מפת הסוגיא — חולין ס״טSugya map — Chullin 69

לאחר שלמדנו שאיבר עובר שיצא נאסר משום ׳יוצא מגבולו׳, מסתפק רב חנניא: עובר של קודשי קודשים שהוציא ידו בעזרה (ששם הוא ׳בתוך גבולו׳) והחזירה — האם תתירנו שחיטת אמו? מצד אחד העזרה מחיצה לקדשים, ואולי גם לעובר; ומצד שני אולי גבול העובר הוא אמו בלבד, והעזרה אינה גבולו.

§ The Gemara taught that the reason to deem a limb of a fetus that was extended outside the womb forbidden for consumption is because it went outside of its boundary. Based on this, Rav Ḥananya raises a dilemma: If the fetus of a sacrificial animal of the most sacred order extended its foreleg outside the womb while in the Temple courtyard and then brought it back, what is the halakha? Will the slaughter of the mother permit that limb? Do we say that since the courtyard is regarded as the boundary for such sacrificial animals, as they are permitted only when in the courtyard, therefore it is also regarded as the boundary for this fetus, and even if it extended its limb outside of the womb, it is irrelevant since it ultimately remained within its boundary? Or perhaps, for this fetus, the courtyard is not considered its boundary, as the boundary of a fetus is its mother, and so the limb would become prohibited.

אביי דחה את הספק: למה לא הסתפקת גם בעובר של קדשים קלים שהוציא ידו בירושלים (שהיא מחיצתם)? אלא ודאי פשוט לך שם שמחיצת העובר היא אמו ולא ירושלים — ואם כן אף כאן, בקדשי קודשים, מחיצת העובר אמו ולא העזרה, והאיבר נאסר.

Abaye said to Rav Ḥananya: But why don’t you raise the same dilemma with regard to the fetuses of offerings of lesser sanctity, which are permitted only within Jerusalem? Abaye continues: It would appear that concerning offerings of lesser sanctity within Jerusalem, what is the reason that you did not raise this dilemma? It is because it is clear to you that the boundary of a fetus is its mother. But here too, concerning a fetus of an offering of the most sacred order, one must say that the boundary of a fetus is its mother, and not the Temple courtyard.

אילפא מסתפק: עובר שהוציא ידו לאחר שחיטת הסימן הראשון (קנה) אך קודם שחיטת הסימן השני (ושט) — מה דינו של אותו איבר?

§ The baraita cited on 68b discusses the case of a fetus that extended a limb outside the womb. It cites the opinion of the Rabbis that although the slaughter of the mother does not permit the consumption of the limb, it does prevent it from being defined as a carcass with the associated ritual impurity. Based on this, Ilfa raises a dilemma: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside the womb between the severing of its mother’s windpipe, which is one of the organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter [siman], and the severing of the other siman, the gullet, what is the halakha?

השאלה: האם שחיטת הסימן הראשון מצטרפת לשני לטהר את האיבר מטומאת נבלה? רבא פושט בקל וחומר: אם הסימן הראשון מצטרף לשני להתיר את שאר העובר באכילה — קל וחומר שיועיל לטהר את האיבר מנבלה.

Does the cutting of the first siman combine with that of the second siman to render that limb pure from the impurity of a carcass or not? The cutting of the first siman could potentially permit the consumption of the limb, as the limb was still inside the womb, whereas the cutting of the second siman could not permit consumption, as the limb had already been extended outside the womb. Since they have different effects, can they combine to render the limb pure? Rava said: It is an a fortiori inference: If the cutting of the first siman was effective to the extent that it can combine with the cutting of the second siman to permit the rest of the fetus for consumption, will it not be effective with regard to the limb to render it pure from the impurity of a carcass?

ר׳ ירמיה מסתפק: עובר שאיברו נאסר משום ׳יוצא׳ ויצא חי לאחר שחיטת אמו — האם חוששים שהאיסור יעבור לזרעו (צאצאיו)?

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma: If a fetus extended a limb outside the womb, thereby rendering the limb forbidden, and then, after the mother animal was slaughtered, the fetus emerged alive, what is the halakha concerning whether there is a need to be concerned with regard to any offspring of that fetus, i.e., that the prohibition pertaining to its limb will pass on to its offspring?

בירור הספק: באיזה אופן? אם העובר נזדווג עם בהמה רגילה — מה שונה דווקא עובר זה שיש בו איסור ׳יוצא׳? והרי ספק זרע האב שייך בכל בהמה.

The Gemara clarifies: What are the circumstances of this case? If we say the dilemma applies to the offspring in a case where the fetus matured and mated with a full-fledged, normal animal, which would be fully permitted if slaughtered, then why raise this dilemma specifically with regard to this fetus, which has a prohibition attached to it caused by leaving its boundary?

שאף בבן פקועה רגיל (שיצא חי לאחר שחיטת אמו) שייך הספק: אמר רב משרשיא — לדעת הסובר שחוששים לזרע האב, בן פקועה שבא על בהמה רגילה, הוולד אין לו תקנה (שמצד האם טעון שחיטה, ומצד האב אין שחיטה מועילה).

Even in the case of a regular fetus that emerged alive from its mother’s womb after the mother was slaughtered [ben pekua], which is permitted without the need for any slaughter, the dilemma could also be raised, as Rav Mesharshiyya says: According to the statement of the one who says that when defining the status of an animal one needs to be concerned with its paternity and not only its maternity, if a ben pekua mated with a full-fledged animal, the offspring has no rectification. The offspring of two ben pekua animals is permitted without ritual slaughter. But if the father is a ben pekua but not the mother, then it is simultaneously defined as requiring slaughter, based on the mother, and being excluded from the possibility of being permitted through slaughter, based on the father. Therefore, no act of slaughter can permit it.

מעמידים: הספק נצרך כשנזדווג עם בן פקועה כמותו (ששניהם אינם טעונים שחיטה). מה הדין? האם כל איבר אב מוליד את האיבר המקביל בוולד, ולכן יחתוך את האיבר האסור והשאר מותר; או שמא זרע האב מתבלבל בכל גוף הוולד, וכולו אסור?

The Gemara answers: No, the dilemma does not concern that case. Rather, it is necessary in a case in which the fetus later mated with a ben pekua like it and had offspring. Since neither of the parents require slaughter, the offspring does not require it either. In such a case, what is the halakha? To what extent does the prohibition pertaining to the limb of the father pass to the offspring? Do we say that each limb of the father produces the corresponding limb in the offspring, and so only the parallel limb in the offspring is prohibited, and therefore one could sever that limb and the rest of the offspring will be permitted? Or perhaps the father’s seed is intermingled through the entire offspring, and so the entire offspring is prohibited.

חזר ר׳ ירמיה ואמר: פשוט שזרע האב מתבלבל בכל הוולד — שאילו כל איבר מוליד את מקבילו, היה אב סומא מוליד סומא ואב קיטע מוליד קיטע, וזה אינו.

After raising this dilemma, Rabbi Yirmeya then said: It is obvious that the seed of the father is intermingled through the entire offspring, as if it were so that each limb produces the corresponding limb, every blind father would bear blind offspring, and an amputee father would bear offspring that is an amputee.

אלא פשוט שזרע האב מתבלבל, וזו השאלה: בהמה רגילה הרי באה ׳מכוח׳ חֵלב ודם (האסורים) ובכל זאת מותרת — אף כאן הוולד יבוא מכוח האיבר האסור ויהיה מותר; או שמא אומרים שהתורה התירה רק שני איסורים (חֵלב ודם), אך שלושה (אף איסור יוצא) לא התירה?

Rather, it is obvious that the seed of the father is intermingled, and this is the dilemma we are raising: Even with regard to a regular animal, is it not produced from the influence of the forbidden fat and blood of its father and mother, and yet it is permitted to be consumed? Here too, it is no different, and although the forbidden limb of the father was an influence in the offspring’s formation, the offspring should nevertheless be permitted. Or perhaps we say that the Torah permitted these two prohibitions, the consumption of forbidden fat and the consumption of blood, but we do not say that it permitted three prohibitions, i.e., also the prohibition of a limb that left its boundary.

ולפי איזו שיטה אפשר לדבר על שלושה איסורים? אי לר׳ מאיר (שעובר שכלו חודשיו אינו ניתר בשחיטת אמו) — יש איסור חֵלב ודם ככל בהמה, אך אין בו איסור יוצא, שאינו תלוי במחיצת אמו.

The Gemara asks: And according to whom is it possible to speak of three prohibitions in order to raise this dilemma? If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir that is difficult, because he holds that a fetus that has completed its gestational term is regarded as being independent of its mother and is no longer permitted by virtue of its mother’s slaughter. Consequently, there is a prohibition of forbidden fat and blood, just like any other animal, but there is no prohibition of a limb that leaves its boundary, as its permitted status is no longer dependent on being within its mother’s womb.

ואי לר׳ יהודה (שהעובר ניתר כולו בשחיטת אמו) — יש בו איסור יוצא (באיבר שיצא), אך אין בו איסור חֵלב ודם. נמצא שלכל הדעות אין שלושת האיסורים חלים יחד.

And if you say it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that is also difficult, because he holds that since ultimately the offspring was inside its mother’s womb when the mother was slaughtered, the fetus is permitted in its entirety by virtue of that slaughter. Consequently, there is a prohibition of a limb that leaves its boundary, but there is no prohibition of forbidden fat and blood.

מקור הדעות (משנה): גיד הנשה נוהג בשליל (עובר שכלו חודשיו) וחֶלבו אסור — דברי ר׳ מאיר (שהוא כבהמה לעצמו). ר׳ יהודה: אין גיד הנשה נוהג בשליל וחֶלבו מותר (שניתר בשחיטת אמו).

The Gemara cites the source of the opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda: As we learned in a baraita: The prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies to the fetus that had already completed its gestational term when its mother was slaughtered, and likewise its fat is forbidden; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says that the prohibition of the sciatic nerve does not apply to the fetus, and its fat is permitted. Evidently, according to all opinions, both the prohibitions of forbidden fat and blood and the prohibition of a limb that leaves its boundary cannot apply to the same animal.

אלא ודאי אין אומרים שכל הבא ׳מכוח׳ דבר אסור — אסור; שהרי בפועל הוולד מותר. ואם כן הספק על הזרע נדחה, ויש להעמיד את ספק ר׳ ירמיה בעניין אחר.

Rather, it must be that we do not say that any item that is produced from the influence of a forbidden entity is itself forbidden, as in fact it is permitted. Therefore, it would certainly be permitted to consume the offspring of a fetus whose limb had been forbidden, and the dilemma does not concern such an animal.

וזו אפוא השאלה: מהו לגמוע (לשתות) את חֲלב העובר שאיברו נאסר? חלב רגיל אינו נחשב כאיבר מן החי ומותר — אף חלב זה לא יהיה שונה ויהיה מותר.

And this is the dilemma that we are raising: What is the halakha with regard to drinking the milk of a fetus whose limb is forbidden? Isn’t regular milk of a normal animal comparable to a limb from a living animal, given that it is taken from a live animal, and yet it is permitted? If so, this milk too should be no different, and although the milk comes from an animal whose limb is forbidden as a limb from a living animal, as it was not permitted through the slaughter of its mother, nevertheless, the milk should be permitted.

או שמא יש לחלק: חלב רגיל מותר משום שלאיסור אבר מן החי שבו יש תקנה בשחיטה; אך כאן (בעובר שאיברו נאסר ׳יוצא׳) אין לאיסורו תקנה בשחיטה, ולכן ייאסר. הספק לא נפשט — תיקו.

Or perhaps there, with regard to regular milk, the Torah waives the prohibition of a limb from a living animal, as there is a rectification for its prohibition through slaughter. But here, with regard to a fetus whose limb is forbidden as a limb from a living animal, there is no rectification for its prohibition through slaughter. The Gemara accepts that this was the dilemma, but concludes that no resolution for it was found, and so the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

המשנה: ׳החותך מן העובר שבמעיה — מותר באכילה׳. מניין? נאמר ״וכל בהמה מפרסת פרסה … תאכלו״, ודרשו ״בהמה … בבהמה״ (בהמה שבתוך בהמה) — לרבות את הוולד, שהוא ניתר בשחיטת אמו אף כשנחתכו ממנו חתיכות.

§ The mishna states: If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severed pieces from a fetus that is in its womb, leaving those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? It is derived from a verse, as it is written: “And every animal that has a split hoof and is cloven into two hooves, chews the cud, of the animals, it you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:6). The term “of the animals [babehema]” is translated literally as: In the animal, and is referring to the term “every animal” mentioned at the beginning of the verse. Accordingly, the verse may be read as saying: Every animal in the animal you may eat, and is referring to a fetus inside its mother. It therefore serves to include the offspring, i.e., the fetus, as being permitted by its mother’s slaughter, even if parts of the fetus had been severed.

קושיא: אם ״בהמה בבהמה״ מלמד שהעובר נחשב כבהמה בפני עצמה, אם כן יוכל אדם להמיר בו (להחליף חולין בקודש), שהרי בתמורה כתוב ״בהמה בבהמה״ אף הוא!

The Gemara objects: If that is so, that the phrase: Every animal of the animals, is referring to a fetus, then one should be able to substitute a non-sacred animal for the sanctified fetus of a pregnant offering, i.e., the non-sacred animal should become consecrated through the attempt to do so. This is because the verse referring to substitution also uses that phrase: “And if he shall substitute an animal for an animal [behema bivhema], it and its substitute shall be consecrated” (Leviticus 27:10). There too, the phrase “an animal for an animal” translates literally as: An animal in an animal.

והרי שנינו (תמורה): אין ממירין לא אברים בעוברים, ולא עוברים באברים, ולא אברים ועוברים בשלמים, ולא שלמים (בהמות שלמות) בהם — משמע שאין העובר נחשב בהמה לעניין תמורה!

Why, then, did we learn in a mishna (Temura 10a): One cannot substitute limbs of a non-sacred animal for fetuses of pregnant offerings, i.e., those limbs will not thereby be consecrated; and one cannot substitute fetuses of non-sacred animals for limbs of an offering, and one cannot substitute limbs and fetuses of non-sacred animals for whole offerings, and one cannot substitute whole, non-sacred animals for them, i.e., limbs and fetuses of offerings?

תירוץ: אין הדרשה מ״בהמה בבהמה״, אלא הכתוב אמר ״וְכָל בהמה״ — תיבת ״וכל״ באה לרבות את הוולד; ולכן אין ממנה ראיה לתמורה.

Rather, the halakha that a fetus and its severed pieces are permitted to be consumed by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal is derived from that which the verse states: “And every animal.” The term “and every” serves to include the offspring, i.e., the fetus, as being permitted, even if parts of it had been severed.

קושיא: אם ״וכל בהמה״ מרבה אף חתיכות, אם כן אף החותך מן הטחול ומן הכליות של הבהמה עצמה יהיה מותר; והרי שנינו: החותך מן העובר — מותר, אך מן הטחול ומן הכליות — אסור! תירוץ: הכתוב אמר ״אותה תאכלו״ — שלמה ולא חסרה; השחיטה מתירה את הבהמה השלמה ולא את אבריה שניטלו.

The Gemara objects: If so, then even if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal, those pieces should be permitted as well. Why, then, did we learn in the mishna: If one severed pieces from a fetus that was in its womb, leaving those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal, but if one severed pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughtered it their consumption is prohibited? The Gemara explains: That verse states: “Of the animal, it you may eat,” which indicates that slaughter permits consumption of only the whole animal, but not of the parts of the animal that it is lacking, i.e., the parts that were severed.

קושיא: אם די בריבוי ״וכל בהמה״, אם כן השוחט בהמה ומצא בה עובר בדמות יונה — יהיה מותר; והרי אמר ר׳ יוחנן שאסור באכילה!

The Gemara objects: If that is so, that the halakha is derived from the term “and every animal,” then even in the case of one who slaughters an animal and finds a dove-shaped fetus in it, it should be permitted. Why, then, does Rabbi Yoḥanan say: One who slaughters an animal and finds a dove-shaped fetus in it, that fetus is prohibited for consumption?

תירוץ: כדי להתיר את העובר אני צריך ׳פרסות׳ (מן הכתוב ״מפרסת פרסה״), ובדמות יונה אין פרסות — ולכן אסור.

The Gemara explains: In order for the fetus to be permitted, I require that it have hooves, and a dove-shaped fetus does not have hooves.

קושיא: אם צריך דווקא פרסות סדוקות, אם כן קלוט (שפרסותיו אינן סדוקות) שנמצא במעי פרה ייאסר! תירוץ: תנא דבי ר׳ ישמעאל כר׳ שמעון בן יוחאי — דורשים ״פרסה בבהמה תאכלו״, שאף בעל פרסה (אחת, שאינה סדוקה) בכלל ההיתר.

The Gemara objects: If that is so, that the fetus is permitted only if it fulfills the conditions mentioned in that verse, then a fetus with non-cloven hooves found inside a cow’s womb should be forbidden, whereas the baraita cited on 68b states that it is permitted. The Gemara answers: This is as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: Each phrase in the verse is taken as a sufficient condition. Furthermore, the term “hoof” can be understood independently of the phrase “cloven into two hooves,” and is referring to a non-cloven hoof. Accordingly, the verse can be interpreted as teaching: An animal that has a hoof, in the animal, it you may eat, and teaches that even a fetus with a non-cloven hoof is permitted.

רב שימי בר אשי: לעולם הדרשה היא מ״בהמה בבהמה״ כמו שאמרת בתחילה; ומה שהקשית מ׳אין ממירין׳ — אותה משנה היא כר׳ שמעון, שמקיש תמורה למעשר בהמה: כשם שמעשר אינו נוהג באברים ועוברים (אלא בבהמות שלמות), כך אין תמורה נוהגת בהם.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Actually, the halakha that the fetus and its severed pieces are permitted should be derived as you previously said, i.e., from the phrase: An animal in the animal. And with regard to that which posed a difficulty for you, i.e., the mishna in Temura that states one cannot substitute a non-sacred animal for the fetus of a pregnant offering, that difficulty can be resolved by saying: In accordance with whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who compares substitution to the animal tithe: Just as the animal tithe does not apply to limbs and fetuses but only to live animals that can walk, as it is stated: “Whatever passes under the rod” (Leviticus 27:32), so too, substitution does not apply to limbs and fetuses.

ומניין שאותה משנה היא כר׳ שמעון? ששנינו בה: אמר ר׳ יוסי — והלוא במוקדשין, האומר ׳רגלה של זו עולה׳, כולה נעשית עולה; אף האומר ׳רגל של זו תחת זו׳, תהא כולה תמורה תחתיה. הרי שלשיטה זו אבר אחד מתפשט בכל הבהמה.

The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that this mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The Gemara explains: As we learned in the same mishna (Temura 10a) that Rabbi Yosei says: But with regard to consecrated offerings, if one says the leg of this animal is a burnt offering, then all of the animal is consecrated as a burnt offering. Accordingly, even with regard to substitution, if one says: The leg of this non-sacred animal should be substituted instead of that offering, the entire animal should be a substitute in its stead.

למי משיב ר׳ יוסי? אם תאמר לר׳ מאיר ולר׳ יהודה — וכי סוברים הם שאבר מתפשט בכולה? והרי שנינו בברייתא: יכול האומר ׳רגלה של זו עולה׳ תהא כולה עולה? תלמוד לומר ״כל אשר יתן ממנו לה׳ יהיה קדש״ — ממנו (אותו אבר) קדש, ולא כולו קדש; אלו דברי ר׳ מאיר ור׳ יהודה.

Rabbi Yosei clearly disagrees with the opinion that substituting a limb is not possible. But Rabbi Yosei’s formulation indicates that even according to that opinion, if a single limb is consecrated then the entire animal becomes consecrated. The Gemara clarifies: To whom is Rabbi Yosei responding? If we say he is responding to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, do they accept this reasoning? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One might have thought that in the case of one who says: The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, all of it will be a burnt offering. Therefore, the verse states: “And if it is an animal of those that they bring as an offering to the Lord, anything of it that one gives to the Lord, it shall be sacred” (Leviticus 27:9). The verse indicates that the part of it that one gives will be sacred, but all of it will not be sacred.

המשך הברייתא: יכול האבר הקדוש יֵצא לחולין (בפדיון)? תלמוד לומר ״יהיה״ — בהווייתו (בקדושתו) יישאר. כיצד? תימכר הבהמה לצורכי עולות, ודמיה חולין חוץ מדמי אותו אבר הקדוש — דברי ר׳ מאיר ור׳ יהודה. הרי שאינם סוברים שאבר מתפשט בכולה.

A non-sacred animal with a consecrated limb may not be sacrificed. Accordingly, one might have thought the consecrated limb may be redeemed and thereby transferred to non-sacred status. Therefore, the verse states: “It shall be sacred,” indicating that it shall remain as it is. How is this possible? The animal should be sold for the needs of burnt offerings, i.e., to an individual who will sacrifice the entire animal as a burnt offering, and the payment received for the animal will be non-sacred, except for the payment received in exchange for that one limb that is consecrated. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.

לעומתם ר׳ יוסי ור׳ שמעון אומרים: מניין לאומר ׳רגלה של זו עולה׳ שתהא כולה עולה? תלמוד לומר ״יהיה״ — לרבות את כולה. נמצא שדעת ר׳ יוסי (שאבר מתפשט בכולה) היא כשיטת ר׳ שמעון.

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: From where is it derived that in the case of one who says: The leg of this animal is a burnt offering, all of it becomes a burnt offering? The verse states: “It shall be sacred.” This serves to include all of the animal, indicating that it all becomes sacred.

ושוב: למי השיב ר׳ יוסי (במשנה ׳והלוא במוקדשין׳)? אם לר׳ מאיר ור׳ יהודה — הרי אין להם סברא זו (שאבר מתפשט בכולה); אלא ודאי השיב לר׳ שמעון — ומכאן שמשנת תמורה כר׳ שמעון.

The Gemara reiterates its question: To whom is Rabbi Yosei responding? Rabbi Yosei clearly disagrees with the opinion that if a single limb is consecrated then the entire animal becomes consecrated. If we say he is responding to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, do they accept this reasoning? Rather, isn’t Rabbi Yosei responding to Rabbi Shimon, as the Gemara suggests above in resolution of the difficulty from the mishna in Temura?

דחייה: לא בהכרח; אפשר שר׳ יוסי אינו משיב לאיש אלא אומר טעם משלו. ולפי זה אין הוכחה שמשנת ׳אין ממירין׳ היא דווקא כר׳ שמעון.

The Gemara responds: No, it is possible that Rabbi Yosei is not responding directly to any other opinion; rather, he stated his own reasoning, without reference to that of another Sage. Consequently, his statement affords no proof that the mishna in Temura expresses the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

משנה: בהמה המבכרת (היולדת ולד ראשון, הקדוש בבכורה) המקשה ללדת — מותר לחתוך את העובר אבר אבר ולהשליך לכלבים, שכל עוד לא יצא רובו אינו קדוש ואינו טעון קבורה. יצא רובו — הרי זה כנולד וקדוש: אם חתכו, יקבר; ונפטרה האם מן הבכורה (ולד הבא אחריו אינו בכור).

MISHNA: Upon its birth, the firstborn male offspring of a domesticated animal is automatically consecrated with firstborn status, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. Furthermore, if it dies, it may not be discarded, but must be buried. If an animal that was giving birth to a firstborn male was encountering difficulty giving birth, and in order to alleviate the difficulty one wishes to terminate the birth, he may cut up the fetus limb by limb and cast it to the dogs. Since the fetus was not born, it is non-sacred and does not require burial. If a majority of the fetus had already emerged, it is considered to have been born and is therefore consecrated; consequently, if one cut it up it must be buried, and the mother animal is exempted from having firstborn status conferred on any future offspring.

גמרא: נחלקו אמוראים בבכור שיצא שליש ממנו, ובעודו כך מכרו לגוי, וחזר ויצא שליש נוסף (כך שיצא רובו). דין בכור של שותפות גוי שאינו קדוש. רב הונא: קדוש; רבה: אינו קדוש.

GEMARA: An amoraic dispute was stated with regard to a case in which one-third of a firstborn fetus emerged from the womb and then one sold it to a gentile, and then another one-third of the fetus emerged. Once a majority of the fetus emerges it is considered born. The halakha is that a fetus partly owned by a gentile is not consecrated as a firstborn. In this case, the firstborn was sold to a gentile only after it had already partially emerged from the womb. Rav Huna says it is consecrated, while Rabba says it is not consecrated.

רב הונא (קדוש): סובר שהבכור קדוש למפרע — משעת יציאת תחילת גופו. וכיוון שיצא רובו, נתברר למפרע שכבר מתחילה היה קדוש; ונמצא שמה שמכר לגוי — לא מכר כלום, שלא היה שלו למכרו.

The Gemara elaborates: Rav Huna says it is consecrated, as he maintains a firstborn is consecrated retroactively from the moment the first part of its body emerges from the womb. And therefore in this case, once most of it had emerged, it became clarified retroactively that it had already been consecrated from the outset, and so with regard to that which he had sold to a gentile, it arises that he did not actually sell anything at all. Since it had already been consecrated, he did not have full ownership of it to be able to sell it.

רבה (אינו קדוש): סובר שהבכור קדוש מכאן ולהבא — רק משעת יציאת הרוב. ולכן מה שמכר לגוי — שפיר מכר (המכירה חלה), שבשעת המכירה עדיין לא היה קדוש; ומשיצא רובו כבר היה שותף גוי, והגוי פוטר מן הבכורה.

Rabba says it is not consecrated, as he maintains a firstborn is consecrated from that point forward, i.e., only at the moment the majority of it emerges. And so with regard to that which he had sold to a gentile, it arises that he had sold it properly, i.e., the sale was valid because at the time of the sale it had not been consecrated. Accordingly, by the time the majority of its body emerged it was already partly owned by a gentile, and that prevented it from being consecrated.

ושניהם הולכים לשיטתם: נחלקו אף בבכור שיצא שלישו דרך דופן (ניתוח), ושני שלישיו דרך הרחם. דין בכור שאינו קדוש אלא ביוצא דרך הרחם. כאן רב הונא: אינו קדוש; רבה: קדוש.

The Gemara notes: Rav Huna and Rabba follow their lines of reasoning, as another dispute between them was stated with regard to a case in which one-third of a firstborn fetus emerged through the wall of the womb, i.e., via caesarean section, and then the other two-thirds emerged through the opening of the womb. The halakha is that a fetus is consecrated only if it emerged through the opening of the womb. In this case a majority did emerge through the opening, but the first majority to emerge was not through the opening. Rav Huna says it is not consecrated and Rabba says it is consecrated.

רב הונא לטעמיה (קדוש למפרע): הקדושה נקבעת לפי הרוב הראשון, וזה יצא דרך דופן ולא דרך הרחם — לכן אינו קדוש. רבה לטעמיה (קדוש מכאן ולהבא): נמדד בשעת יציאת הרוב המכריע, והרוב יצא דרך הרחם — לכן קדוש.

The Gemara elaborates: When Rav Huna says it is not consecrated Rav Huna conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says a firstborn is consecrated retroactively, since the birth consecrates it. And in this case, the first majority that emerged, which defined its birth, was not through the opening of the womb. Therefore, it was not consecrated. Conversely, when Rabba says it is consecrated Rabba conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as he says a firstborn is consecrated from that point forward, i.e., only once a majority of the fetus has emerged from the opening of the womb. This is because the emergence of a majority of the fetus through the opening of the womb consecrates it, even if that is not the first majority, and in this case the majority of the animal emerged through the opening of the womb.

וצריכא — שתי המחלוקות נחוצות: אילו שמענו רק במקרה הראשון (מכרו לגוי), היינו אומרים שדווקא שם רב הונא מקל ואומר ׳קדוש למפרע׳ (להוציא משותפות גוי), אבל במקרה השני, שדעתו תחמיר (אינו קדוש), שמא היה מודה לרבה.

The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to convey Rav Huna and Rabba’s dispute in both of these cases. As, had the Sages taught us only their dispute with regard to this case, where after one-third emerged it was sold to a gentile, one might have thought that it is only with regard to this case that Rav Huna says the animal is consecrated retroactively. This is because to rule it is consecrated from that point forward would be a leniency, as then the fetus would be exempt from being subject to firstborn status. But with regard to that case, when one-third emerged through the wall of the womb, where Rabba’s opinion would lead to a stringency, one might say that Rav Huna concedes to Rabba.

ומאידך, אילו שמענו רק במקרה השני (דרך דופן), היינו אומרים שדווקא שם רבה מחמיר ואומר ׳מכאן ולהבא׳ (וקדוש), אבל במקרה הראשון, שדעתו תקל, שמא היה מודה לרב הונא. לכן צריכא לשתיהן.

And if their dispute was stated only with regard to that case, when one-third emerged through the wall of the womb, one might have thought it is only in that case that Rabba says the animal is consecrated from that point forward, as that results in a stringency, i.e., the fetus is subject to firstborn status. But in this case, when after one-third emerged it was sold to a gentile, and where ruling that the animal is consecrated from that point forward results in a leniency, one might say that Rabba concedes to Rav Huna. Therefore, it was necessary for the dispute to be stated in both cases.

קושיא על רב הונא ממשנתנו: ׳המבכרת המקשה לילד — מחתך אבר אבר ומשליך לכלבים׳. וכי לא מדובר שמחתך ומניח את האברים עד שיוצא הרוב? ואם הבכור קדוש למפרע, הרי משיצא רובו נתקדשו כל האברים למפרע — והיה צריך לומר שיקברו, לא להשליך לכלבים!

The Gemara raises a difficulty with the opinion of Rav Huna. We learned in the mishna: If an animal that was giving birth to a firstborn male was encountering difficulty giving birth, and in order to alleviate the difficulty one wishes to terminate the birth, he may cut up the fetus limb by limb and cast it to the dogs. What, is it not teaching that one cuts each limb and leaves it outside the body, casting the limbs to the dogs only after he has already extracted a majority of its body? And if you say a firstborn is consecrated retroactively, then once the majority of the fetus emerges from the womb all of the limbs would be consecrated retroactively according to Rav Huna. Accordingly, the mishna should have said the limbs must be buried.

תירוץ: לא; כאן המשנה עוסקת במחתך ומשליך — שחותך כל אבר ומיד משליכו לכלבים בזה אחר זה, קודם שיצא הרוב, ולכן אינו קדוש ואין צריך קבורה.

The Gemara responds: No, here we are dealing with one who cuts each limb and immediately casts it to the dogs, before any consecration takes effect.

קושיא: אם כן, מה הדין במחתך ומניח? יקבר. אם כך — תחת ששנה הסיפא ׳יצא רובו יקבר ונפטרה מן הבכורה׳, היה לו לחלק בתוך הרישא עצמה: במה דברים אמורים (שמשליך לכלבים) — במחתך ומשליך אבר אבר, אבל מחתך ומניח — יקבר!

The Gemara asks: But according to this, if one cuts the limbs and leaves them, what is the halakha? Each one must be buried. If that is so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the mishna: If a majority of the fetus had already emerged it is considered to have been born and duly consecrated, and so if one cut it up it must be buried, and any future offspring from that animal is exempted from firstborn status; let the tanna instead distinguish and teach a case in which the limbs are consecrated within the context of the first case itself, in the following manner: In what case is this statement, that the limbs may be cast to the dogs, said? It is with regard to one who cuts pieces of the fetus and immediately casts them to the dogs limb by limb, before a majority has emerged. But if one cuts and leaves the limbs until a majority has emerged, each one of them must be buried.

יישוב: אכן כך כוונת הסיפא — במה דברים אמורים שמשליך לכלבים? במחתך ומשליך; אבל מחתך ומניח עד שיצא רובו, נעשה כמי שיצא רובו בבת אחת, ולכן יקבר. נמצא שאין מן המשנה קושיא על רב הונא.

The Gemara answers: That is indeed what the latter clause of the mishna is saying: In what case is this statement said? It is with regard to one who cuts and casts the limbs to the dogs before a majority emerges. But if one cuts and leaves the limbs until a majority emerges it is regarded as though a majority of it emerged at one time, and so it must be buried.