מפת הסוגיא — מגילה כ״זSugya map — Megillah 27

דרש בר קפרא: ׳וישרף את בית ה׳ ואת בית המלך ואת כל בתי ירושלים ואת כל בית גדול שרף באש׳ — ׳בית ה׳׳ זה בית המקדש, ׳בית המלך׳ אלו פלטרי המלך, ׳בתי ירושלים׳ כפשוטם, ו׳כל בית גדול׳ — נחלקו רבי יוחנן ורבי יהושע בן לוי: אחד אמר מקום שמגדלים בו תורה (בית המדרש), והשני מקום שמגדלים בו תפילה (בית הכנסת).

§ Bar Kappara interpreted a verse homiletically: What is the meaning of that which is written: “And he burnt the house of the Lord, and the king’s house, and all the houses of Jerusalem, and every great house he burnt with fire” (II Kings 25:9)? He explained: “The house of the Lord”; this is the Holy Temple. “The king’s house”; these are the king’s palaces [palterin]. “And all the houses of Jerusalem”; as understood in its literal sense. With regard to the final phrase: “And every great house he burnt with fire,” Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi disagree about the meaning of “great house”: One of them said: It is referring to a place where the Torah is made great, i.e., the study hall; and the other one said: It is referring to a place where prayer is made great, i.e., the synagogue.

זה שאמר ׳תורה׳ — לפי ׳ה׳ חפץ למען צדקו יגדיל תורה ויאדיר׳; וזה שאמר ׳תפילה׳ — לפי ׳ספרה נא הגדולות אשר עשה אלישע׳, ומה שעשה אלישע — בתפילה עשה.

The Gemara explains their respective opinions: The one who said that the reference is to where the Torah is made great bases his opinion on a verse that describes Torah study as great, as it is written: “The Lord was pleased, for His righteousness’ sake, to make Torah great and glorious” (Isaiah 42:21). And the one who said that the reference is to where prayer is made great bases his opinion on a verse that describes prayer as great, as it is written: “Tell me, I pray you, all the great things that Elisha has done” (II Kings 8:4), and that which Elisha did, i.e., restored a boy to life, he did through prayer.

מסיקים: ניתן לקבוע שרבי יהושע בן לוי הוא שאמר ׳מקום שמגדלים בו תורה׳, שהרי אמר במקום אחר: בית הכנסת מותר לעשותו בית המדרש (משמע שקדושת בית המדרש גדולה יותר). שמע מינה.

The Gemara comments: Conclude that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi is the one who said that “great house” is referring to a place where the Torah is made great, as Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said elsewhere: It is permitted for a synagogue to be made into a study hall. This ruling indicates that he holds that a study hall has a higher degree of sanctity than a synagogue. It is therefore reasonable that he assumes that “great house” is referring specifically to a study hall. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that he was the one who said the term is referring to a place where the Torah is made great.

המשנה: ׳אבל מכרו תורה לא יקחו ספרים׳. נשאלה שאלה: האם מותר למכור ספר תורה ישן כדי לקנות בכספו ספר תורה חדש? מצד אחד אין כאן העלאת קדושה ולכן אסור, או שמא כיוון שאין דרך להעלות לקדושה גבוהה יותר — מותר.

§ The mishna states: However, if they sold a Torah scroll, they may not use the proceeds to purchase scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings. Similarly, the proceeds of the sale of any sacred item may not be used to purchase an item of a lesser degree of sanctity. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: What is the halakha with regard to whether it is permitted to sell an old Torah scroll in order to purchase a new one? The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: On the one hand, since the proceeds are not raised to a higher degree of sanctity by doing so, maybe it is prohibited; or, perhaps in this case, since there is no possibility of raising it to another, higher degree of sanctity, it seems well and should be permitted?

תא שמע מן המשנה: ׳מכרו תורה לא יקחו ספרים׳ — דווקא ספרים (נביאים וכתובים) אסור, אך תורה בתורה מותר! ודוחים: המשנה עוסקת בדיעבד (לאחר שכבר נמכר), ושאלתנו היא לכתחילה.

Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the mishna: However, if they sold a Torah scroll, they may not use the proceeds to purchase scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings. One may infer: It is only scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings that may not be purchased with the proceeds, but to purchase a new Torah scroll with the proceeds of an old Torah scroll seems well and is permitted. The Gemara rejects this proof: The mishna discusses the halakha that applies only after the fact that a Torah scroll was sold. Perhaps it is only in that case where the proceeds may be used to purchase another Torah scroll. When the dilemma was raised to us, it was with respect to permitting the sale of one Torah scroll in order to purchase another ab initio.

תא שמע מן המשנה: ׳מכרו תורה לא יקחו ספרים׳ — דווקא ספרים (נביאים וכתובים) אסור, אך תורה בתורה מותר! ודוחים: המשנה עוסקת בדיעבד (לאחר שכבר נמכר), ושאלתנו היא לכתחילה.

Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the mishna: However, if they sold a Torah scroll, they may not use the proceeds to purchase scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings. One may infer: It is only scrolls of the Prophets and the Writings that may not be purchased with the proceeds, but to purchase a new Torah scroll with the proceeds of an old Torah scroll seems well and is permitted. The Gemara rejects this proof: The mishna discusses the halakha that applies only after the fact that a Torah scroll was sold. Perhaps it is only in that case where the proceeds may be used to purchase another Torah scroll. When the dilemma was raised to us, it was with respect to permitting the sale of one Torah scroll in order to purchase another ab initio.

תא שמע מברייתא: גוללים ספר תורה במטפחות של חומשים, וחומשים במטפחות של נביאים וכתובים; אבל לא נביאים וכתובים במטפחות חומשים, ולא חומשים במטפחת ספר תורה.

Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: A Torah scroll may be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah. And scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of the Prophets or Writings, since in each case the wrapping cloths are being used for something with a greater degree of sanctity. However, a scroll of the Prophets or Writings may not be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah, and scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may not be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for a Torah scroll.

דייקים מן הברייתא: ׳גוללים ספר תורה במטפחות חומשים׳ — במטפחות חומשים כן, אבל במטפחת ספר תורה (אחר) לא; משמע שאין משתמשים בקדוש לצורך קדוש כמותו.

The Gemara explains the proof: In any event, the baraita is teaching: A Torah scroll may be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah. One may infer: A Torah scroll may be rolled up only in wrapping cloths that are used for scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah; but to roll it up in wrapping cloths of another Torah scroll, no, it is not permitted. By extension, one Torah scroll may certainly not be sold in order to purchase another.

דוחים: אמור את הסיפא — ׳ולא חומשים במטפחת ספר תורה׳, ומכאן תורה בתורה מותר! הרי שתי הדיוקים סותרים — אלא אין ללמוד מכאן כלום.

The Gemara rejects the proof: If this inference is valid, one should be able to say the latter clause and make a similar inference from it. The latter clause teaches: And scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may not be rolled up in wrapping cloths that are used for a Torah scroll. It may be inferred from this that it is prohibited only to roll up scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah in wrapping cloths that are used for a Torah scroll, but to roll up one Torah scroll in the wrapping cloths of another Torah scroll seems well. By extension, one should be permitted to sell a Torah scroll to purchase another. Rather, perforce one must conclude that no inference beyond its basic meaning can be deduced from the baraita, as the inferences are contradictory.

תא שמע: מניחים ספר תורה על גבי ספר תורה, ותורה על גבי חומשים, וחומשים על נביאים וכתובים; אבל לא נביאים וכתובים על גבי חומשים, ולא חומשים על גבי תורה. ומכאן שתורה בתורה מותר.

Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from the Tosefta (Megilla 3:12): A Torah scroll may be placed upon another Torah scroll, and a Torah scroll may be placed upon scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah, and scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may be placed upon scrolls of the Prophets or Writings. However, scrolls of the Prophets or Writings may not be placed upon scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah, and scrolls of one of the five books of the Torah may not be placed upon a Torah scroll. From the first clause, it is apparent that one Torah scroll may be used for the sake of another. By extension, it should be permitted to sell one Torah scroll to purchase another.

דוחים: בהנחה שונה הדבר, שאי אפשר אחרת — שאם לא כן כיצד היינו כורכים ספר כלל, והרי דף מונח על חברו? אלא כיוון שאי אפשר — מותר; וכאן אין ללמוד מכך.

The Gemara rejects this proof: Can you say a proof from the halakha of placing one Torah scroll upon another? The halakha of placing scrolls upon one another is different, because it is impossible to place them in any other way, as they must be laid one atop the other when placed in the ark. As, if you do not say so, that it is indeed permitted when in an unavoidable situation, how could we furl a Torah scroll at all? Does one sheet of parchment not rest upon another? Rather, since it is impossible to furl the scroll in any other way, it is permitted. Here too, since it is impossible to place the scrolls in the ark in any other way, it is permitted.

תא שמע מברייתא: אמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן משום רבן שמעון בן גמליאל — לא ימכור אדם ספר תורה ישן כדי ליקח בו חדש.

Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: As Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: A person may not sell an old Torah scroll in order to purchase a new one.

דוחים: שם הטעם משום פשיעוּת (שמא ימכור ולא יקנה); אבל שאלתנו היא כשהחדש כבר כתוב ומונח ועומד להיגאל מיד — מהו?

The Gemara rejects this proof. There, in the case of the baraita, it is prohibited because of a concern for negligence. The old one might be sold and a new one never bought. However, when we speak, it is of a case where the new scroll is already written and waiting to be redeemed immediately with the proceeds of the sale. Therefore, the question remains: What is the halakha in this case?

תא שמע מברייתא: אמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי מאיר — אין מוכרים ספר תורה אלא כדי ללמוד תורה או לישא אישה.

Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from a baraita: As Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Meir: A Torah scroll may be sold only if the seller needs the money in order to study Torah or to marry a woman.

שמע מינה תורה בתורה מותר! ודוחים: שמא תלמוד תורה שאני, שהתלמוד מביא לידי מעשה; ואישה גם כן — ׳לא תהו בראה לשבת יצרה׳; אבל תורה בתורה — לא בהכרח.

Learn from this baraita that exchanging one entity of Torah, i.e., a Torah scroll, for another entity of Torah, i.e., Torah study, seems well, and by extension, it should be permitted to sell one Torah scroll to purchase another. The Gemara rejects the proof: Perhaps Torah study is different, as the study of Torah leads to action, i.e., the fulfillment of the mitzvot, and perhaps it is only due to its great importance of Torah study that it is permitted to sell a Torah scroll for it. Similarly, marrying a woman is also of utmost importance, as it is stated with regard to Creation: “He created it not a waste; He formed it to be inhabited” (Isaiah 45:18). This indicates that marrying and having children fulfills a primary goal of Creation. But selling an old Torah in order to buy a new Torah might not be permitted.

תנו רבנן: לא ימכור אדם ספר תורה אף על פי שאינו צריך לו. יתר על כן אמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל: אפילו אין לו מה יאכל ומכר ספר תורה או את בתו — אינו רואה סימן ברכה לעולם.

On the same topic, the Sages taught in a baraita: A person may not sell a Torah scroll, even if he does not need it. Furthermore, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Even if a person has nothing to eat, and out of his need he sold a Torah scroll or he sold his daughter to be a maidservant, he never sees a sign of blessing from the proceeds of either sale. Clearly, it is never appropriate to sell a Torah scroll for any purpose.

המשנה: ׳וכן במותריהן׳. אמר רבא: לא נאמר אלא במקרה שמכרו דבר שבקדושה והותירו; אבל אם גבו מעות (לקניית דבר קדוש) והותירו — המותר מותר בכל שימוש, שמעולם לא חלה עליו קדושה.

The mishna states: And similarly, the same limitation applies to any surplus funds from the sale of sacred items. Rava said: They taught that the surplus funds have sanctity only in a case where the community sold a sacred object and then used the proceeds to purchase something with a greater degree of sanctity, and there was money left over. However, if the community collected money from its members in order to purchase a sacred object, and there was extra money left over beyond the price of the object, that extra money is permitted to be used for any purpose, as the money was never sanctified.

הקשה אביי לרבא מברייתא: ׳במה דברים אמורים — שלא התנו, אבל התנו — אפילו לדוכסוסיא מותר׳ (דוכסוסיא יתבאר).

Abaye raised an objection to Rava from a baraita: In what case is this statement of the mishna said? When they did not explicitly stipulate that they would do with the surplus funds as they see fit. However, if they made such a stipulation, then even to use the money for a dukhsusya is permitted. The Gemara will explain the meaning of the term dukhsusya.

מבאר אביי את הקושיה: במה מדובר? אם במכרו והותירו — מה מועיל התנאי? אלא בגבו והותירו; ומשמע שדווקא בהתנו מותר, הא לא התנו — אסור (ובניגוד לרבא שהתיר בגבו תמיד).

Abaye explains the challenge: What are the circumstances of this stipulation? If we say that they sold a sacred object and after using the proceeds to purchase another sacred object there was money left over, then even when they made a stipulation, of what avail is it? How can a stipulation desanctify the money? Rather, the mishna must be referring to a case where they collected money to purchase a sacred object and there was money left over after they made the purchase. In such a case, the reason that it is permitted to use the extra money for any purpose is that they made an explicit stipulation. However, if they did not make a stipulation, no, it would not be permitted.

מתרץ רבא: לעולם במכרו והותירו, וכך פירוש הברייתא: במה דברים אמורים — שלא התנו שבעה טובי העיר במעמד אנשי העיר; אבל אם התנו שבעה טובי העיר במעמד אנשי העיר — אפילו לדוכסוסיא מותר.

Rava rejects this argument: Actually, you can explain that the mishna is referring to a case where they sold a sacred object and there was money left over after purchasing a new one, and this is what the baraita is saying: In what case is this statement of the mishna said? In a case where the seven representatives of the town did not explicitly stipulate that they could use the money as they see fit, in an assembly of the residents of the town. However, if the seven representatives of the town made such a stipulation in an assembly of the residents of the town, then even to use the money for a dukhsusya would also be permitted.

שאל אביי את אחד החכמים שהיה מסדר את המשניות לפני רב ששת: שמעת מרב ששת מהו ׳דוכסוסיא׳? אמר לו: כך אמר רב ששת — פרשׁ (פרש) של העיר, הרוכב המשמש את בני העיר.

Abaye said to one of the Sages who would arrange the Mishna before Rav Sheshet: Did you hear anything from Rav Sheshet with regard to what the meaning of the term dukhsusya is? He said to him: This is what Rav Sheshet said: It is the town horseman who would serve the townspeople as a sentry and for public dispatches.

אמר אביי: לפיכך, תלמיד חכם ששמע דבר ואינו יודע פירושו — ישאל את מי שמצוי לפני חכמים, שאי אפשר שלא שמע זאת מאדם גדול.

The Gemara introduces a parenthetical comment: Abaye said: Accordingly, one can learn from this incident that with regard to this young Torah scholar who has heard something and does not know the meaning of it, he should inquire of its meaning before somebody who is frequently before the Sages, as it is impossible that such a person did not hear something about it from some great man.

אמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי מאיר: בני העיר שהלכו לעיר אחרת ופסקו עליהם (גבאי אותה עיר) צדקה — נותנים; וכשהם חוזרים, מביאים אותה עמם ומפרנסים בה עניי עירם.

§ Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Meir: In the case of residents of a town who collectively went to another town and, while there, the charity collectors in that town made them pledge a certain sum for charity, they must give the promised sum to the town’s charity collector, so as not to be suspected of reneging. But when they go home, their money is returned to them, and they bring it back with them, and with it they finance the poor of their own town.

תניא נמי הכי כדברי רבי יוחנן: בני עיר שהלכו לעיר אחרת ופסקו עליהם צדקה — נותנים, וכשבאים מביאים אותה עמם; אבל יחיד שהלך לעיר אחרת ופסקו עליו צדקה — תינתן לעניי אותה העיר.

The Gemara comments: That is also taught in a baraita: In the case of residents of a town who collectively went to another town and, while there, the local charity collectors made them pledge a certain sum for charity, they must give the promised sum to the town’s charity collector. But when they go home, their money is returned to them, and they bring it back with them. But in the case of an individual who went from his hometown to another town and, while there, the local charity collectors made him pledge a certain sum for charity, he should give it to the poor of that town.

מעשה: רב הונא גזר תענית. באו אליו רב חנא בר חנילאי וכל בני עירו, הטילו עליהם צדקה ונתנו. כשביקשו לחזור אמרו לו: יחזיר לנו מר את הצדקה ונלך ונפרנס בה את עניי עירנו.

The Gemara relates: Rav Huna once decreed a fast day. On the day of the fast, Rav Ḥana bar Ḥanilai and all the people of his town came to Rav Huna. A certain sum of charity was imposed upon them and they gave it. When they wanted to go home, they said to Rav Huna: May our Master give to us the charity that we gave, and we will go back, and with it we will finance the poor of our own town.

אמר להם: שנינו — ׳במה דברים אמורים׳ (שמחזירים) בשאין שם

He said to them: It was taught in a baraita: In what case is this statement, that the money is returned when the people leave, said? When there is no

׳חבר עיר׳ (חכם הממונה על צורכי הציבור); אבל אם יש שם חבר עיר — תינתן לחבר העיר. וכל שכן כאן, שעניי עירי ועירכם סומכים עליי (שרב הונא ממונה על חלוקת צדקה לכל הסביבה).

town scholar supervising the handling of the community’s needs, in the town in which the charity was collected. However, if there is a town scholar there, the money should be given to the town scholar, and he may use it as he sees fit. Since, in this case, the money had been given to Rav Huna, the use of the money should be up to his discretion. Rav Huna added: And all the more so in this instance, as both my poor in my town and your poor in your town rely upon me and my collections of charity. Rav Huna was also in charge of distributing charity for the surrounding area. It was certainly proper to leave the money with him, so that he could distribute it among all those in need.

משנה: אין מוכרים דבר שבקדושה של רבים ליחיד, מפני שמורידים אותו מקדושתו — דברי רבי מאיר. אמרו לו חכמים: אם כן אף אל ימכרו מעיר גדולה לעיר קטנה (שגם בה פוחתים המשתמשים)!

MISHNA: They may not sell a sacred object belonging to the community to an individual, even if the object will still be used for the same purpose, due to the fact that by doing so they downgrade its degree of sanctity, as an item used by fewer people is considered to have a lower degree of sanctity than one used by many; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. The Rabbis said to him: If so, by your logic, it should also not be permitted to sell a sacred object from a large town to a small town. However, such a sale is certainly permitted, and therefore it must also be permitted to sell such an object to an individual.

גמרא: יפה אמרו חכמים לרבי מאיר! וכיצד ישיב רבי מאיר? מעיר גדולה לקטנה — מעיקרא קדוש לציבור והשתא נמי קדוש לציבור; אבל מרבים ליחיד — אין שם קדושת ציבור כלל.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: The Rabbis are saying well to Rabbi Meir, as they provided a rational argument for their opinion. How could Rabbi Meir counter their claim? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir holds that when a sacred object is transferred from a large town to a small town, there is no significant downgrade in the degree of sanctity, as at the outset it was sacred for a community and now too it is sacred for a community. But when it is transferred from a community to an individual, there is a significant downgrade in the degree of sanctity, as there is no longer the degree of sanctity that existed beforehand.

גמרא: יפה אמרו חכמים לרבי מאיר! וכיצד ישיב רבי מאיר? מעיר גדולה לקטנה — מעיקרא קדוש לציבור והשתא נמי קדוש לציבור; אבל מרבים ליחיד — אין שם קדושת ציבור כלל.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: The Rabbis are saying well to Rabbi Meir, as they provided a rational argument for their opinion. How could Rabbi Meir counter their claim? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Meir holds that when a sacred object is transferred from a large town to a small town, there is no significant downgrade in the degree of sanctity, as at the outset it was sacred for a community and now too it is sacred for a community. But when it is transferred from a community to an individual, there is a significant downgrade in the degree of sanctity, as there is no longer the degree of sanctity that existed beforehand.

וחכמים — אם יש לחוש (לירידת מספר המשתמשים), אף בכהאי גוונא (מעיר גדולה לקטנה) יש לחוש, משום ׳ברוב עם הדרת מלך׳; ומכיוון שמעיר גדולה לקטנה מותר — אף ליחיד מותר.

And the Rabbis, how could they respond to Rabbi Meir’s claim? If there is cause to be concerned about the decrease in the number of people who will use the object when it is transferred from a community to an individual, then in a case like this as well, where the object is transferred to a smaller community, there should be cause to be concerned about this due to the principle expressed in the verse: “In the multitude of people is the king’s glory” (Proverbs 14:28). The verse teaches that the larger the assembly involved in a mitzva, the greater the honor to God. However, it is apparent that this principle does not prevent the sale of a synagogue to a smaller community, and therefore it should not prevent the selling of a synagogue to an individual.

משנה: אין מוכרים בית כנסת אלא על תנאי שאם ירצו יחזירוהו — דברי רבי מאיר. וחכמים אומרים: מוכרים אותו ממכר עולם, חוץ מארבעה דברים (מרחץ, בורסקי, מקום טבילה, בית הכסא). רבי יהודה אומר: מוכרים אותו לשם חצר, והלוקח עושה בו כרצונו.

MISHNA: They may sell a synagogue only with a stipulation that if the sellers so desire it, the buyers will return it to them; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They may sell a synagogue with a permanent sale for any usage, except the following four things, which would be an affront to the synagogue’s previous sanctity: For a bathhouse, where people stand undressed; or for a tannery [burseki], due to the foul smell; for immersion, i.e., to be used as a ritual bath, where people also stand undressed; or for a lavatory. Rabbi Yehuda says: They may sell a synagogue for the generic purpose of serving as a courtyard, and then the buyer may then do with it as he wishes, even if that is one of the above four purposes.

גמרא: ולרבי מאיר (שהמכר על תנאי) — כיצד דרים הלוקחים בבית הכנסת? הרי הכסף כהלוואה (העתידה לחזור), והדיוּר בו כריבית!

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Meir, how may those who purchased the synagogue live in it? Isn’t living there tantamount to taking interest? If the sellers demand the synagogue’s return, the payment given for it would be returned to the buyers. Accordingly, in a broad view of things, that sum of money may be considered as a loan that was given from the buyers to the sellers, until the synagogue was demanded back. The buyers benefited from giving that loan by being able to live in the synagogue building. However, gaining any benefit from a loan is prohibited as interest.

אמר רבי יוחנן: רבי מאיר אמרהּ בשיטת רבי יהודה, שאמר — ׳צד אחד בריבית׳ (ספק ריבית) מותר.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Meir stated his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: Uncertain interest, i.e., a transaction that will not certainly result in a situation of interest, is permitted.

דתניא: הרי שהיה נושה בחברו מנה ועשה לו (הלווה) שדהו מכר (על תנאי שיחזירנה כשיפרע) — בזמן שהמוכר אוכל את הפירות, מותר; אם הלוקח אוכל את הפירות — אסור (משום ריבית).

In the case of the mishna, the sale might never be undone, and then there would be no loan to speak of. It should therefore be permitted as a case of uncertain interest, as it is taught in a baraita: If one had a debt of one hundred dinars against his fellow, and the borrower made a conditional sale of his field because he did not have any money to repay the loan, stipulating that if he later comes into the possession of money with which to repay the loan, the field reverts back to his ownership, then as long as the seller of the field consumes the produce of that field, such an arrangement is permitted. If the buyer consumes the produce, the arrangement is prohibited, as if the sale were to be reverted, then the money given for it would be considered a loan from the buyer to the seller, and therefore any benefit the buyer gains due to that loan should be prohibited as interest.

רבי יהודה אומר: אפילו לוקח אוכל פירות — מותר. ואמר רבי יהודה: מעשה בביתוס בן זונין שעשה שדהו מכר על פי רבי אלעזר בן עזריה, והלוקח היה אוכל הפירות. אמרו לו: משם ראיה? המוכר היה אוכל הפירות ולא הלוקח.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if the buyer consumes the produce, it is permitted. Since it is possible that the sale might never be undone, in which case there would be no loan to speak of, it is a case of uncertain interest, which is permitted. And Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving Baitos ben Zunen, who made a conditional sale of his field in a similar arrangement under the direction of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and the buyer was consuming the produce in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling. The Rabbis said to him: Do you seek to bring a proof from there? In that case, it was actually the seller who was consuming the produce and not the buyer.

מאי בינייהו? ׳צד אחד בריבית׳ (ספק ריבית) ביניהם: מר (רבי יהודה) סובר צד אחד בריבית מותר, ומר (חכמים) סובר אסור.

The Gemara analyses the dispute: What is the practical difference between them? The permissibility of an uncertain interest agreement is the practical difference between them. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that uncertain interest is permitted and one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that uncertain interest is prohibited.

רבא אמר: לדברי הכול צד אחד בריבית אסור, וכאן ׳ריבית על מנת להחזיר׳ ביניהם: מר (רבי יהודה) סובר ריבית על מנת להחזיר מותר, ומר (חכמים) סובר אסור.

Rava said a different explanation of the dispute: According to everyone, uncertain interest is prohibited, and here it is the question of the permissibility of interest given on the condition that it will be returned that is the practical difference between them. In addition to the arrangement described in the baraita, the parties in this case agreed that the buyer would consume the produce; if the sale would later be reverted, then the buyer would reimburse the seller for the value of the produce. One Sage, Rabbi Yehuda, holds that interest that is given on condition that it will be returned is permitted; this is because even if the sale is reverted and the sale becomes a loan retroactively, the buyer-lender will not benefit from that loan since he reimbursed the seller-borrower for the value of the produce. And one Sage, i.e., the Rabbis, holds that it is prohibited.

המשנה: ׳וחכמים אומרים מוכרים אותו ממכר עולם׳. אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: מותר לאדם להשתין מים בתוך ארבע אמות של (מקום) תפילה.

§ The mishna states: And the Rabbis say: They may sell a synagogue with a permanent sale. However, it may not be sold if it will be used for activities that would be an affront to the synagogue’s previous sanctity. The Gemara considers a related halakha: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is permitted for a person to urinate within four cubits of where one has just offered a prayer, i.e., one may urinate even in the same place as he prays.

אמר רב יוסף: מה השמיענו? כבר שנינו — רבי יהודה אומר מוכרים אותה לשם חצר והלוקח עושה כרצונו, ואפילו חכמים לא אמרו (איסור) אלא בבית כנסת שקדושתו קבועה; אבל ארבע אמות שאין קדושתן קבועה — לא.

Rav Yosef said: What is he teaching us? We already learned this in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: They may sell a synagogue for the generic purpose of serving as a courtyard, and the buyer may then do with it as he wishes, even if he wishes to make it into a lavatory. And even the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, say their ruling only with regard to a synagogue whose sanctity is permanent. However, with regard to the four cubits of where one happened to stand in prayer, whose sanctity is not permanent, no, even the Rabbis would be lenient.

תני תנא לפני רב נחמן: המתפלל מרחיק ארבע אמות ומשתין, והמשתין מרחיק ארבע אמות ומתפלל.

A tanna taught a baraita before Rav Naḥman: One who prayed should distance himself four cubits from where he was standing, and only then may he urinate. And one who urinated should distance himself four cubits, and only then may he pray.

אמר לו רב נחמן: בשלמא ׳המשתין מרחיק ארבע אמות ומתפלל׳ — שנינו: כמה ירחיק מהם ומן הצואה? ארבע אמות.

Rav Naḥman said to him: Granted, the second clause of the baraita, that one who urinated should distance himself four cubits and only then may he pray, makes sense, as we already learned in a mishna (Berakhot 22b): How far must one distance oneself from urine and excrement? Four cubits.

אלא ׳המתפלל מרחיק ארבע אמות ומשתין׳ — למה לי? אם כן קידשת את כל שבילי נהרדעא (שהרי התפללו בכולם)! תני (תקן): ׳ישהה׳ (כדי הילוך ארבע אמות).

But the first clause of the baraita, that one who prayed should distance himself four cubits from where he was standing and only then may he urinate, why should I require this? How could there be such a halakha? If that is so, you have sanctified all the streets of the city of Neharde’a, for people have certainly prayed on every one of its streets. According to this halakha, it should be prohibited to urinate everywhere. The Gemara answers: Emend and teach the baraita as saying not that one should distance himself four cubits, but that one should wait the time it takes to walk four cubits.

בשלמא המשתין ישהה כדי הילוך ארבע אמות — משום ניצוצות; אלא המתפלל ישהה כדי הילוך ארבע אמות — למה לי? אמר רב אשי: שכל (זמן הילוך) ארבע אמות תפילתו עדיין סדורה בפיו ושפתיו מרחשות.

The Gemara addresses the emended version of the baraita: Granted, its second clause, that one who urinated waits the time it takes to walk four cubits and only then may he pray, makes sense. This is due to the droplets of urine that may still be issuing from him; he should wait until they cease entirely. However, with regard to the first clause, that one who prayed should wait the time it takes to walk four cubits and only then may he urinate, why should I require this? Rav Ashi said: Because for all the time it takes to walk four cubits, his prayer is still arranged in his mouth, and his lips are still articulating them.

סימן (לשמות החכמים שלהלן): זלפ״ן — זכאי, (אלעזר ל)לעזר, פרידא, נחוניא.

§ The Gemara cites a series of Sages who explained the reasons they were blessed with longevity and provides a mnemonic device, indicating the order in which the Sages are cited: Zayin, lamed, peh, nun. Zayin for Rabbi Zakkai; lamed for Rabbi Elazar; peh for Rabbi Perida; nun for Rabbi Neḥunya.

שאלו תלמידיו את רבי זכאי: במה הארכת ימים? אמר להם: מימי לא השתנתי מים בתוך ארבע אמות של תפילה, ולא כיניתי שם (גנאי) לחברי, ולא ביטלתי קידוש היום — אמא זקנה הייתה לי, פעם מכרה כיפה שבראשה והביאה לי (יין ל)קידוש היום.

The Gemara presents the first incident: Rabbi Zakkai was once asked by his disciples: In the merit of which virtue were you blessed with longevity? He said to them: In all my days, I never urinated within four cubits of a place that had been used for prayer. Nor did I ever call my fellow by a nickname. And I never neglected the mitzva of sanctifying the day of Shabbat over wine. I was meticulous about this mitzva to the extent that I had an elderly mother, and once, when I did not have wine, she sold the kerchief that was on her head, and from the proceeds she brought me wine upon which to do the mitzva of sanctifying the day.

תנא: כשמתה (אמו) הניחה לו שלוש מאות גרבי יין; כשמת הוא, הניח לבניו שלושת אלפים גרבי יין (שכר על דקדוקם בקידוש).

It was taught concerning Rabbi Zakkai: When his mother died, she left him three hundred barrels of wine. When he died, he left his sons three thousand barrels of wine. Since they were so meticulous in the mitzva of sanctifying the day of Shabbat with wine, God rewarded them with wealth and an abundance of wine.

רב הונא היה חגור בחבל קש ועומד לפני רב. אמר לו: מה זה? אמר לו: לא היה לי (יין ל)קידוש, ומשכנתי את חגורתי וקניתי בה יין לקידוש. אמר לו רב: יהי רצון שתתעטף בשיראין (משי).

In a related incident, it once happened that Rav Huna was girded with a piece of straw [rita] and was standing before Rav. Rav said to him: What is this? Why are you dressed in this way? He said to him: I had no wine for sanctifying the day of Shabbat, so I pawned my belt [hemyanai], and with the proceeds I brought wine for sanctifying the day. Rav said to him: May it be God’s will that you be enveloped in silk [shira’ei] in reward for such dedication.

כשנישא רבה בנו — רב הונא איש נמוך היה ושכב על המיטה; באו בנותיו וכלותיו, פשטו והשליכו בגדיהן עליו עד שנתעטף בשיראין. שמע רב וכעס: מדוע לא אמרת לי כשבירכתיך ׳וכן למר׳ (שאף אני אזכה)?

When Rabba, his son, was married, Rav Huna, who was a short man, was lying on his bed, and owing to his diminutive size he went unnoticed. His daughters and daughters-in-law came into the room and removed and threw their silk garments upon him until he was entirely enveloped in silk. With this, Rav’s blessing was fulfilled to the letter. When Rav heard about this, he became angry with Rav Huna, and said: What is the reason that when I blessed you, you did not respond in kind and say to me: And likewise to the Master? Had you done so, I would have also benefitted from the blessing.

שאלו תלמידיו את רבי אלעזר בן שמוע: במה הארכת ימים? אמר להם: מימי לא עשיתי קפנדריא (קיצור דרך) בבית הכנסת, ולא פסעתי על ראשי עם קדוש, ולא נשאתי כפי (לברכת כהנים) בלא ברכה.

The Gemara discusses the second occasion where a Sage explained his longevity: Rabbi Elazar ben Shammua was once asked by his disciples: In the merit of which virtue were you blessed with longevity? He said to them: In all my days, I never made a shortcut through a synagogue. Nor did I ever stride over the heads of the sacred people, i.e., I never stepped over people sitting in the study hall in order to reach my place, so as not to appear scornful of them. And I never raised my hands in the Priestly Benediction without reciting a blessing beforehand.

שאלו תלמידיו את רבי פרידא: במה הארכת ימים? אמר להם: מימי לא קדמני אדם לבית המדרש (תמיד הייתי ראשון),

On the third occasion, Rabbi Perida was once asked by his disciples: In the merit of which virtue were you blessed with longevity? He said to them: In all my days, no person ever arrived before me to the study hall, as I was always the first to arrive.

ולא בירכתי (ברכת המזון) לפני כהן (אלא נתתי לו לברך), ולא אכלתי מבהמה שלא הורמו מתנותיה (זרוע, לחיים וקיבה).

And I never recited Grace after Meals in the presence of a priest, but rather I gave him the privilege to lead. And I never ate from an animal whose priestly portions, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, had not already been set aside.

שהרי אמר רבי יצחק אמר רבי יוחנן: אסור לאכול מבהמה שלא הורמו מתנותיה; ואמר רבי יצחק: כל האוכל מבהמה שלא הורמו מתנותיה — כאילו אוכל טבלים. ואין הלכה כמותו (אך רבי פרידא החמיר).

Another example of Rabbi Perida’s meticulous behavior is based on that which Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is prohibited to eat meat from an animal whose priestly portions have not been set aside. And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Anyone who eats meat from an animal whose priestly portions have not been set aside is regarded as if he were eating untithed produce. The Gemara comments: And the halakha is not in accordance with his opinion. Rather, it is permitted to eat meat from such an animal. Nevertheless, Rabbi Perida acted stringently and did not eat from it.

(מבארים בבא נוספת:) ׳ולא בירכתי לפני כהן׳ — נתתי לכהן לברך ברכת המזון.

The Gemara considers another of Rabbi Perida’s actions: He said: And I never blessed Grace after Meals in the presence of a priest, but rather I gave him the privilege to lead.

וכי מעלה היא? והאמר רבי יוחנן: כל תלמיד חכם שמברך לפניו (מניח לאחר לברך), אפילו כהן גדול עם הארץ — אותו תלמיד חכם חייב מיתה, שנאמר ׳כל משנאי אהבו מות׳, אל תקרי ׳משנאי׳ אלא ׳משניאי׳ (המשניאים את ה׳).

Is this to say that doing so is especially virtuous? But hasn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Any Torah scholar who allows someone else to bless Grace after Meals in his presence, i.e., to lead for him, even if that person is a High Priest who is an ignoramus, then that Torah scholar is liable to receive the death penalty for belittling his own honor? This is as it is stated: “All those who hate me, love death” (Proverbs 8:36). Do not read it as “those who hate Me [mesan’ai],” rather read it as though it said: Those who make Me hated [masni’ai]. The honor due to a Torah scholar is representative of the honor of God in the world. Therefore, by belittling his own honor, he causes others to fail to respect God, which can ultimately develop into hate. If so, why did Rabbi Perida consider his behavior to be so deserving of praise?

מתרצים: כשאמר רבי פרידא (שכיבד את הכהן) — בשווים, כשהכהן היה אף הוא תלמיד חכם.

The Gemara answers: When Rabbi Perida says this, he was speaking of people of equal stature. He was particular to honor the priesthood only when the priest was also a Torah scholar.

שאלו תלמידיו את רבי נחוניא בן הקנה: במה הארכת ימים? אמר להם: מימי לא נתכבדתי בקלון חברי, ולא עלתה על מיטתי קללת חברי, וותרן בממוני הייתי.

The Gemara discusses the fourth Sage who was blessed with longevity: Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana was once asked by his disciples: In the merit of which virtue were you blessed with longevity? He said to them: In all my days, I never attained veneration at the expense of my fellow’s degradation. Nor did my fellow’s curse ever go up with me upon my bed. If ever I offended someone, I made sure to appease him that day. Therefore, when I went to bed I knew that no one had any grievances against me. And I was always openhanded with my money.

׳לא נתכבדתי בקלון חברי׳ — כגון רב הונא שנשא מעדר על כתפו; בא רב חנא בר חנילאי ונטלוֹ ממנו לשאתו. אמר לו: אם רגיל אתה לשאת בעירך — שָׂא; ואם לא — להתכבד בקלונך אינו נוח לי.

The Gemara clarifies the meaning of his statement: Rabbi Neḥunya said: I never attained veneration at the expense of my fellow’s denigration. This is referring to conduct such as that of Rav Huna, who was carrying a hoe over his shoulder as he returned from his work. Rav Ḥana bar Ḥanilai came and, out of respect for his teacher, took the hoe from him to carry it for him. Rav Huna said to him: If you are accustomed to carry such objects in your own city, you may carry it; but if not, then for me to be venerated through your denigration is not pleasing for me.

׳ולא עלתה על מיטתי קללת חברי׳ — כגון מר זוטרא, שכשהיה עולה למיטתו אמר: מחול לכל מי שציערני.

Rabbi Neḥunya also said: Nor did I ever allow the resentment caused by my fellow’s curse to go up with me upon my bed. This is referring to conduct such as that of Mar Zutra. When he would go to bed at night, he would first say: I forgive anyone who has vexed me.

׳וותרן בממוני הייתי׳ — כמו שאמר מר: איוב וותרן בממונו היה, שהיה מניח פרוטה לחנווני מממונו (ולא דקדק בעודף).

Lastly, Rabbi Neḥunya said: And I was always openhanded with my money. This is referring to conduct such as that which the Master said: Job was openhanded with his money, as he would always leave at least a peruta of his money with the shopkeeper. He never demanded the change from his transactions.

שאל רבי עקיבא את רבי נחוניא הגדול: במה הארכת ימים? באו משרתיו והכוהו (שראו זאת כחוסר כבוד). ברח רבי עקיבא וישב בראש דקל. אמר לו: רבי, אם נאמר ׳כבש׳ למה נאמר ׳אחד׳? אמר נחוניא למשרתיו: תלמיד חכם הוא, הניחוהו.

On a similar occasion, Rabbi Akiva asked Rabbi Neḥunya the Great; he said to him: In the merit of which virtue were you blessed with longevity? Rabbi Neḥunya’s attendants [gavzei] came and started beating Rabbi Akiva, for they felt that he was acting disrespectfully by highlighting Rabbi Neḥunya’s old age. Rabbi Akiva ran away from them, and he climbed up and sat upon the top of a date palm. From there, he said to Rabbi Neḥunya: My teacher, I have a question about the verse concerning the daily offering that states “one lamb” (Numbers 28:4). If it is stated “lamb” in the singular, why is it also stated “one”; isn’t this superfluous? Upon hearing Rabbi Akiva’s scholarly question, Rabbi Neḥunya said to his attendants: He is clearly a young Torah scholar, let him be.

אמר לו (תשובה לשאלת ׳אחד׳): ׳אחד׳ — המיוחד והמשובח שבעדרו.

Rabbi Neḥunya then addressed Rabbi Akiva’s questions. With regard to the second question, he said to him: The word “one” teaches that the lamb should be the unique one of its flock, i.e., only the best quality lamb should be used.

אמר לו (ולעצם השאלה): מימי לא קיבלתי מתנות, ולא עמדתי על מידותי (לא דקדקתי לנקום), וותרן בממוני הייתי.

With regard to the original question, Rabbi Neḥunya said to him: In all my days I never accepted gifts. Nor was I ever inflexible by exacting a measure of retribution against those who wronged me. And I was always openhanded with my money.

׳לא קיבלתי מתנות׳ — כרבי אלעזר, שכששלחו לו מתנות מבית הנשיא לא נטל, וכשהזמינוהו לא הלך, ואמר: לא ניחא לכם שאחיה? ׳שונא מתנות יחיה׳. ורבי זירא — כששלחו לו לא נטל, אך כשהזמינוהו הלך, ואמר: הם מתכבדים בי (ואין זו מתנה).

The Gemara explains: I never accepted gifts; this is referring to conduct such as that of Rabbi Elazar. When they would send him gifts from the house of the Nasi, he would not take them, and when they would invite him, he would not go there, as he considered hospitality to be a type of gift. He would say to them: Is it not pleasing to you that I should live, as it is written: “He that hates gifts shall live” (Proverbs 15:27)? In contrast, it was reported about Rabbi Zeira that when they would send him gifts from the house of the Nasi, he would not accept them, but when they would invite him, he would go there. He said: They are honored by my presence; therefore my visiting is not considered like I am taking a gift from them.

׳ולא עמדתי על מידותי׳ — כדאמר רבא: כל המעביר על מידותיו (מוחל) — מעבירים ממנו כל פשעיו, שנאמר ׳נושא עוון ועובר על פשע׳; למי נושא עוון — למי שעובר (מוחל) על פשע.

He also said: Nor was I ever inflexible in exacting a measure of retribution against those who wronged me. This is referring to conduct such as that which Rava said: Anyone who overlooks exacting a measure of retribution against those who wronged him, all his transgressions are removed from him, as it is stated: “He pardons iniquity and overlooks transgression” (Micah 7:18), which is homiletically read as saying: For whom does He pardon iniquity? For he who overlooks transgressions that others have committed against him.

שאל רבי (יהודה הנשיא) את רבי יהושע בן קרחה: במה הארכת ימים? אמר לו: קצת בחיי? אמר לו: רבי, תורה היא וללמוד אני צריך. אמר לו: מימי לא נסתכלתי בדמות אדם רשע, שאמר רבי יוחנן: אסור להסתכל בצלם דמות אדם רשע, שנאמר ׳לולא פני יהושפט … אם אביט אליך ואם אראך׳.

In a similar incident, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi once asked Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa: In the merit of which virtue were you blessed with longevity? He said to him: Why do you ask me, are you wearied of my long life? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: My teacher, it is Torah and so I must learn it. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said to him: In all my days I never gazed at the likeness of a wicked man, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is prohibited for a person to gaze in the image of the likeness of a wicked man, as it is stated that the prophet Elisha said to Jehoram king of Israel: “Were it not that I regard the presence of Jehoshaphat, the king of Judea, I would not look toward you, nor see you” (II Kings 3:14).

רבי אלעזר אמר: המסתכל ברשע — עיניו כהות, שנאמר ׳ויהי כי זקן יצחק ותכהין עיניו מראות׳, משום שהסתכל בעשו הרשע.

Rabbi Elazar said: One who gazes at the likeness of an evil man, his eyes become dim, as it is stated: “And it came to pass, that when Isaac was old, and his eyes were dim so that he could not see” (Genesis 27:1). This happened because he gazed at the wicked Esau.

מקשים: וכי הסתכלות בעשו גרמה לו? והאמר רבי יצחק: לעולם אל תהי קללת הדיוט קלה בעיניך, שהרי אבימלך קילל את שרה ׳הנה הוא לך כסות עיניים׳, ונתקיים בזרעה (יצחק) — אל תקרי ׳כסות׳ אלא ׳כסיית עיניים׳!

The Gemara asks: Did this cause Isaac’s blindness? Didn’t Rabbi Yitzḥak say: A curse of an ordinary person should not be lightly regarded in your eyes, because Abimelech cursed Sarah, and although he was not a righteous man, his curse was nevertheless fulfilled, albeit in her descendant. As it is stated that Abimelech said to Sarah with regard to the gift that he gave to Abraham: “Behold, it is for you a covering of the eyes” (Genesis 20:16). Do not read it as “a covering [kesut] of the eyes,” but rather read it as: A blindness [kesiat] of the eyes. Abimelech’s words were a veiled curse for Sarah to suffer from blindness. While she herself did not suffer, the curse was apparently fulfilled in the blindness of her son, Isaac.

מתרצים: הא והא גרמו לו (גם הקללה וגם ההסתכלות). רבא אמר: מהכא (לומדים את האיסור) — ׳שאת פני רשע לא טוב׳.

According to Rabbi Yitzḥak, Abimelech’s curse was the cause of Isaac’s blindness, and it was not, as Rabbi Elazar suggested, the fact he gazed at Esau. The Gemara explains: Both this and that jointly caused it. Rava said: The prohibition against gazing at the likeness of a wicked person is derived from here: “It is not good to raise the face of the wicked” (Proverbs 18:5).

בשעת פטירתו אמר לו רבי (יהודה הנשיא): רבי, ברכני! אמר לו: יהי רצון שתגיע לחצי ימי. ולכולם לא? אמר לו: הבאים אחריך (בניך) — בהמה ירעו?! (אם תאריך ימים כמותי לא יזכו לרשת מקומך).

At the time of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa’s departure from this world, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: My teacher, bless me. He said to him: May it be God’s will that you live to reach to half of my days. When Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi heard this, he asked in astonishment: Are you saying that to the entirety of your days I should not reach? Why? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said to him: Shall those who come after you just tend cattle? If you live as long as me, your sons will never be able to succeed you in the position of Nasi. As such, they will never achieve greatness in Torah, and it will be as if they just tended cattle throughout their lives. It is therefore better that your life not be so prolonged, so that they have the opportunity to rise to eminence.

אבוה בר איהי ומניָמין בר איהי: אחד אמר — תיתי לי (יבוא לי שכר) שלא הסתכלתי בגוי (רשע); והאחד אמר — תיתי לי שלא עשיתי שותפות עם גוי (רשע).

Avuh bar Ihi and Minyamin bar Ihi both spoke on this topic: One of them said: May a blessing come to me for I never gazed at a wicked gentile. And the other one said: May a blessing come to me for I never formed a partnership with a wicked gentile, so as not to have any association with a wicked person.

שאלו תלמידיו את רבי זירא: במה הארכת ימים? אמר להם: מימי לא הקפדתי בתוך ביתי, ולא צעדתי לפני מי שגדול ממני, ולא הרהרתי (בדברי תורה) במבואות המטונפות, ולא הלכתי ארבע אמות בלא תורה ובלא תפילין, ולא ישנתי בבית המדרש לא שינת קבע ולא שינת עראי, ולא ששתי בתקלת חברי, ולא קראתי לחברי בכינוי גנאי.

The Gemara presents a similar incident: Rabbi Zeira was once asked by his disciples: In the merit of which virtue were you blessed with longevity? He said to them: In all my days, I was never angry inside my house with members of my household who acted against my wishes. Nor did I ever walk ahead of someone who was a greater Torah scholar than me. Nor did I ever meditate upon words of Torah in filthy alleyways, as doing so is a disgrace to the Torah. Nor did I ever walk four cubits without meditating on words of Torah or without wearing phylacteries. Nor did I ever sleep in a study hall, neither a deep sleep or a brief nap. Nor did I ever rejoice when my fellow stumbled. Nor did I ever call my fellow by his derogatory nickname [ḥanikhato]. And some say that he said: I never called my fellow by his nickname [ḥakhinato], i.e., even one that is not derogatory.