מפת הסוגיא — חולין ס״חSugya map — Chullin 68

משנה: שחיטת אם מעוברת מתירה גם את עוברה. בהמה המקשה לילד, והוציא העובר את ידו (רגלו הקדמית) חוץ לרחם והחזירה, ואחר כך נשחטה האם — מותר העובר באכילה. אבל אם הוציא העובר את ראשו, אף שהחזירו — הרי הוא כילוד, ואין שחיטת האם מתירתו אלא צריך שחיטה לעצמו.

MISHNA: When a pregnant kosher animal is slaughtered, the slaughter also renders the consumption of its fetus permitted. Even if an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and meanwhile the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s womb and then brought it back inside, and then the mother animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if the fetus extended its head outside the womb, even if it then brought it back inside, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn, and the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the fetus. Rather, it requires its own slaughter.

החותך חתיכות מן העובר שבמעיה ומניחן שם, ואחר כך שחטה — מותרות באכילה מכוח שחיטת האם. אבל החותך מן הטחול או מן הכליות של הבהמה עצמה — אסור, שאבר הפורש מן החי אינו ניתר בשחיטה. זה הכלל: דבר שהוא מגוף האם — אסור, ומה שאינו גופה (העובר) — מותר.

If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severs pieces from a fetus that is in the womb and leaves those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughters it, then even if those pieces are left inside the animal their consumption is prohibited, because an organ severed from a living being is not permitted by the subsequent slaughter of the animal. This is the principle: An item that is part of an animal’s body that was severed prior to its slaughter is prohibited even after slaughter, and an item that is not part of its body, i.e., its fetus, is permitted by virtue of its slaughter.

גמרא: הגמרא מסייגת את הרישא. רב יהודה אמר רב: אף שהמשנה התירה את העובר כשהחזיר את ידו, האבר עצמו (היד) — אסור, אף על פי שהחזירו קודם השחיטה.

GEMARA: The Gemara qualifies the first ruling of the mishna: Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: But as for the limb itself, i.e., the foreleg, its consumption is prohibited, even though the fetus brought it back inside prior to the slaughter.

מה הטעם? שאמר הכתוב ״ובשר בשדה טריפה לא תאכלו״. נדרש: כיון שיצא בשר חוץ למחיצתו שבה הוא מותר (כמו בשר קדשים שיצא מן העזרה) — נאסר לעולם, כטריפה. וכן אבר העובר שיצא מן הרחם — נאסר.

What is the reason for this? It is as the verse states: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30). A tereifa is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months; its consumption is prohibited even if it is ritually slaughtered. The Gemara interprets the verse as teaching a principle: Once flesh whose permitted status is dependent on being within a certain area, e.g., sacrificial meat within the Temple courtyard, has gone outside of its boundary, i.e., the area in which it is permitted, which the verse describes as being “in the field,” it becomes permanently prohibited, like a tereifa. Likewise, the permitted status of a fetus is dependent on its being within the womb when the mother animal is slaughtered. Accordingly, if any part of the fetus leaves the womb before the slaughter, it is rendered permanently prohibited.

קושיא מן המשנה: שנינו ״המקשה לילד… והחזירו — מותר באכילה״. וכי לא מדובר על האבר עצמו שהחזיר, שהוא מותר — נגד רב? תשובה: לא, המשנה מדברת על שאר העובר (חוץ מן היד), שהוא המותר.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna: If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body but then brought it back, and then the animal was slaughtered, the consumption of the fetus is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. The Gemara assumes: What, is the mishna not referring to the entire fetus, including the limb, i.e., the foreleg, when it states that its consumption is permitted by the slaughter? This would contradict Rav’s ruling. The Gemara answers: No, the mishna is referring to the rest of the fetus, apart from the foreleg.

קושיא: אם המשנה מדברת על העובר, מדוע נקטה דווקא ״החזירו״? אפילו לא החזיר — שאר העובר מותר! תשובה: אכן הוא הדין אף שלא החזיר; ומפני שהתנא רצה לשנות בסיפא ״הוציא ראשו אף על פי שהחזירו — כילוד״, שנה גם ברישא ״החזירו״ לשם אחידות הלשון.

The Gemara asks: If the mishna is referring to the rest of the fetus, why state specifically that the fetus brought back its foreleg? Even if it did not bring it back the rest of the fetus would still be permitted. The Gemara answers: The same is true, that the rest of the fetus is permitted, even if it did not bring back its foreleg. But since the tanna of the mishna wants to teach in the latter clause: If the fetus extended its head, even though it brought it back, the halakhic status of that fetus is like that of a newborn and is permitted only through its own slaughter, therefore he also taught in the first clause that the fetus brought back its foreleg, for stylistic reasons, despite the fact that the ruling is not limited to that case.

ועל הסיפא: מה משמיעה? שכיון שיצא ראשו הריהו לידה? כבר שנינו זאת (בכורות): איזהו בכור לנחלה ואינו בכור לכהנים (לפדיון)? הבא אחר נפלים — אף על פי שיצא ראש הנפל חי, או בן תשעה שיצא ראשו מת. הרי שיציאת הראש נחשבת לידה.

The Gemara asks: And concerning this latter clause itself, what does it teach us? Does it teach that once the fetus extended its head, that is considered a birth? But we have already learned this in a mishna (Bekhorot 46a): Who is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not considered a firstborn with regard to the requirement to be redeemed by giving five shekels to the priests? It is a son who came after the miscarriage of an underdeveloped fetus. The mishna adds that the category of stillbirth includes the case of a child who did not reach full term, even if its head emerged alive, or a fully developed, nine-month-old fetus whose head emerged dead.

דיוק: הטעם שהבא אחריו בכור לנחלה — לפי שיצא ראש הנפל מת; אבל אם יצא ראשו חי (ואחר כך מת), הבא אחריו אינו בכור אף לנחלה — לפי שיציאת הראש בחיים נחשבת לידה גמורה. אם כן, למה הוצרכה משנתנו לחזור ולשנות שראש הוי לידה?

The Gemara infers from the final clause of the mishna: The reason a son born following the miscarriage is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance is that the head of the miscarriage emerged only after it was already dead. But if its head had initially emerged alive, even if it then died before being fully delivered, the son born after him would not be considered a firstborn even with regard to inheritance. Apparently, this is because the emergence of the head alive is considered a birth, and therefore any subsequent child cannot be considered the firstborn. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach this definition of a birth.

וכי תאמר: המשנה בבכורות השמיעה דין יציאת הראש באדם, ומשנתנו באה להשמיע שאותו דין נוהג אף בבהמה — ולכן אינו חוזר על מה שכבר נשנה.

And if you would say that the mishna there teaches us the definition of birth with regard to a person, and the mishna here teaches us that the same definition applies to an animal, another problem remains, as the Gemara will presently explain.

שהיה צורך בשניהם: דין האדם אינו נלמד מבהמה, שאין לבהמה פרוזדור (מבוא נסתר לרחם) כבאשה — ושמא באשה דווקא צריך שייצא הראש לגמרי; ודין הבהמה אינו נלמד מאדם, שצורת פני האדם חשובה (שנברא בצלם) — ושמא רק בו יציאת הראש לבד לידה. לפיכך הוצרכו שניהם.

Before explaining the problem with this suggestion, the Gemara explains why it is necessary to teach the definition with regard to both people and animals: Because the definition of birth with regard to a person cannot be derived from that of an animal, as an animal does not have a concealed opening [prozdor] to the womb, unlike women, whose thighs conceal the opening to their womb. Consequently, even if the definition were stated with regard to an animal, one might limit it to animals, as that stage is immediately visible; whereas in women it is not. And conversely, the definition of birth with regard to an animal cannot be derived from that of a person, as the form of a person’s face is significant because people are created in the image of God, and their faces bear the mark of their intelligence, which is not true of animals. Consequently, perhaps the emergence of the head alone is considered a birth only with regard to a person.

אף דין הבהמה כבר שנינו (לקמן עז.): שליא (שִׁלְיָה) שיצתה מקצתה — אסור העובר באכילה, שכשם שהשליא סימן ולד באשה כך היא סימן ולד בבהמה (שמא יצא בה ראש העובר ונחשב לידה). אם כן, אין צורך שמשנתנו תלמד שראש הוי לידה אף בבהמה.

The Gemara proceeds to explain why the above suggestion is not a solution: With regard to this halakha also, that the emergence of the head of an animal is considered a birth, we have already learned it in a mishna (77a): If part of a placenta emerged from the womb of an animal before it was slaughtered, its consumption is prohibited even after the mother animal is slaughtered. The reason for this is just as the placenta is an indication of the presence of a fetus in a woman, so too, it is an indication of the presence of a fetus in an animal. Consequently, it is possible that the part of the placenta that emerged contained the head of the fetus, and accordingly it would be considered to have been born. The slaughter of the mother animal would therefore not permit it for consumption. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach the definition of a birth even with regard to an animal.

חזרה לקושיא על רב: בשלמא אם תאמר ש״החזירו״ דרישא נשנה בדווקא — ללמד שהאבר עצמו אסור אלא אם כן החזירו (כנגד רב) — אז מובן שהתנא שנה ״החזירו״ אף בסיפא רק אגב הרישא, ואין בסיפא חידוש.

The Gemara has established that the latter clause does not teach any novelty. Accordingly, it returns to challenging Rav’s ruling: Granted, the mishna is understood if you say that the statement that the fetus brought its foreleg back inside the mother animal, which is mentioned in the first clause of the mishna, is written specifically in order to teach the novelty that the foreleg is permitted if it was brought back before the slaughter, in contrast to Rav’s ruling. If so, then one can claim the mishna taught it in the latter clause due to the first clause, so that they would be parallel stylistically, and no novelty is necessary in the latter clause.

אבל אם תאמר שלא הרישא בדווקא (אלא מדברת בשאר העובר) ולא הסיפא בדווקא (שכבר נשנה דין הראש) — אם כן למה הוצרך התנא לשנות ״החזירו״ כלל? על כרחך הרישא בדווקא, ללמד שהאבר אסור אלא אם כן החזירו — נגד רב.

But if you say the first clause is not written specifically and does not teach a novelty, but rather the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, which is permitted even if it does not bring back its foreleg, and you also say the latter clause is not written specifically to teach a novelty, since the definition of birth is already taught in a mishna elsewhere, then why does it need to teach the halakha that the foreleg or head were brought back at all? Perforce, the first clause must be referring to the permitted status of the foreleg and limiting it specifically to the case where it was brought back inside. This contradicts Rav’s ruling.

תירוץ: לעולם המשנה מדברת בשאר העובר, ו״החזירו״ בכל זאת מחדש דבר — כמו שאמר רב נחמן בר יצחק בברייתא: לא נצרכה אלא ללמד על מקום החתך. אף כאן: אם לא החזיר, נאסר גם מקום החתך שבגוף העובר (ולא רק היד עצמה).

The Gemara responds: No; actually, the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, but nevertheless, the statement that the fetus brought back its foreleg does teach a novelty. This is similar to that which Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of a cut limb on the fetus’s body. If the foreleg were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside of the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus’s body would also be prohibited. Here too, one can explain that the ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not bring back its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is also prohibited.

תא שמע מברייתא לסתור את רב: המקשה לילד, הוציא העובר ידו והחזירה ואחר כך שחט את אמו — מותר באכילה; שחט את אמו ורק אחר כך החזירה — אסור באכילה.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a challenge to Rav’s ruling from a baraita: If an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth, and as a result the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward did the fetus return its foreleg back inside, its consumption is prohibited.

המשך הברייתא: הוציא העובר את ידו וחתכוה, ואחר כך שחט את אמו — מה שהיה בחוץ (היד) טמא ואסור, כאבר מן החי; ומה שבפנים (שאר העובר) טהור ומותר מכוח שחיטת האם.

If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and one cut it off, and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, then the part of the foreleg that was outside and was cut off is ritually impure and its consumption is prohibited, as it has the status of a limb cut from a living animal, which is forbidden. And the rest of the fetus that was inside is ritually pure and its consumption is permitted by virtue the slaughter of the mother animal.

המשך: שחט את אמו ורק אחר כך חתך את היד שיצאה —

If one slaughtered its mother and only afterward cut off the foreleg that had been extended outside,

— הבשר (של האם ושאר העובר שנגעו ביד) דינו כמגע נבלה, שהיד שלא ניתרה בשחיטה הרי היא כנבלה ומטמאה במגע. דברי ר׳ מאיר.

then the flesh of both the mother animal and the fetus, excluding the foreleg, is impure due to contact with a carcass. Since the foreleg of the now dead fetus was not permitted through an act of slaughtering, it is regarded as a carcass. It therefore imparts impurity to the rest of the flesh, which was in contact with it. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

וחכמים אומרים: דין הבשר כמגע טריפה שחוטה — שאמנם שחיטת האם אינה מתירה את היד באכילה, אבל מועילה למנוע ממנה טומאת נבלה; ולכן אינה מטמאה אלא פוסלת קדשים במגעה.

And the Rabbis say: Although the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the foreleg, it does serve to prevent the foreleg from imparting the ritual impurity of a carcass. Accordingly, the flesh has the status of having been in contact with a slaughtered tereifa. By Torah law, consumption of the animal is prohibited but it does not impart ritual impurity. The Sages decreed it to be impure in that it disqualifies sacrificial flesh with which it comes in contact.

על כל פנים שנינו ברישא של הברייתא: הוציא ידו והחזירה ואחר כך שחט — מותר. וכי לא מדובר על האבר עצמו, שמותר — נגד רב? תשובה: לא, מדובר על שאר העובר.

The Gemara explains the challenge to Rav’s ruling: In any event, the first clause of the baraita teaches: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside the mother animal’s body and then brought it back inside and then afterward one slaughtered its mother, its consumption is permitted. What, is it not referring to the limb, i.e., the foreleg, and the baraita rules that it is permitted, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling? The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to the rest of the fetus.

קושיא: אם הברייתא בשאר העובר, אמור את הסיפא: ״שחט את אמו ואחר כך החזירו — אסור״; ואם בעובר מדובר, מדוע יהא אסור? והרי שאר העובר ניתר בשחיטה!

The Gemara questions this: If the baraita is referring to the fetus, say the latter clause: If one first slaughtered its mother, and only afterward the fetus returned its foreleg inside, its consumption is prohibited. The Gemara explains the question: And if it is referring to the fetus, why should it be prohibited in this case?

תירוץ: כמו שאמר רב נחמן בר יצחק — לא נצרכה הסיפא אלא למקום החתך. אף כאן הברייתא בשאר העובר, והאיסור הוא על מקום החתך שבגוף העובר כשלא החזיר; אבל היד עצמה אסורה לעולם, אף שהחזירה — כדברי רב.

The Gemara answers: The baraita is referring to the fetus, and should be explained in a manner similar to that which Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said, in explanation of a ruling in a baraita cited below, that it is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the fetus’s body. If the foreleg was severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and outside when it was extended outside the womb, the location of the cut on the fetus’s body is also prohibited. Here too, one can explain that this ruling is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut, and it teaches that if the fetus did not return its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is prohibited as well. The foreleg itself, though, is prohibited even if it was brought back inside before the slaughter.

וכי כן? והרי כשבא אבימי מבי חוזאי הביא עמו ברייתא: ״פרסה (פרסת רגל אחת) החזיר — אכול, פרסות החזיר — אכול״. וכי לא משמע: החזיר את הפרסה — אכול את אותה פרסה עצמה — נגד רב?

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But when Avimi came from Bei Ḥozai he came and brought a baraita with him: One of the sources (see 69a) that the slaughter of a pregnant animal also serves to permit the consumption of the fetus is the verse: “And every animal that has a split hoof and is cloven into two hooves, chews the cud, of the animals, it you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:6). The verse mentions both “hoof” in the singular and “hooves” in the plural to teach that sometimes one may eat two hooves and sometimes only one, as follows: If the fetus extended two of its hooves outside the womb, if it returned one hoof one may eat, if it brought back both hooves one may eat. What, is it not that the baraita means that if it brought back one hoof one may eat that hoof, and likewise if it brought back both hooves one may eat both of them, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling?

תשובה: לא, ״החזיר פרסה — אכול עובר״, שאר העובר. וקשה: אם בעובר, למה נקט ״החזיר״? אפילו לא החזיר מותר! ענה רב נחמן בר יצחק: לא נצרכה הברייתא אלא ללמד על מקום החתך.

The Gemara responds: No, it means that if it brought back one hoof or even both, one may eat the rest of the fetus but not the hooves. The Gemara objects: If it is referring to the permitted status of the fetus, why does it specifically state that it brought back the hoof? Even if it did not bring it back the fetus would be permitted. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said the ruling of the baraita is necessary only with regard to the location of the cut limb on the body of the fetus. If the limb were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside when it was extended outside the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus’s body would also be prohibited, but only if the fetus had not brought back that limb before the mother animal was slaughtered.

קושיא: והרי הברייתא נוקטת שני כתובים (פרסה ופרסות)! וכי לא אחד מהם בא להתיר את האבר עצמו (נגד רב) ואחד למקום החתך? תשובה: לא; אחד למקום החתך, ואחד להתיר קלוט (בעל פרסה סתומה) הנמצא במעי פרה.

The Gemara persists: But even given Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s claim the baraita adduces two verses, i.e., the mention of hoof and hooves. What, is it not that one serves to permit the limb, in contradiction to Rav’s ruling, and the other one serves to permit the location of the cut, in accordance with Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak’s ruling? The Gemara responds: No; one mention does serve to permit the location of the cut, but the other one serves to permit a fetus with non-cloven hooves [kalut] found inside the womb of a cow that was slaughtered. Although the fetus does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species, it is nevertheless permitted by virtue of the slaughter of its mother.

וכתוב זה נצרך אליבא דר׳ שמעון, שאמר: קלוט בן פרה (עגל בעל פרסה סתומה שנולד מפרה כשרה) — אסור, שאין בו סימני טהרה. ולמדנו שדבר זה אמור דווקא כשיצא לאויר העולם (נולד); אבל כשעודנו במעי אמו — מותר בשחיטתה.

And it is necessary to have a specific source to permit this according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon says: A calf with non-cloven hooves born from a kosher cow is forbidden, as the calf does not bear the distinguishing characteristics of a kosher species. The verse teaches that this matter applies only where the fetus emerged into the airspace of the world, i.e., it was born before the mother animal was slaughtered. But if it was still inside its mother’s womb when the mother was slaughtered, it is permitted.

עולא אמר בשם ר׳ יוחנן, כנגד רב: ואבר עצמו (היד שיצאה והוחזרה) — מותר באכילה מכוח שחיטת האם.

§ The Gemara attempted to challenge Rav’s ruling that once a limb of a fetus is extended outside the mother animal’s body it becomes prohibited even if it was then brought back, but did not find a conclusive refutation. It now presents a dissenting opinion: Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: And even the limb itself is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal.

אמר לו רב יהודה לעולא: והרי רב ושמואל שניהם אמרו שהאבר עצמו אסור! ענה לו עולא: מי יתן לנו מעפר קבריהם של רב ושמואל ונמלא עינינו (כה גדולים הם), ואף על פי כן אני נוקט כר׳ יוחנן, וכך אמר: הכל היו בכלל ״ובשר בשדה טריפה לא תאכלו״ — כל דבר שיצא חוץ למחיצתו נאסר.

Rav Yehuda said to Ulla: But Rav and Shmuel both say the limb itself is prohibited; how can you say otherwise? Ulla said to him: Who will give us some of the dust of the graves of Rav and Shmuel and we will fill our eyes with it; such is the greatness of those Sages. But I follow the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Initially one would assume all flesh that is permitted due to being within a certain boundary, e.g., a fetus inside its mother’s womb, the flesh of offerings of the most sacred order within the Temple courtyard, and the flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity within Jerusalem, was included in the verse: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30). The verse is interpreted to teach that if such flesh leaves its boundaries it is rendered forbidden, even should it subsequently return.

המשך דברי ר׳ יוחנן: כיון שפרט לך הכתוב בנפרד אצל חטאת, שאם יצאה חוץ למחיצתה וחזרה — אסורה, שמע מינה שדווקא בחטאת פרט הכתוב; אבל כל שאר הדברים שיצאו חוץ למחיצתם וחזרו — מותרים, ובכללם אבר העובר שהוחזר.

Once another verse applies the concept for you specifically with regard to a sin offering, teaching that if it went outside of its boundary and returned it is prohibited (see Leviticus 10:18), then it is apparent that the Merciful One specifically applied the concept to a sin offering. But with regard to all other items that left their boundary, once they are brought back they are permitted, including the limb of a fetus that was extended outside the womb and then was brought back.

מיתיבי על עולא ור׳ יוחנן מברייתא: ״בשר בשדה טריפה לא תאכלו״ — מה בא ללמד? לפי שמצינו במעשר שני ובכורים שאף שיצאו חוץ למחיצתם (ירושלים) וחזרו — מותרים, יכול אף בשר שיצא חוץ למחיצתו וחזר יהא מותר? תלמוד לומר ״טריפה״ — שאינו חוזר להיתרו.

The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yoḥanan from a baraita: It is derived from the verse: “And flesh, in the field, a tereifa, you shall not eat,” that flesh that leaves the boundary in which it is permitted is thereby rendered forbidden like a tereifa. Why must the verse state that it is like a tereifa? The baraita explains: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that even though they went outside of their boundary, which is the city of Jerusalem and the only place where it is permitted to eat them, nevertheless if they are brought back to there they are once again permitted, one might have thought that also with regard to this prohibition, that of flesh that leaves its boundary, it is so, i.e., if it is brought back it once again becomes permitted for consumption. Therefore, the verse states: “A tereifa.”

מהו הלימוד מן ״טריפה״? אמר רבה: הוקש הבשר לטריפה — מה טריפה, כיון שנטרפה שוב אין לה היתר, אף בשר שיצא חוץ למחיצתו שוב אין לו היתר אף אם הוחזר. נמצא שאבר העובר נאסר לעולם — תיובתא דעולא, תיובתא (נדחו דבריו לגמרי).

The Gemara clarifies: What is the biblical derivation from the term “a tereifa”? Rabba said: The verse indicates that the prohibition of flesh that left its boundary is like the prohibition of a tereifa. Just as with regard to a tereifa, once an animal is mortally wounded, rendering it a tereifa, it can no longer regain a permitted status, so too with regard to flesh referred to in the verse: Once it has gone outside of its boundary it can no longer regain permitted status. Accordingly, if the limb of a fetus was extended outside the womb it would thereby become permanently prohibited, contradicting the opinion of Ulla and Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the statement of Ulla is indeed a conclusive refutation.

הגמרא מבארת אגב את הברייתא: ״אמר מר: לפי שמצינו במעשר שני ובכורים שיצאו וחזרו ומותרין״. שואלת הגמרא: היכן מצינו דין זה?

The Gemara analyzes the baraita, which states: The Master said: Since we find with regard to second tithe and first fruits that although they left their boundary, if they are brought back there they are again permitted. The Gemara asks: Where did we find this, i.e., what is the source for this halakha?

שנאמר: ״לא תוכל לאכל בשעריך מעשר דגנך וגו׳״ — דווקא בשעריך (מחוץ לירושלים) אסור לאכלם, ומכלל הן אתה שומע לאו: אבל אם יצאו חוץ למחיצתם (ירושלים) וחזרו — מותרים.

The Gemara explains that it is written: “You may not eat within your gates the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil, or the firstborn of your herd or of your flock, nor any of your vows that you have vowed, nor your voluntary offerings, nor the offering of your hand. But you shall eat them before the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 12:17–18). The phrase “the tithe of your grain, or of your wine, or of your oil” is referring to second tithe, and the phrase “the offering of your hand” is referring to first fruits. The verse states that all the items listed may be eaten only “before the Lord your God,” i.e., within the city of Jerusalem. The prohibition stated in the verse is that within your gates, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, you may not eat these items. But by inference, if these items went outside of their boundary, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, and then were brought back, they are permitted.

בארץ ישראל (מערבא) שנו את המחלוקת כך: רב אמר — יש לידה לאברים: אבר שיצא נחשב כנולד ועומד בפני עצמו, ולעולם אין שחיטת האם מתירתו. ור׳ יוחנן אמר — אין לידה לאברים: כל זמן שהאבר בפנים בשעת השחיטה, הוא ניתר בה.

§ The Gemara explained the dispute between Rav and Rabbi Yoḥanan in the way in which it was taught in Babylonia. The Gemara notes that in the West, Eretz Yisrael, they taught the dispute like this: Rav says there is a concept of birth with regard to limbs. When a limb is extended outside the womb, it is considered born and is independent of the mother animal. Consequently, it can never be permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says that there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs. Since the limb is never considered to have been born, as long as it is inside the mother animal when the mother animal is slaughtered it will be permitted by virtue of that slaughter.

מה ההבדל המעשי בין שתי הגרסאות (טעם רב)? כשיצא רוב האבר בלבד: לגרסת ׳יש לידה׳ — כל האבר נאסר, אף מיעוטו שנשאר בפנים; ולגרסת ׳יצא חוץ למחיצתו׳ — רק החלק שיצא נאסר, ולא המיעוט שבפנים.

The Gemara asks: What is the difference between these two versions which explain why Rav deemed the limb forbidden? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in a case in which only the majority of a limb was extended outside the womb. In that case, the issue is whether or not to prohibit the minority of the limb that remained inside. If the limb is forbidden because it is considered to have been born, the entire limb would be forbidden and not just the part that was extended. If the limb is forbidden because it left its boundary, then only the part that extended outside the womb would be forbidden.

איבעיא (שאלה): לדעת ר׳ יוחנן ש״אין לידה לאברים״ — הוציא העובר ידו והחזירה, וחזר והוציא ידו האחרת והחזירה, וכן הלאה עד שהשלים את רוב גופו ביציאה (אבל בכל פעם החזיר) — מהו? האם אומרים: הרי בסך הכל יצא רובו ונחשב נולד; או שמא כיון שבכל פעם החזיר — חזר, ואין כאן יציאת רוב.

A dilemma was raised before the Sages: According to the statement of the one who says there is no concept of birth with regard to limbs, if the fetus extended its foreleg outside the womb and brought it back, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and brought it back, and continued to extend parts of its body outside until the total amount that had been outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that ultimately the majority of the fetus has left the womb and the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born, and consequently the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit its being consumed? Or perhaps, since it brought each limb back, the limbs are considered to have been brought back; therefore, the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb and it is not regarded as having been born. In that case, the slaughter of its mother would still permit its being consumed.

ואם תמצי לומר שכיון שהחזיר — חזר, יש לשאול עוד: הוציא העובר ידו וחתכהּ, וחזר והוציא ידו האחרת וחתכהּ, וכן עד שהשלים את רובו (כאן לא החזיר, אלא חתך) — מהו? האם אומרים: הרי יצא רובו ונחשב נולד; או שמא צריך שיצא הרוב בבת אחת, וכאן לא יצא הרוב בבת אחת.

The Gemara asks: If you want to say that since it brought back each limb, they are considered to have been brought back and the majority of the fetus is not considered to have left the womb, the following dilemma still arises: If the fetus extended its foreleg outside and someone severed it, and again it extended its other foreleg outside and someone severed it, and this continued with its other limbs until the total amount outside the womb constituted the majority of the fetus, what is the halakha? Do we say that since the majority of the fetus has left the womb, the entire fetus should be regarded as having been born and therefore the slaughter of its mother can no longer permit it? Or perhaps, in order for the fetus to be regarded as having been born we require a majority of the fetus to leave simultaneously, which does not exist in this case.

תא שמע — הגמרא מציעה להכריע את האיבעיא ממשנתנו:

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from the mishna:

״זה הכלל: דבר שגופה אסור, ושאינה גופה מותר״. מאחר שכבר נשנה שהחותך מן העובר מותר, מה בא ״שאינה גופה מותר״ להוסיף? וכי לא בא לרבות כגון זה — שיצא רוב העובר אבר אחר אבר וחזר, ואף על פי כן שאר העובר שבפנים מותר?

This is the principle: An item that is part of an animal’s body that was severed prior to the slaughter is prohibited to be consumed even after slaughter, and an item that is not part of its body, i.e., its fetus, is permitted by virtue of its slaughter. The Gemara asks: Just prior to stating the principle, the mishna states the halakha that even if parts of a fetus are cut from it the slaughter of the mother permits it. If so, when the mishna presents the principle and states that an item that is not part of its body is permitted, what is added? Is it not to include a case like this, where the majority of the fetus has already left the womb, and nevertheless the principle clarifies that the rest of the fetus that remains inside the womb is permitted?

דחייה: לא, ״שאינה גופה מותר״ בא לרבות קלוט הנמצא במעי פרה, ואליבא דר׳ שמעון — שאף שאמר ר׳ שמעון קלוט בן פרה אסור, היינו דווקא כשיצא לאויר העולם (נולד); אבל במעי אמו — מותר בשחיטתה. ואין מכאן ראיה לאיבעיא, שנשארת בלא הכרעה.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, it comes to include a fetus with non-cloven hooves found inside the womb of a cow that was slaughtered. Although the fetus does not bear the hallmarks of a kosher animal, which has split hooves and chews its cud, it is nevertheless permitted to be consumed by virtue of the slaughter of its mother. And a specific clause in the mishna permitting this is necessary according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon says: A calf with non-cloven hooves born from a kosher cow is forbidden, as the calf does not bear the hallmarks of a kosher animal. The mishna teaches that this matter applies only where the fetus emerged into the airspace of the world, i.e., it was born before the mother animal was slaughtered. But if it is still inside its mother’s womb when the mother is slaughtered, it is permitted to be consumed.