מפת הסוגיא — חולין ע״חSugya map — Chullin 78

סיום פרק ׳בהמה המקשה׳ ופתיחת פרק חמישי. משנה: איסור ׳אותו ואת בנו׳ (שלא לשחוט בהמה ובנה ביום אחד) נוהג בכל מקום — בארץ ובחוצה לארץ, בזמן הבית ושלא בזמן הבית, ובין בחולין ובין בקדשים.

(הדרן — chapter division; no Davidson translation) MISHNA: The prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring applies both in Eretz Yisrael and outside of Eretz Yisrael, both in the presence, i.e., the time, of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, and it applies with regard to non-sacred animals and with regard to sacrificial animals.

כיצד? השוחט בהמה ובנה — שניהם חולין, מחוץ לעזרה — שתיהן כשרות לאכילה, אך על שחיטת השנייה לוקה ארבעים (משום ׳לא תשחטו ביום אחד׳).

How so? In the case of one who slaughters an animal itself and its offspring, both of which are non-sacred, and slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard, both of the animals are fit for consumption, but for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs [sofeg] the forty lashes for violating the prohibition: “You shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day” (Leviticus 22:28).

שניהם קדשים, ושחטם בחוץ — על הראשון חייב כרת (שחוטי חוץ); שתיהן פסולות לקרבן; ועל שתיהן לוקה ארבעים — הראשונה משום שחוטי חוץ, והשנייה משום ׳אותו ואת בנו׳.

If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, then for slaughtering the first animal, one is liable to receive excision from the World-to-Come [karet]. For slaughtering the second animal one is not liable to receive karet. The second animal was not fit for sacrifice, since one may not slaughter an animal and its offspring on the same day. And both animals are disqualified for use as offerings, and for the slaughter of both of them, one incurs forty lashes apiece: The first being a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard and the second being the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day.

שניהם חולין ושחטם בעזרה — שתיהן פסולות (חולין בעזרה), ועל השנייה לוקה. שניהם קדשים בעזרה — הראשון כשר ופטור, ועל השני לוקה והוא פסול (שאסור היה לשוחטו ביום זה).

If both animals were non-sacred and slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, both of them are unfit to be sacrificed, being non-sacred animals slaughtered in the courtyard. And for slaughter of the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day. If both animals were sacrificial animals slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice, and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. But for slaughter of the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and it is unfit for sacrifice, because one was not allowed to slaughter it on that day.

הראשון חולין והשני קדשים, ושחטם בחוץ — הראשון כשר לאכילה ופטור, ועל השני (קדשים) לוקה משום ׳אותו ואת בנו׳, והוא פסול לקרבן.

If the first animal was non-sacred and the second a sacrificial animal, and both were slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for consumption and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. But for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice.

הראשון קדשים והשני חולין, ושחטם בחוץ — על הראשון חייב כרת (שחוטי חוץ) והוא פסול; השני כשר לאכילה; ועל שתיהן לוקה — הראשון משום שחוטי חוץ, והשני משום ׳אותו ואת בנו׳.

If the first animal was a sacrificial animal and the second was non-sacred and both were slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard, for the first animal, one is liable to receive karet for slaughtering a sacrificial animal outside the courtyard, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice. And the second is fit for consumption; and for the slaughter of both of them one incurs forty lashes apiece: The first being a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard and the second being the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day.

הראשון חולין והשני קדשים בעזרה — שניהם פסולים, ועל השני לוקה. הראשון קדשים והשני חולין בעזרה — הראשון כשר ופטור, ועל השני לוקה והוא פסול (שהוא חולין).

If the first animal was non-sacred and the second was a sacrificial animal and both were slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, both of them are unfit for sacrifice. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes. If the first animal was a sacrificial animal and the second was non-sacred and both were slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice, as it is non-sacred.

שניהם חולין, ושחט הראשון בחוץ והשני בעזרה — הראשון כשר לאכילה ופטור; ועל השני לוקה משום ׳אותו ואת בנו׳, והוא פסול (חולין בעזרה).

If both animals were non-sacred, and one slaughters them, the first outside the Temple courtyard and the second inside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for consumption and one who slaughters it is exempt from any punishment. And for slaughtering the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on a single day, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice as it is non-sacred.

שניהם קדשים, ושחט הראשון בחוץ והשני בעזרה — על הראשון חייב כרת; ועל שתיהן לוקה — הראשון משום שחוטי חוץ, והשני משום ׳אותו ואת בנו׳; ושתיהן פסולות.

If both animals were sacrificial animals, and one slaughters them, the first outside the Temple courtyard and the second inside the Temple courtyard, for slaughtering the first animal one is liable to receive karet, and for slaughtering both of them one incurs forty lashes apiece. One set of lashes is given because the first was a sacrificial animal slaughtered outside the courtyard, and the second set of lashes is given because the second animal is the offspring of an animal slaughtered that day. And both of them are unfit for sacrifice.

שניהם חולין, ושחט הראשון בעזרה והשני בחוץ — הראשון פסול (חולין בעזרה) ופטור; ועל השני לוקה והוא כשר לאכילה. שניהם קדשים, הראשון בעזרה והשני בחוץ — הראשון כשר ופטור; ועל השני לוקה והוא פסול (שלא הגיע זמנו).

If both animals were non-sacred, and one slaughters them, the first inside the Temple courtyard and the second outside the Temple courtyard, the first is unfit for sacrifice, as it is non-sacred, and the one who slaughters it is exempt. And for the second, one incurs the forty lashes and the animal is fit for consumption. If both animals were sacrificial animals, and one slaughters them, the first inside the Temple courtyard and the second outside the Temple courtyard, the first is fit for sacrifice and one who slaughters it is exempt. And for the second animal, one incurs the forty lashes, and the animal is unfit for sacrifice because its requisite time has not yet arrived.

גמרא: שנו חכמים — מניין שאיסור ׳אותו ואת בנו׳ נוהג גם בקרבנות? נלמד מסמיכות הכתובים: ״שור או כשב או עז כי יולד״ (פרשת קרבנות), ואחריו ״ושור או שה אותו ואת בנו לא תשחטו ביום אחד״ — סמיכות זו מלמדת שהאיסור נוהג אף במוקדשין.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring in a single day applies to sacrificial animals? It is derived from a verse, as the verse states: “When a bull, or a sheep, or a goat, is born…but from the eighth day and forward it may be accepted for an offering…to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:27), and it is written in the following verse: “And whether it be a bull or a sheep, you shall not slaughter it and its offspring both in one day.” The juxtaposition of the verses teaches with regard to the prohibition against slaughtering an animal itself and its offspring that it applies to sacrificial animals as well.

קושיא: ואמור להפך — נוהג רק במוקדשין ולא בחולין? תירוץ: חזרת ״ושור או שה״ (לאחר שכבר נזכרו בכתוב הקודם) הפסיקה את עניין הקרבנות — סימן שהכתוב השני אינו עוסק דווקא בקדשים.

The Gemara challenges: But since this prohibition is taught in the context of other halakhot of consecrated animals, perhaps I will say: Yes, it applies to sacrificial animals, but it does not apply to non-sacred animals. The Gemara explains: The repetitive phrase “and whether it be a bull or a sheep” in the second verse, when those types of animals, i.e., bulls and sheep, were already mentioned in the first verse, interrupted the topic, clarifying that the second verse is not referring to sacrificial animals.

קושיא הפוכה: ואמור — נוהג רק בחולין ולא במוקדשין? תירוץ: נאמר ״וְשור״ בוי״ו, והוי״ו מוסיפה את האיסור שבכתוב השני על העניין הראשון (הקרבנות) — ולכן נוהג אף במוקדשין.

The Gemara challenges: But if so, I will say: Yes, the prohibition applies to non-sacred animals, but it does not apply to sacrificial animals. The Gemara explains: Since in that verse it is written: “And whether it be a bull…you shall not slaughter it and its offspring,” the conjunction “and” adds the prohibition stated in the second verse to the first matter, including sacrificial animals as well.

קושיא: אם למדים מן הקרבנות — כשם שבקרבנות כלאים (ולד עז וכבש) פסול, כך גם ב׳אותו ואת בנו׳ ולד כלאים לא יהיה אסור? והרי שנינו: ׳אותו ואת בנו׳ נוהג בכלאים ובכוי (בעל סימני חיה ובהמה)!

The Gemara challenges: If this prohibition also applies to sacrificial animals, perhaps just as with regard to sacrificial animals, the offspring of diverse kinds is not included, e.g., the offspring of a ewe and a goat is unfit to be an offering, so too with regard to the prohibition of: A mother and its offspring, the offspring of diverse kinds should not be included, so that in the case of the offspring of a ewe and a goat, it would be permitted to slaughter the mother and offspring on the same day. Why, then, is it taught in a baraita (see Tosefta 5:1): The prohibition of: A mother and its offspring, applies to the offspring of diverse kinds and to a koy, a kosher animal with characteristics of both domesticated and undomesticated animals?

ועוד קושיא: מדוע בכלל יהיה כלאים אסור — והרי ״שה״ כתוב בכתוב זה (״ושור או שה״), ואמר רבא:

And additionally, why should the prohibition of: A mother and its offspring, apply to the offspring of diverse kinds? “A sheep,” is written in the verse with regard to that prohibition, and Rava said

תירוץ רבא: זה בנה אב — כל מקום שנאמר ״שה״ בתורה בא להוציא כלאים (שאינו לא כבש ולא עז). אם כן ׳שה׳ היה צריך להוציא כלאים מ׳אותו ואת בנו׳; אלא שאמר הכתוב ״או״ לרבות את הכלאים — ולכן נוהג בו האיסור.

concerning the verse: “These are the animals that you may eat: An ox, a seh of sheep, and a seh of goats” (Deuteronomy 14:4), that this verse establishes a paradigm for other cases: Wherever the word seh is stated in the Torah, it serves only to exclude an animal of diverse kinds. The Hebrew word seh denotes either a sheep or a goat. The offspring of diverse kinds, which is neither a sheep nor a goat, does not qualify as a seh. The Gemara answers that with regard to a mother and its offspring, the verse states: “Whether it be a bull or a sheep” (Leviticus 22:28), and the “or” is superfluous there and serves to include the offspring of diverse kinds.

קושיא: ה״או״ דרוש לחלק את האיסורים — שלא תאמר אינו חייב עד שישחט גם שור ובנו וגם שה ובנו; ה״או״ מלמד שחייב על כל מין בפני עצמו. תירוץ: לחלק נלמד מ״בנו״ (ולא ׳בניהם׳), וה״או״ פנוי לרבות כלאים.

The Gemara challenges: This word “or” is necessary to separate the prohibitions, as it might enter your mind to say: One is not liable unless he slaughters both a bull and its offspring and a sheep and its offspring in a single day. Therefore, the word “or” teaches us that one is liable for slaughtering either type of animal with its offspring. The Gemara responds: Separating the prohibitions is derived from the use of the words “its offspring” instead of their offspring.

קושיא: ועדיין ה״או״ דרוש לברייתא — אילו נאמר ״שור ושה ובנו״ הייתי אומר שאינו חייב עד שישחט שור ושה ובנו יחד; ת״ל ״שור או שה אותו ואת בנו״. וכי לא מ״או״ נלמד? תירוץ: לא, מ״אותו״ נלמד — וה״או״ פנוי לרבות כלאים.

The Gemara challenges: But the word “or” is still necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: If it were stated: A bull, and a sheep, and its offspring you shall not slaughter in one day, I would say: One is not liable unless he slaughters a bull, and a sheep, and the offspring of one of them in a single day. Therefore, the verse states: “A bull or a sheep…it and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28), to teach that one is liable even for slaughtering either of them and its offspring. What, is it not from the word “or” that the baraita derives this halakha? The Gemara responds: No, it is derived from the word “it,” and the offspring of diverse kinds are included in the prohibition due to the word “or.”

קושיא: ניחא לרבנן ש״אותו״ מיותר אצלם (ומשמש לחלק), אבל לחנניה ש״אותו״ אינו מיותר — מניין לו לחלק? תירוץ: לחלק אינו צריך כתוב, שחנניה סובר כר׳ יונתן (שאף בלי ייתור מחלקים).

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, cited further in the discussion, for whom the word “it” is superfluous and can be used for this derivation, leaving the word “or” available to include the offspring of diverse kinds; but according to the opinion of Ḥananya, for whom the word “it” is not superfluous, from where does he derive that one is to separate into two prohibitions slaughtering either a bull with its offspring or a sheep with its offspring? The Gemara answers that there is no need for a verse to separate them into two prohibitions, as Ḥananya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan.

ראיה למחלוקת: שנינו — ״איש אשר יקלל את אביו ואת אמו״, אין לי אלא שקילל שניהם; קילל אביו לבד או אמו לבד מניין? ת״ל ״אביו ואמו קלל״ — אביו קלל, אמו קלל. דברי ר׳ יאשיה: ׳וו החיבור׳ נדרשת בדווקא, שאין חייב על אחד אלא בכתוב מיוחד.

As it is taught in a baraita: From the verse: “A man who curses his father and his mother shall die” (Leviticus 20:9), I have derived only that one is liable if he curses both his father and his mother. From where do I derive that if one curses his father but not his mother, or his mother but not his father, he is liable? The continuation of the verse states: “His father and his mother he has cursed, his blood is upon him.” In the first part of the verse, the word “curses” is in proximity to “his father,” and in the last part of the verse, “cursed” is in proximity to “his mother.” This teaches that the verse is referring to both a case where he cursed only his father and a case where he cursed only his mother; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yoshiya maintains that conjunctions are interpreted strictly unless the verse indicates otherwise.

ר׳ יונתן חולק: ׳וו החיבור׳ משמעה גם שניהם יחד וגם כל אחד בפני עצמו, ואין צורך בכתוב מיוחד לחיוב על אחד — אלא אם כן פירש הכתוב ״יחדו״ (כגון ׳לא תחרוש בשור ובחמור יחדו׳). לפיכך ה״או״ מיותר לחנניה ומשמש לרבות כלאים.

Rabbi Yonatan says: There is no need for this derivation, because the phrase “his father and his mother” indicates that one is liable if he curses both of them together, and it also indicates that he is liable if he curses either one of them on their own, unless the verse specifies that one is liable only if he curses both together. An example of a verse where the Torah specifies that the halakha applies only to the two elements in conjunction is: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together” (Deuteronomy 22:10). According to Rabbi Yonatan, had the verse stated with regard to a mother and its offspring: A bull and a sheep, and not: A bull or a sheep, one would still be liable for slaughtering each with its own offspring independently. Therefore, the word “or” is superfluous, and is utilized by Ḥananya, who agrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, to include the offspring of diverse kinds in this prohibition.

הגמרא מבררת: מהי דעת חנניה ומהי דעת רבנן שהוזכרו? שנינו — ׳אותו ואת בנו׳ נוהג בנקבות (אם ובתה) ואינו נוהג בזכרים (אב ובנו). חנניה אומר: נוהג בין בזכרים בין בנקבות.

The Gemara asks: What is the opinion of Ḥananya, and what is the opinion of the Rabbis that were mentioned earlier? Their opinions are elucidated as it is taught in a baraita: Despite the fact that the verse is written in the masculine form, the prohibition against slaughtering itself and its offspring in a single day applies to females, i.e., to a mother and its offspring, but it does not apply to males, i.e., a male animal and its offspring. Ḥananya says: It applies both to males and to females.

טעם רבנן: שנינו — יכול יהא נוהג אף בזכרים? דין הוא: התורה חייבה כאן (אותו ואת בנו) וחייבה ב׳אם על הבנים׳ (שילוח הקן); מה ׳אם על הבנים׳ נוהג בנקבות ולא בזכרים (״והאם רובצת״), אף כאן בנקבות ולא בזכרים.

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the Rabbis, i.e., the first tanna? Their reasoning is as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that the prohibition against slaughtering a mother and its offspring would apply both to males and to females. But could one not derive this by logical inference, reaching the opposite conclusion: The Torah rendered one obligated here not to slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day, and the Torah rendered one obligated with regard to a mother bird with its chicks not to seize them together, but to dispatch the mother. Just as when it rendered one obligated with regard to a mother bird with its chicks, the obligation applies to female birds but not to males, as the verse states: “And the mother sitting on the chicks” (Deuteronomy 22:6), so too, when it rendered one obligated here, with regard to an animal and its offspring, the obligation should apply to female animals, but not to males.

דחיית ההיקש: לא! מה ל׳אם על הבנים׳ שהקל בו — אינו נוהג במזומן (קן שבביתו) כבאינו מזומן; תאמר ב׳אותו ואת בנו׳ שהחמיר בו ונוהג אף במזומן? משכך אין ללמוד שאינו נוהג בזכרים.

One may respond: No, if you say that this is so with regard to a mother bird with its chicks, for which the Torah did not render prepared ones equivalent to unprepared ones, as the obligation to dispatch the mother bird applies only where one happens to encounter a mother bird with its chicks spontaneously, but not to ones that he keeps in his property, shall you also say that this is so with regard to the prohibition of an animal itself and its offspring, for which the Torah rendered prepared ones equivalent to unprepared ones, prohibiting an animal and its offspring even if they are prepared? If so, the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring should apply to both males and females.

ת״ל ״אותו״ — אחד ולא שניים (חייב על אחד מן ההורים בלבד). לאחר שחילק הכתוב (שאין מצרפים אב ואם), חזר וזכה ההיקש: מה ׳אם על הבנים׳ בנקבות ולא בזכרים, אף ׳אותו ואת בנו׳ בנקבות ולא בזכרים — שכן עתה אין הפירכא של מזומן שייכת.

Therefore, the verse states: “A bull or a sheep, it and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28). The superfluous word “it” indicates that this applies to only one parent, but not to two. The baraita continues: After the verse separated the parents, rendering the prohibition applicable to only one of them, I merited returning to the logical inference mentioned earlier: The Torah rendered one obligated here not to slaughter an animal and its offspring in a single day, and the Torah rendered one obligated to dispatch the mother with regard to a mother bird with its chicks. Just as when it rendered one obligated with regard to a mother bird with its chicks, the obligation applies to females but not to males, so too, when it rendered one obligated here, the obligation applies to females but not to males.

ואם תרצה לפרוך — יש כתוב נוסף: ״בנו״ — מי שבנו כרוך אחריו (האם, שהוולד נמשך אחריה), יצא הזכר שאין בנו כרוך אחריו. ולכן נוהג בנקבות בלבד.

And if it is your wish to say that one can refute this, that refutation can be countered by the following derivation: The verse states: “It and its offspring” (Leviticus 22:28), indicating that this applies to that parent whose offspring clings to it. This serves to exclude the male parent, whose offspring does not cling to it.

למה נצרך ה׳אם נפשך לומר׳? משום שאם תאמר ש״אותו״ משמעו זכר (לשון זכר) — ומכאן שנוהג גם בזכר — לכך אומר הכתוב ״בנו״: מי שבנו כרוך אחריו, יצא זכר שאין בנו כרוך אחריו. לדעת רבנן.

And according to the opinion of Ḥananya, the reason for his ruling is that it is written “it,” which indicates a male, and it is written “its offspring,” teaching that the prohibition applies to that parent whose offspring clings to it, which indicates a female. Therefore, this prohibition applies to both males and females.

ולחנניה: כתוב ״אותו״ המשמע זכר, וכתוב ״בנו״ — מי שבנו כרוך אחריו, המשמע נקבה; הואיל ושני הכתובים קיימים, נוהג האיסור בין בזכרים בין בנקבות.

And according to the opinion of Ḥananya, the reason for his ruling is that it is written “it,” which indicates a male, and it is written “its offspring,” teaching that the prohibition applies to that parent whose offspring clings to it, which indicates a female. Therefore, this prohibition applies to both males and females.

רב הונא בר חייא בשם שמואל: הלכה כחנניה (שנוהג אף בזכרים). ושמואל הולך לשיטתו, שכן שנינו (כלאים): ר׳ יהודה אומר — ולדות הנולדים מסוסה, אף שאבי האחד חמור והשני סוס, מותרים זה בזה (שהאם קובעת); אבל הנולדים מחמורה עם הנולדים מסוסה — אסורים.

Rav Huna bar Ḥiyya says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Ḥananya. And Shmuel follows his line of reasoning, as we learned in a mishna (Kilayim 8:4): Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to two animals that are born from a female horse, even if the father of one is a donkey and the father of the other is a horse, they are permitted to mate with one another. Since the mothers of both are horses, the offspring are all considered of the same species. But to mate animals that are born from a female donkey with animals that are born from a female horse, even if one animal was born from a male horse and a female donkey and the other was born from a male donkey and a female horse, is prohibited, due to the prohibition of diverse kinds.

ועוד אמר רב יהודה בשם שמואל: משנה זו דברי ר׳ יהודה, הסובר שאין חוששין לזרע האב — המין נקבע לפי האם בלבד. אבל חכמים אומרים: כל מיני הפרדות מין אחד הן (שהמין נקבע אף לפי האב), ולכן מותרות זו בזו.

And, commenting on that mishna, Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda, who says: One need not be concerned with its paternity in determining the species of an animal, as the species is determined solely by the mother. But the Rabbis say: The species of an animal is determined according to both its mother and its father. Therefore, all types of mules, regardless of which parent is a horse and which is a donkey, are considered a single species and may mate with each other.

מי הם ׳חכמים׳ כאן? חנניה הוא, הסובר שחוששין לזרע האב — ולכן פרדה זו שמאביה סוס ואמה חמורה, ופרדה זו שמאביה חמור ואמה סוסה, כולן מין אחד הן (שניהם תערובת סוס וחמור), ומותרות זו בזו.

Now, whose opinion is referred to as that of the Rabbis here? It is that of Ḥananya, who says: One needs to be concerned with paternity, as, in his opinion, the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring applies to a male and its offspring as well. And therefore, with regard to the prohibition of diverse kinds as well, this mule that is the offspring of a female horse and a male donkey, and that mule that is the offspring of a female donkey and a male horse are all a single species.

נשאלה שאלה: האם ר׳ יהודה פשוט לו שאין חוששין לזרע האב, או שמא מסופק הוא בדבר? ושואלת הגמרא: מה הנפקא מינה?

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is Rabbi Yehuda certain that one need not be concerned with its paternity in determining the species of the offspring, or perhaps he is uncertain whether or not one need be concerned with its paternity? The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference?

הנפקא מינה: להתיר הרבעת הוולד עם בני מין אמו. אם פשוט לו שאין חוששין לזרע האב — הוולד עם מין האם מותר (שניהם נחשבים סוס). ואם מסופק לו — אסור, שמא חוששין גם לזרע האב.

The Gemara answers: The practical difference is with regard to permitting the mating of the offspring with the species of the mother, e.g., the mating of the offspring of a female horse and a male donkey together with a horse. If you say that Rabbi Yehuda is certain that one need not be concerned with its paternity, then the mating of the offspring with the species of the mother is permitted, as, in this case, they are both considered horses. But if you say that Rabbi Yehuda is uncertain, then the mating of the offspring with the species of the mother is prohibited, as one must be concerned about the species of the father.

תא שמע מן המשנה: ר׳ יהודה — כל הנולדים מסוסה מותרים זה בזה. כיצד? אם אבי שניהם חמור — פשוט שמותרים (שניהם בני סוסה), ולמה נצרך לומר? אלא ודאי שאבי האחד סוס ואבי השני חמור,

What, then, is the answer to the question? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a possible resolution from the mishna cited earlier: Rabbi Yehuda says: All that are born from a female horse, even if the father of one of them is a donkey, are permitted to mate with each other. What are the circumstances here? If we say that the father of this male animal is a donkey, and the father of that female animal, with which the male is to be mated, is a donkey, does it need to be said? Since the mothers of both animals are horses, they are both of exactly the same species and may certainly mate with each other. Rather, is it not that the father of this one is a horse, and the father of that other one is a donkey?

ובכל זאת שנינו שמותרים זה עם זה — משמע שפשוט לר׳ יהודה שאין חוששין לזרע האב; שאם היה מסופק, היה אוסר (שהרי אבי האחד סוס ואבי השני חמור).

And yet it is taught that they are permitted to mate with each other. Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda is certain that one need not be concerned with its paternity in determining the species of the offspring. If he were uncertain, he would deem their mating prohibited, as the father of one is a horse while the father of the other is a donkey.

דחיית הראיה: לא! לעולם אבי שניהם חמור (וניתן לדחות). ומה שהקשית ׳צריכא למימר?׳ — אכן צריך, שלא תאמר שצד הסוס שבזכר ישתמש בצד החמור שבנקבה וצד החמור שבזכר בצד הסוס שבנקבה (ויהא כלאים); קא משמע לן שמותר.

The Gemara responds: No, one cannot cite proof from this, as it can be said that actually, the father of this male animal is a donkey, and the father of that female animal is also a donkey. And with regard to that which you say: Does it need to be said that these two may mate? It does need to be said, lest you say: The horse component of the male mule comes and copulates with the donkey component of the female mule, and the donkey component of the male mule copulates specifically with the horse component of the female mule, which would violate the prohibition of diverse kinds. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda teaches us that they are both of the same species and may mate.

תא שמע: ר׳ יהודה — פרדה שתבעה (להזדווג), אין מרביעין עליה לא סוס ולא חמור אלא בן מינה (פרד). ואם פשוט לו שאין חוששין לזרע האב — מדוע לא ירביע עליה את מין אמה? אלמא מספקא ליה! ומשני: מדובר שאין יודעים מהו מין אמה.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a possible resolution from a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to a female mule in heat, one may not mate a horse or a donkey with her, due to the prohibition against crossbreeding diverse kinds of livestock. Rather, one mates her with one of her kind, another mule. And if you say that Rabbi Yehuda is certain that one need not be concerned with its paternity in determining the species of the offspring, then why not mate her with the species of her mother? Evidently, Rabbi Yehuda is uncertain and therefore deems it prohibited to mate her with either a horse or a donkey. The Gemara responds: The baraita is referring to a case where we do not know what the mother’s species is.

קושיא: והרי שנינו ׳אלא מינה׳ — משמע שמינה ידוע! תירוץ: כך אמר — אין מרביעין עליה מין סוס ולא מין חמור לפי שאין יודעין מינה. וליבדוק בסימנים? שאמר אביי: קולו עבה — בן חמורה, קולו צלול — בן סוסה; ורב פפא: אוזניו גדולות וזנבו קצר — בן חמורה, אוזניו קטנות וזנבו ארוך — בן סוסה. ומשני: כאן מדובר בפרדה אילמת וקטועת אוזניים וזנב, שאי אפשר לבדקה.

The Gemara challenges: But the baraita teaches: Rather, one mates her with one of her kind, indicating that her species is known. The Gemara explains that this is what the baraita is saying: One may not mate the species of a horse or the species of a donkey with her, because one does not usually know the species of the mother of a mule that one encounters. The Gemara suggests: But let one check her species by her distinguishing characteristics, as Abaye says: If its voice is deep, it is the offspring of a female donkey; if its voice is shrill, it is the offspring of a female horse. And Rav Pappa says: If its ears are large and its tail is small, it is the offspring of a female donkey; if its ears are small and its tail is large, it is the offspring of a female horse. The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a mule who is mute, and whose ears and tail are lopped off, and whose species cannot be determined. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion cannot be proven from this case.

מה הוכרע בדבר? תא שמע: אמר רב הונא בריה דרב יהושע — הכל מודים (ואף ר׳ יהודה) שהרבעת הוולד עם מין אמו אסורה. שמע מינה: מספקא ליה לר׳ יהודה אם חוששין לזרע האב — שאילו היה פשוט לו, היה מתיר; שמע מינה.

The Gemara asks: What conclusion was reached about it? Come and hear a resolution, as Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, says: All, including Rabbi Yehuda, agree with regard to mating the offspring with the species of its mother that it is prohibited. Conclude from it that Rabbi Yehuda is uncertain. If he were certain that one need not be concerned with its paternity, he would deem mating the offspring with the species of its mother permitted, since the father’s species would not matter. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.

מעשה: ר׳ אבא אמר למשרתו — אם תכניס לי פרדות לרכב, בחר אותן הדומות זו לזו (בקול ובאוזניים ובזנב) והכניסן לי, כדי שלא לעבור על כלאים. אלמא ר׳ אבא סובר שאין חוששין לזרע האב (שהסימנים מורים רק על מין האם); וסימנין אלו תוקפם מן התורה, ואפשר לסמוך עליהם אף באיסור תורה.

The Gemara relates with regard to this issue that Rabbi Abba said to his servant: If you bring me mules attached to a wagon [rispak], look for those that are similar to each other in their voices and the sizes of their ears and tails, and bring those for me, in order not to violate the prohibition of diverse kinds. Evidently, Rabbi Abba holds that with regard to the offspring of diverse kinds, one need not be concerned with its paternity, since, as explained earlier, these distinguishing characteristics indicate only the species of the mother.