a burnt offering on the same day as the slaughter of the other, renders one liable to receive lashes even according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

משנה: השוחט בהמה (וחברתה) ונמצאת אחת מהן טריפה, או השוחט לשם עבודה זרה, או השוחט פרת חטאת (פרה אדומה), שור הנסקל ועגלה ערופה — שכולן אסורות בהנאה — ר׳ שמעון פוטר מ״אותו ואת בנו״ (שאין זו שחיטה המתירה), וחכמים מחייבים.

MISHNA: With regard to one who slaughters an animal and its offspring and one of them is discovered to be an animal with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa] and may not be eaten, or one who slaughters one of the animals for the sake of idol worship, from which deriving benefit is prohibited, or one who slaughters the red heifer of purification, or an ox that was to have been stoned, or a heifer whose neck was to have been broken, all of which are animals from which deriving benefit is prohibited, Rabbi Shimon deems one who slaughters them exempt from lashes for the slaughter of a mother and its offspring, as in his opinion, slaughter that does not render the animal fit for consumption is not considered slaughter and does not violate the prohibition. And the Rabbis deem him liable, as the slaughter need not render the animal fit for consumption in order to violate the prohibition.

אבל השוחט ונתנבלה בידו (שקלקל בשחיטה), והנוחר (ההורג בנקיבת הסכין שלא במקום שחיטה), והמעקר (העוקר את הסימנים) — לדברי הכל פטור משום ״אותו ואת בנו״, שאין כאן מעשה שחיטה כלל.

All agree that one who slaughters an animal and it becomes a carcass by his hand because the slaughter was invalid, or one who stabs an animal, or one who uproots the windpipe and the gullet, is exempt with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring, as it is written: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28), and in these cases, no ritual slaughter was performed.

גמרא: ריש לקיש: חכמים מחייבים בשוחט לע״ז רק כשהראשון נשחט לעבודה זרה והשני לשולחנו (לאכילה); אבל אם הראשון לשולחנו והשני לעבודה זרה — פטור ממלקות על השני, שקם ליה בדרבה מיניה (נענש בעונש החמור — מיתה — ולא במלקות).

GEMARA: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The Rabbis in the mishna taught that one is liable when one of the animals is slaughtered for the sake of idol worship only when he slaughtered the first animal for the sake of idol worship and the second animal for his own table. But if he slaughtered the first animal for his own table and the second animal for the sake of idol worship, he is exempt from lashes for the second act of slaughter, as he receives only the greater punishment, that for idol worship, which is death.

ר׳ יוֹחָנָן דחה: הלכה זו (שקם ליה בדרבה מיניה) אפילו תינוקות של בית רבן יודעים אותה — ואין צורך לאומרה! אלא יש לפרש: פעמים שאף ששחט הראשון לשולחנו והשני לעבודה זרה — חייב מלקות על השני.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: Even schoolchildren know this halakha, that one who is liable to receive two punishments receives only the greater punishment. Rather, sometimes, even if he slaughtered the first for his own table and the second for the sake of idol worship, he is liable to receive lashes for the second act of slaughter.

כגון שהתרו בו משום ״אותו ואת בנו״ אך לא התרו בו משום עבודה זרה — ולכן אינו נהרג ולוקה על הקל. וריש לקיש משיב: כיוון שאילו התרו בו (גם לע״ז) היה פטור ממלקות, אף כשלא התרו בו לע״ז — פטור.

This occurs, for example, where the witnesses forewarned him before the second act of slaughter with regard to the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, but they did not forewarn him with regard to idol worship. Since he is not punished for performing idol worship, he receives lashes for the less severe transgression. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: Since, had they forewarned him with regard to idol worship he would have been exempt from lashes; therefore, even if they did not forewarn him with regard to idol worship, he is also exempt from lashes.

ומכאן ששניהם הולכים לשיטתם הכללית: כשבא רב דימי מארץ ישראל אמר — חייבי מיתות שוגגין, או חייבי מלקות שוגגין, ועמהם דבר אחר (חיוב ממון), והתרו בו לממון בלבד: ר׳ יוחנן אומר חייב (לשלם), וריש לקיש אומר פטור.

The Gemara notes: And they each follow their known lines of reasoning in this matter. As when Rav Dimi came to Babylonia from Eretz Yisrael he said: With regard to those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive the death penalty if one performed it intentionally, or those who unwittingly performed a transgression for which one is liable to receive lashes, and that transgression also involved another matter, monetary payment, and they were forewarned with regard to the monetary penalty but not with regard to the lashes or the death penalty, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable to pay; and Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.

ביאור טעמיהם: ר׳ יוחנן — חייב לשלם, שהרי לא התרו בו לעונש החמור ונמצא ששגג בו ונשאר רק חיוב הממון. וריש לקיש — פטור, שכיוון שאילו התרו בו לחמור היה פטור מן הממון, אף כשלא התרו בו פטור.

The Gemara clarifies the rationales for their statements. Rabbi Yoḥanan says that he is liable; since they did not forewarn him with regard to the severe transgression, he sinned unwittingly, and he remains liable only to pay the monetary payment. And Reish Lakish says that he is exempt; since had they forewarned him with regard to the severe transgression, he would have been exempt from the monetary payment, when they did not forewarn him, he is also exempt.

וצריך להשמיע את מחלוקתם בשני המקרים: שאילו אמרו רק בעניין השוחט (מיתה ומלקות יחד) — היינו אומרים שדווקא שם ריש לקיש פוטר, אבל במקרה של ממון אֵימא שמודה לר׳ יוחנן שחייב.

The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to state their disagreement with regard to both of these cases. As, if it were taught to us only about this case where one slaughters the mother for his private use and afterward slaughters its offspring for idol worship, perhaps only in this case involving the death penalty and lashes does Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish say that even if they did not forewarn the transgressor with regard to idol worship, he is still exempt from lashes for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, because the death penalty and lashes are similar in that they are both corporal punishments, and so the obligation of lashes does not take effect at all when the death penalty is potentially applicable. But in that case, involving the death penalty or lashes together with a monetary payment, say that he agrees with Rabbi Yoḥanan that the transgressor is liable to pay the monetary payment.

ואילו אמרו רק בעניין הממון — היינו אומרים שדווקא שם ר׳ יוחנן מחייב, אבל במקרה השוחט (מיתה ומלקות) אֵימא שמודה לריש לקיש שפטור. לפיכך צריך להשמיע את מחלוקתם בשני המקרים.

And if the disagreement was stated only with regard to that case, where one unwittingly performed a transgression involving the death penalty or lashes together with a transgression bearing a monetary payment, perhaps only in that case does Rabbi Yoḥanan say that he is liable to pay the monetary payment. But in this case, where one slaughtered an animal and its offspring, and the second animal was slaughtered for the sake of idol worship, which involves the death penalty and lashes, but without a forewarning with regard to the death penalty, say that he agrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that one is exempt from lashes. Therefore, it is necessary to state their disagreement with regard to both cases.

קושיה על המשנה: וכי שחיטת פרת חטאת (פרה אדומה) אינה ראויה, שר׳ שמעון פוטר בה? והרי שנינו בברייתא: ר׳ שמעון אומר שהפרה (אף לאחר שחיטה ואיסור הנאה) מקבלת טומאת אוכלין, הואיל והיתה לה שעת הכושר (שעה שהיתה ראויה לאכילה) — משמע שיש בה שחיטה ראויה.

§ The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon deems one who slaughters the red heifer of purification exempt from punishment for the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, as that act of slaughter does not render the animal fit for consumption. The Gemara asks: And is the slaughter of the red heifer of purification considered an act of slaughter that is unfit for consumption? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says: A red heifer, even if it has been slaughtered and it is therefore prohibited to derive benefit from it, is susceptible to the ritual impurity of food, since it had a time in which it was fit for consumption?

וריש לקיש ביאר: ר׳ שמעון היה אומר שהפרה נפדית אף לאחר ששחטוה ונתנוה על מערכת העצים — אם כן יש לה שעת כושר (אילו תיפדה), ומדוע פוטרה? תירוץ — רב שמן בר אבא בשם ר׳ יוחנן: דין ״פרת חטאת״ אינו חלק מן המשנה (משבשתא היא), ולמעשה ר׳ שמעון מחייב בה.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says in explanation of Rabbi Shimon’s statement: Rabbi Shimon would say that the red heifer can be redeemed with money even once it has been slaughtered and placed upon its pyre in preparation for being burned. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon states that there could be a time when the heifer was fit for consumption, i.e., if it was redeemed. Why, then, does he deem one who slaughters it exempt from liability for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring? Rav Shemen bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The statement with regard to the red heifer of purification is not considered part of the mishna, and Rabbi Shimon agrees that its slaughterer is liable for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.

וכן בעגלה ערופה: וכי שחיטתה אינה ראויה? והרי שנינו (סוטה): נמצא ההורג קודם שנערפה העגלה — תצא ותרעה בעדר (שאינה אסורה בהנאה עד עריפתה), ומשמע ששחיטתה קודם לכן ראויה. תירוץ — ריש לקיש משום ר׳ ינאי: דין ״עגלה ערופה״ אינו חלק מן המשנה.

The Gemara asks: And is the slaughter of the heifer whose neck was to have been broken not considered an act of slaughter that is fit? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Sota 47a): If a heifer was set aside to have its neck broken to atone for the murder of an individual whose murderer was not known, and then the murderer was found before the heifer’s neck was broken, the heifer shall go out and graze among the flock, as it is not consecrated. Evidently, before its neck is broken, deriving benefit from it is not prohibited, and its slaughter would be one that is fit. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yannai: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck was to have been broken is not considered part of the mishna, and Rabbi Shimon agrees that its slaughterer is liable for violating the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring.

קושיה: וכי ר׳ ינאי אמר ש״עגלה ערופה אינה משנה״? והרי ר׳ ינאי עצמו אמר: גבול (שלב) שממנו נאסרת העגלה בהנאה שמעתי, ושכחתי מהו; והחברים נטו לומר שירידתה לנחל איתן (מקום העריפה) היא האוסרתה — ומשמע שקודם לכן מותרת, ושחיטתה ראויה.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yannai actually say so? But doesn’t Rabbi Yannai say: I heard the boundary, i.e., stage, beyond which the heifer is forbidden, but I have forgotten what it is; but the group of scholars were inclined to say that the heifer’s descent to a hard valley, where its neck is broken, is the action that renders it forbidden?

ואם נכון שר׳ ינאי סובר כך — היה לו ליישב את הסתירה בלא לומר ״אינה משנה״: כאן (במשנת סוטה, מותרת) קודם ירידתה לנחל, וכאן (במשנתנו, אסורה ושחיטתה אינה ראויה) לאחר ירידתה. מדוע אמר ״אינה משנה״?

And if it is so, let him resolve the contradiction by saying: Here, where deriving benefit from the heifer is permitted, and its slaughterer is liable for transgressing the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, it is referring to an act of slaughtering that is fit and is performed before the heifer’s descent, while there, in the mishna, where Rabbi Shimon holds that there is no liability for transgressing: Itself and its offspring, it is referring to slaughtering performed after its descent. At that time, deriving benefit from the heifer is already prohibited, and the slaughter is therefore not considered fit.

רב פנחס בריה דרב אמי: אנו שונים את המימרא בשם ריש לקיש עצמו (לא משם ר׳ ינאי): ״עגלה ערופה אינה משנה״. רב אשי: כשהיינו בבית מדרשו של רב פפי הוקשה לנו — וכי באמת אמר ריש לקיש כן?

Rav Pineḥas, son of Rav Ami, said: We taught the statement in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish himself, not as a quote from Rabbi Yannai: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken is not considered part of the mishna. Rav Ashi said: When we were studying in the study hall of Rav Pappi, that statement was difficult for us: Did Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish actually say that it is not considered part of the mishna?

והרי נאמר במחלוקת: ציפורי מצורע מאימתי נאסרות בהנאה? ר׳ יוחנן — משעת שחיטה, וריש לקיש — משעת לקיחה (מעת שנלקחו לשם המצוה). ושאלנו: מהו טעמו של ריש לקיש שאוסר כבר משעת לקיחה?

But it was stated that amora’im engaged in a dispute concerning the following issue: From when is one prohibited from deriving benefit from the leper’s birds? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: One is prohibited from the moment of their slaughter; and Reish Lakish says: One is prohibited from the moment they are taken and designated to be a leper’s birds. And we say: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish?

טעמו: גזירה שווה ״קיחה״ ״קיחה״ מעגלה ערופה — מה עגלה ערופה נאסרת משעת לקיחתה, אף ציפורי מצורע כן. מכאן שריש לקיש סובר שהעגלה נאסרת מחיים, ושחיטתה אינה ראויה — ולשיטתו ראוי שר׳ שמעון יפטור בה. אם כן כיצד אמר ש״אינה משנה״?

His reasoning is that he derives it via verbal analogy from the terms: “Taking [kiḥa]” (Leviticus 14:4), with regard to the birds, and: “Taking [kiḥa]” (Deuteronomy 21:3), with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken. Consequently, just as deriving benefit from the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited from the time of its selection, so too must deriving benefit from these birds be prohibited from the time of their selection. Clearly, then, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish holds that deriving benefit from the heifer whose neck is broken is prohibited while it is still alive. Therefore, its slaughter is one that does not render the animal fit for consumption. Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon would exempt its slaughterer from the prohibition of: Itself and its offspring, as is taught in the mishna.

אלא — חוזרת הגמרא בה: לא ריש לקיש אמר ״אינה משנה״, כי אם ר׳ חייא בר אבא בשם ר׳ יוחנן: ״עגלה ערופה אינה משנה״ — דין זה נדחה מן המשנה, ולמעשה ר׳ שמעון מחייב אף בה.

Rather, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The statement with regard to the heifer whose neck is broken is not considered part of the mishna, and this resolution of the difficulty was articulated by Rabbi Yoḥanan rather than Reish Lakish.