מפת הסוגיא — שבת קי״בSugya map — Shabbat 112

משנה: יש קשרים שאין חייבים עליהם חטאת כקשר הגמלים וקשר הספנים (קשרי קבע) — אך אסורים מדרבנן. ואלו מותרים לכתחילה: אישה קושרת את פתח חלוקהּ, חוטי סְבָכָה (רשת לשׂער), ושל פסיקיא (חגורה רחבה), ורצועות מנעל וסנדל, ונודות יין ושמן, וקדירה של בשר (קשירת בגד על הסיר). רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר: קושרין חבל לפני הבהמה כדי שלא תצא.

MISHNA: You have knots for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering as one is liable for tying a camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot; however, it is nevertheless prohibited to tie them. A woman may tie closed the opening of her robe with straps, as well as the strings of her hairnet and the laces of her girdle, i.e., a wide belt tied with laces. One may also tie the straps of a shoe or a sandal, as well as the spouts of wine or oil jugs. One may also tie a garment over a pot of meat. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: One may tie a rope across an entrance before an animal so that it will not go out.

גמרא: המשנה עצמה קשה (סתירה פנימית): אמרת שיש קשרים שאין חייבים עליהם כקשר הגמלים והספנים — משמע שחיוב חטאת אין, אבל איסור (מדרבנן) יש; ושוב שנית ׳קושרת אישה מפתח חלוקהּ׳ — משמע מותר אפילו לכתחילה! מתרצת: כך כוונת המשנה — יש קשרים שאין חייבים עליהם חטאת כקשר הגמלים והספנים, ומהם —

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult, as there is an internal contradiction in the mishna. On the one hand, you said that there are knots for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering as he is for tying a camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot, which would seem to indicate that although there is no Torah liability, there is a rabbinic prohibition. And then it was taught that a woman may tie the opening of her robe, indicating that doing so is permitted even ab initio. The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is saying: There are knots for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering for tying them on Shabbat as he is for tying a camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot. And which are these?

גמרא: המשנה עצמה קשה (סתירה פנימית): אמרת שיש קשרים שאין חייבים עליהם כקשר הגמלים והספנים — משמע שחיוב חטאת אין, אבל איסור (מדרבנן) יש; ושוב שנית ׳קושרת אישה מפתח חלוקהּ׳ — משמע מותר אפילו לכתחילה! מתרצת: כך כוונת המשנה — יש קשרים שאין חייבים עליהם חטאת כקשר הגמלים והספנים, ומהם —

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: This matter itself is difficult, as there is an internal contradiction in the mishna. On the one hand, you said that there are knots for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering as he is for tying a camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot, which would seem to indicate that although there is no Torah liability, there is a rabbinic prohibition. And then it was taught that a woman may tie the opening of her robe, indicating that doing so is permitted even ab initio. The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is saying: There are knots for which one is not liable to bring a sin-offering for tying them on Shabbat as he is for tying a camel driver’s knot and a sailor’s knot. And which are these?

קשר שקושרים בּזממא (טבעת אף הגמל) וקשר שקושרים באיסטרידא (טבעת ספינה) — חיוב חטאת אין בהם אבל איסור יש. ויש שמותרים אף לכתחילה, ומהם — האישה הקושרת את פתח חלוקהּ.

A knot with which one ties a strap to the camel’s nose ring and a knot with which one ties a rope to the ring fixed to the bow of a ship, with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering, there is none; however, there is a rabbinic prohibition. And there are knots that are permitted to be tied on Shabbat ab initio. And which are these? The knot that a woman uses to tie the opening of her robe.

׳מפתח חלוקהּ׳ — פשיטא (הרי קשר זה עשוי להתירו)! מתרצת: לא נצרכה אלא כשיש לחלוק שני פתחים (שני שרוכים). מהו דתימא: אחד מהם היא מבטלת (אינה מתירתו לעולם) ונעשה קשר קבע — קא משמע לן שאין כך, שניהם ארעי.

We learned in the mishna: A woman may tie the opening of her robe on Shabbat. The Gemara states: This is obvious, as the knot is meant to be untied and is therefore not permanent. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to state this halakha in a case where the robe has two laces with which to tie the opening. Lest you say that one of them may become void because the woman can remove the garment even with one string, leaving the one not untied a permanent knot, it therefore teaches us that neither knot is considered permanent.

׳מפתח חלוקהּ׳ — פשיטא (הרי קשר זה עשוי להתירו)! מתרצת: לא נצרכה אלא כשיש לחלוק שני פתחים (שני שרוכים). מהו דתימא: אחד מהם היא מבטלת (אינה מתירתו לעולם) ונעשה קשר קבע — קא משמע לן שאין כך, שניהם ארעי.

We learned in the mishna: A woman may tie the opening of her robe on Shabbat. The Gemara states: This is obvious, as the knot is meant to be untied and is therefore not permanent. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to state this halakha in a case where the robe has two laces with which to tie the opening. Lest you say that one of them may become void because the woman can remove the garment even with one string, leaving the one not untied a permanent knot, it therefore teaches us that neither knot is considered permanent.

׳מפתח חלוקהּ׳ — פשיטא (הרי קשר זה עשוי להתירו)! מתרצת: לא נצרכה אלא כשיש לחלוק שני פתחים (שני שרוכים). מהו דתימא: אחד מהם היא מבטלת (אינה מתירתו לעולם) ונעשה קשר קבע — קא משמע לן שאין כך, שניהם ארעי.

We learned in the mishna: A woman may tie the opening of her robe on Shabbat. The Gemara states: This is obvious, as the knot is meant to be untied and is therefore not permanent. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to state this halakha in a case where the robe has two laces with which to tie the opening. Lest you say that one of them may become void because the woman can remove the garment even with one string, leaving the one not untied a permanent knot, it therefore teaches us that neither knot is considered permanent.

׳וחוטי סְבָכה׳ — פשיטא! לא נצרכה אלא כשהרשת רחבה לה (רפויה). מהו דתימא: לעיתים היא שולפתהּ בלא להתיר והקשר נשאר קבוע — קא משמע לן שאישה חסה על שׂערהּ ולכן מתירה את הרשת, ואין זה קשר קבע.

We learned in the mishna: And a woman may tie the strings of her hairnet on Shabbat. The Gemara states: This is obvious. The Gemara clarifies the matter: It was only necessary to state this halakha in a case where the hairnet is tied loosely on her head. Lest you say that she sometimes removes it without untying it and the knots remain, the mishna teaches us that a woman is protective of her hair and avoids pulling it out, and therefore she unties the hairnet to avoid damaging her hair.

׳וחוטי סְבָכה׳ — פשיטא! לא נצרכה אלא כשהרשת רחבה לה (רפויה). מהו דתימא: לעיתים היא שולפתהּ בלא להתיר והקשר נשאר קבוע — קא משמע לן שאישה חסה על שׂערהּ ולכן מתירה את הרשת, ואין זה קשר קבע.

We learned in the mishna: And a woman may tie the strings of her hairnet on Shabbat. The Gemara states: This is obvious. The Gemara clarifies the matter: It was only necessary to state this halakha in a case where the hairnet is tied loosely on her head. Lest you say that she sometimes removes it without untying it and the knots remain, the mishna teaches us that a woman is protective of her hair and avoids pulling it out, and therefore she unties the hairnet to avoid damaging her hair.

׳וחוטי סְבָכה׳ — פשיטא! לא נצרכה אלא כשהרשת רחבה לה (רפויה). מהו דתימא: לעיתים היא שולפתהּ בלא להתיר והקשר נשאר קבוע — קא משמע לן שאישה חסה על שׂערהּ ולכן מתירה את הרשת, ואין זה קשר קבע.

We learned in the mishna: And a woman may tie the strings of her hairnet on Shabbat. The Gemara states: This is obvious. The Gemara clarifies the matter: It was only necessary to state this halakha in a case where the hairnet is tied loosely on her head. Lest you say that she sometimes removes it without untying it and the knots remain, the mishna teaches us that a woman is protective of her hair and avoids pulling it out, and therefore she unties the hairnet to avoid damaging her hair.

׳ורצועות מנעל וסנדל׳ — נאמרה מחלוקת ברייתות במי שהתיר רצועות מנעל וסנדל: ברייתא אחת — חייב חטאת; אחרת — פטור אבל אסור; ואחרת — מותר לכתחילה. קשיא מנעל אמנעל, וקשיא סנדל אסנדל (סתירה בין הברייתות).

We learned in the mishna: And it is permitted to tie the straps of a shoe or a sandal on Shabbat. It was stated with regard to one who untied the straps of a shoe or a sandal: One baraita taught that one who did so on Shabbat is liable to bring a sin-offering; and it was taught in another baraita that one is exempt by Torah law, and it is prohibited to untie those straps ab initio; and it was taught in another baraita that it is permitted to untie these knots ab initio. This is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one statement with regard to a shoe and another statement with regard to the straps of a shoe; and this is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one statement with regard to the straps of a sandal and another statement with regard to the straps of a sandal.

מנעל אמנעל לא קשיא: זו שאמרה ׳חייב חטאת׳ — בקשר של אומנים (אושכפי, סנדלרים) שהוא קשר קבע; ׳פטור אבל אסור׳ — בקשר של תלמידי חכמים (שרגילים לחלוץ ולנעול); ׳מותר לכתחילה׳ — בקשר של בני מחוזא (שמתירים וקושרים בכל יום).

The Gemara explains: The apparent contradiction between one statement with regard to a shoe and the other statement with regard to a shoe is not difficult, as that baraita, which teaches that one is liable to bring a sin-offering, is referring to a shoemaker’s knot, which is permanent as it holds the shoe together. The baraita that states that he is exempt by Torah law and it is prohibited by rabbinic decree is referring to the shoe worn by Sages, as they often tie their shoes loosely so they can easily put on and remove their shoes. The baraita that teaches that it is permitted to tie shoes ab initio is referring to such knots used by the residents of the city of Meḥoza, who are meticulous in their dress and who tie and untie their shoes every day.

סנדל אסנדל לא קשיא: ׳חייב חטאת׳ — בסנדלי הטייעים (ערבים) שהאומנים קושרים בקבע; ׳פטור אבל אסור׳ — בקשר שהם עצמם קושרים; ׳מותר לכתחילה׳ — בסנדל שיוצאים בו שניים בזה אחר זה, כמעשה רב יהודה אחי רב סלא חסידא, שהיתה לו זוג סנדלים, פעמים יצא בהם הוא ופעמים בנו. בא לפני אביי ושאל: כהאי גוונא מהו? אמר לו: חייב חטאת.

Similarly, the contradiction between one statement with regard to the straps of a sandal and the other statement with regard to the straps of a sandal is not difficult, as that baraita, which teaches that one is liable to bring a sin-offering, is referring to Arab sandals, for which shoemakers tie permanent knots. And the baraita that teaches that he is exempt by Torah law and it is prohibited by rabbinic decree is referring to straps that they, i.e., ordinary people, tie. The baraita that teaches that it is permitted to tie and untie the straps of a sandal ab initio is referring to a sandal shared by two people who alternate going out at different times. They untie and retie the straps each time to ensure that the sandals will fit properly, like the sandals of Rav Yehuda; as Rav Yehuda, brother of Rav Sala Ḥasida, had a pair of sandals, and sometimes he would go out wearing them and sometimes his child would go out wearing them. Rav Yehuda came before Abaye and said to him: What is the ruling in a case of this kind? May I tie the straps on Shabbat? Abaye said to him: Doing so renders you liable to bring a sin-offering.

סנדל אסנדל לא קשיא: ׳חייב חטאת׳ — בסנדלי הטייעים (ערבים) שהאומנים קושרים בקבע; ׳פטור אבל אסור׳ — בקשר שהם עצמם קושרים; ׳מותר לכתחילה׳ — בסנדל שיוצאים בו שניים בזה אחר זה, כמעשה רב יהודה אחי רב סלא חסידא, שהיתה לו זוג סנדלים, פעמים יצא בהם הוא ופעמים בנו. בא לפני אביי ושאל: כהאי גוונא מהו? אמר לו: חייב חטאת.

Similarly, the contradiction between one statement with regard to the straps of a sandal and the other statement with regard to the straps of a sandal is not difficult, as that baraita, which teaches that one is liable to bring a sin-offering, is referring to Arab sandals, for which shoemakers tie permanent knots. And the baraita that teaches that he is exempt by Torah law and it is prohibited by rabbinic decree is referring to straps that they, i.e., ordinary people, tie. The baraita that teaches that it is permitted to tie and untie the straps of a sandal ab initio is referring to a sandal shared by two people who alternate going out at different times. They untie and retie the straps each time to ensure that the sandals will fit properly, like the sandals of Rav Yehuda; as Rav Yehuda, brother of Rav Sala Ḥasida, had a pair of sandals, and sometimes he would go out wearing them and sometimes his child would go out wearing them. Rav Yehuda came before Abaye and said to him: What is the ruling in a case of this kind? May I tie the straps on Shabbat? Abaye said to him: Doing so renders you liable to bring a sin-offering.

סנדל אסנדל לא קשיא: ׳חייב חטאת׳ — בסנדלי הטייעים (ערבים) שהאומנים קושרים בקבע; ׳פטור אבל אסור׳ — בקשר שהם עצמם קושרים; ׳מותר לכתחילה׳ — בסנדל שיוצאים בו שניים בזה אחר זה, כמעשה רב יהודה אחי רב סלא חסידא, שהיתה לו זוג סנדלים, פעמים יצא בהם הוא ופעמים בנו. בא לפני אביי ושאל: כהאי גוונא מהו? אמר לו: חייב חטאת.

Similarly, the contradiction between one statement with regard to the straps of a sandal and the other statement with regard to the straps of a sandal is not difficult, as that baraita, which teaches that one is liable to bring a sin-offering, is referring to Arab sandals, for which shoemakers tie permanent knots. And the baraita that teaches that he is exempt by Torah law and it is prohibited by rabbinic decree is referring to straps that they, i.e., ordinary people, tie. The baraita that teaches that it is permitted to tie and untie the straps of a sandal ab initio is referring to a sandal shared by two people who alternate going out at different times. They untie and retie the straps each time to ensure that the sandals will fit properly, like the sandals of Rav Yehuda; as Rav Yehuda, brother of Rav Sala Ḥasida, had a pair of sandals, and sometimes he would go out wearing them and sometimes his child would go out wearing them. Rav Yehuda came before Abaye and said to him: What is the ruling in a case of this kind? May I tie the straps on Shabbat? Abaye said to him: Doing so renders you liable to bring a sin-offering.

אמר לו רב יהודה לאביי: עתה אפילו ׳פטור אבל אסור׳ היה קשה לי, ואתה אומר לי ׳חייב חטאת׳?! שאל אביי: מאי טעמא (מה הקושי)? אמר לו: משום שאף בחול לעיתים יוצא בהם אני ולעיתים בני (ואין זה קשר קבע). אמר לו אביי: אם כן — מותר לכתחילה.

Rav Yehuda said to him: Now, even if your ruling in that case had been that one is exempt by Torah law but it is still prohibited by rabbinic law, it would be difficult for me, and you say to me that the ruling is that one is liable to bring a sin-offering. Abaye asked him: What is the reason for that difficulty? Rav Yehuda said to him: Because on weekdays too I sometimes go out wearing them and sometimes my child goes out wearing them. Abaye said to him: If so, it is permitted to untie the straps ab initio.

אמר לו רב יהודה לאביי: עתה אפילו ׳פטור אבל אסור׳ היה קשה לי, ואתה אומר לי ׳חייב חטאת׳?! שאל אביי: מאי טעמא (מה הקושי)? אמר לו: משום שאף בחול לעיתים יוצא בהם אני ולעיתים בני (ואין זה קשר קבע). אמר לו אביי: אם כן — מותר לכתחילה.

Rav Yehuda said to him: Now, even if your ruling in that case had been that one is exempt by Torah law but it is still prohibited by rabbinic law, it would be difficult for me, and you say to me that the ruling is that one is liable to bring a sin-offering. Abaye asked him: What is the reason for that difficulty? Rav Yehuda said to him: Because on weekdays too I sometimes go out wearing them and sometimes my child goes out wearing them. Abaye said to him: If so, it is permitted to untie the straps ab initio.

רבי ירמיה היה הולך אחר רבי אבהו בכרמלית, ונפסקה רצועת סנדלו. שאל: מה אעשה לו? אמר לו: קח גמי לח הראוי למאכל בהמה וכרוך עליו. ומעשה אחר: אביי עמד לפני רב יוסף, נפסקה רצועתו. שאל: מה אעשה לו? אמר לו: הניחהו (אל תטלטלהו). שאל: מאי שנא ממעשה רבי ירמיה? אמר לו: שם לא היה הסנדל משתמר, כאן משתמר. אמר לו: והרי כלי הוא, שאם ארצה אהפכנו מימין לשמאל (ואלבשנו)? אמר לו: מדמתרץ רבי יוחנן אליבא דרבי יהודה — שמע מינה הלכה כרבי יהודה (וסנדל פגום אינו כלי).

Rabbi Yirmeya was walking after Rabbi Abbahu in a karmelit on Shabbat when the strap of his sandal tore. Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abbahu: What should I do to it? Rabbi Abbahu said to him: Take a moist reed fit for animal consumption and wrap it around the sandal to fasten it. And the Gemara relates: Abaye was standing before Rav Yosef on Shabbat when the strap of his sandal tore. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What should I do with it? He said to him: Leave it and do not move it. Abaye said to him: How is this case different from that of Rabbi Yirmeya? He answered him: There the sandal would not have been protected; here it will be protected. Abaye said to him: But it remains a utensil and may therefore be moved on Shabbat, as if I so desire, I can switch it from the right foot to the left foot and wear it. Rav Yosef said to him: From the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan explains the matter in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as will be explained, conclude from it that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Therefore, a torn sandal is not considered to be a utensil even if it were switched, i.e., turned around.

רבי ירמיה היה הולך אחר רבי אבהו בכרמלית, ונפסקה רצועת סנדלו. שאל: מה אעשה לו? אמר לו: קח גמי לח הראוי למאכל בהמה וכרוך עליו. ומעשה אחר: אביי עמד לפני רב יוסף, נפסקה רצועתו. שאל: מה אעשה לו? אמר לו: הניחהו (אל תטלטלהו). שאל: מאי שנא ממעשה רבי ירמיה? אמר לו: שם לא היה הסנדל משתמר, כאן משתמר. אמר לו: והרי כלי הוא, שאם ארצה אהפכנו מימין לשמאל (ואלבשנו)? אמר לו: מדמתרץ רבי יוחנן אליבא דרבי יהודה — שמע מינה הלכה כרבי יהודה (וסנדל פגום אינו כלי).

Rabbi Yirmeya was walking after Rabbi Abbahu in a karmelit on Shabbat when the strap of his sandal tore. Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abbahu: What should I do to it? Rabbi Abbahu said to him: Take a moist reed fit for animal consumption and wrap it around the sandal to fasten it. And the Gemara relates: Abaye was standing before Rav Yosef on Shabbat when the strap of his sandal tore. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What should I do with it? He said to him: Leave it and do not move it. Abaye said to him: How is this case different from that of Rabbi Yirmeya? He answered him: There the sandal would not have been protected; here it will be protected. Abaye said to him: But it remains a utensil and may therefore be moved on Shabbat, as if I so desire, I can switch it from the right foot to the left foot and wear it. Rav Yosef said to him: From the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan explains the matter in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as will be explained, conclude from it that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Therefore, a torn sandal is not considered to be a utensil even if it were switched, i.e., turned around.

רבי ירמיה היה הולך אחר רבי אבהו בכרמלית, ונפסקה רצועת סנדלו. שאל: מה אעשה לו? אמר לו: קח גמי לח הראוי למאכל בהמה וכרוך עליו. ומעשה אחר: אביי עמד לפני רב יוסף, נפסקה רצועתו. שאל: מה אעשה לו? אמר לו: הניחהו (אל תטלטלהו). שאל: מאי שנא ממעשה רבי ירמיה? אמר לו: שם לא היה הסנדל משתמר, כאן משתמר. אמר לו: והרי כלי הוא, שאם ארצה אהפכנו מימין לשמאל (ואלבשנו)? אמר לו: מדמתרץ רבי יוחנן אליבא דרבי יהודה — שמע מינה הלכה כרבי יהודה (וסנדל פגום אינו כלי).

Rabbi Yirmeya was walking after Rabbi Abbahu in a karmelit on Shabbat when the strap of his sandal tore. Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Abbahu: What should I do to it? Rabbi Abbahu said to him: Take a moist reed fit for animal consumption and wrap it around the sandal to fasten it. And the Gemara relates: Abaye was standing before Rav Yosef on Shabbat when the strap of his sandal tore. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What should I do with it? He said to him: Leave it and do not move it. Abaye said to him: How is this case different from that of Rabbi Yirmeya? He answered him: There the sandal would not have been protected; here it will be protected. Abaye said to him: But it remains a utensil and may therefore be moved on Shabbat, as if I so desire, I can switch it from the right foot to the left foot and wear it. Rav Yosef said to him: From the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan explains the matter in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as will be explained, conclude from it that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Therefore, a torn sandal is not considered to be a utensil even if it were switched, i.e., turned around.

מאי היא (מהי דעת רבי יהודה)? דתניא: סנדל (טמא) שנפסקו שתי אוזניו, או שתי תרסיותיו, או שניטל כל הכף שלו — טהור (אינו כלי). נפסקה אחת מאוזניו, או אחת מתרסיותיו, או שניטל רוב הכף — טמא. רבי יהודה אומר: נפסקה הפנימית — טמא; החיצונה — טהור. ואמר עולא, ואיתימא רבה בר בר חנה, אמר רבי יוחנן: כמחלוקת לעניין טומאה כך מחלוקת לעניין שבת (אם מותר לצאת בו), אבל לא לעניין חליצה.

The Gemara asks: What is that opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? As it was taught in a baraita: A sandal that was ritually impure, whose two ears that hold the straps or whose two straps (ge’onim) broke, or whose entire sole was removed, becomes ritually pure because it is no longer a utensil. However, if only one of its ears or one of its straps broke, or if only most but not all of its sole was removed, it remains impure. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the inner strap broke it remains impure, because the outer strap can still be used. If the outer strap broke it is rendered pure. And Ulla, and some say Rabba bar bar Ḥana, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Like there is a dispute with regard to ritual impurity, so too, there is a dispute with regard to Shabbat, i.e., whether or not it is permitted to wear such a sandal on Shabbat. However, there is no dispute with regard to ḥalitza.

מאי היא (מהי דעת רבי יהודה)? דתניא: סנדל (טמא) שנפסקו שתי אוזניו, או שתי תרסיותיו, או שניטל כל הכף שלו — טהור (אינו כלי). נפסקה אחת מאוזניו, או אחת מתרסיותיו, או שניטל רוב הכף — טמא. רבי יהודה אומר: נפסקה הפנימית — טמא; החיצונה — טהור. ואמר עולא, ואיתימא רבה בר בר חנה, אמר רבי יוחנן: כמחלוקת לעניין טומאה כך מחלוקת לעניין שבת (אם מותר לצאת בו), אבל לא לעניין חליצה.

The Gemara asks: What is that opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? As it was taught in a baraita: A sandal that was ritually impure, whose two ears that hold the straps or whose two straps (ge’onim) broke, or whose entire sole was removed, becomes ritually pure because it is no longer a utensil. However, if only one of its ears or one of its straps broke, or if only most but not all of its sole was removed, it remains impure. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the inner strap broke it remains impure, because the outer strap can still be used. If the outer strap broke it is rendered pure. And Ulla, and some say Rabba bar bar Ḥana, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Like there is a dispute with regard to ritual impurity, so too, there is a dispute with regard to Shabbat, i.e., whether or not it is permitted to wear such a sandal on Shabbat. However, there is no dispute with regard to ḥalitza.

מאי היא (מהי דעת רבי יהודה)? דתניא: סנדל (טמא) שנפסקו שתי אוזניו, או שתי תרסיותיו, או שניטל כל הכף שלו — טהור (אינו כלי). נפסקה אחת מאוזניו, או אחת מתרסיותיו, או שניטל רוב הכף — טמא. רבי יהודה אומר: נפסקה הפנימית — טמא; החיצונה — טהור. ואמר עולא, ואיתימא רבה בר בר חנה, אמר רבי יוחנן: כמחלוקת לעניין טומאה כך מחלוקת לעניין שבת (אם מותר לצאת בו), אבל לא לעניין חליצה.

The Gemara asks: What is that opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? As it was taught in a baraita: A sandal that was ritually impure, whose two ears that hold the straps or whose two straps (ge’onim) broke, or whose entire sole was removed, becomes ritually pure because it is no longer a utensil. However, if only one of its ears or one of its straps broke, or if only most but not all of its sole was removed, it remains impure. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the inner strap broke it remains impure, because the outer strap can still be used. If the outer strap broke it is rendered pure. And Ulla, and some say Rabba bar bar Ḥana, said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Like there is a dispute with regard to ritual impurity, so too, there is a dispute with regard to Shabbat, i.e., whether or not it is permitted to wear such a sandal on Shabbat. However, there is no dispute with regard to ḥalitza.

והוינן בה (הקשינו): רבי יוחנן — לדעת מי? אם לדעת חכמים: מדהוי כלי לטומאה — אף לשבת כלי, אבל לא לחליצה (דלאו כלי) — והרי שנינו ׳חלצה של שמאל בימין חליצתהּ כשרה׳! ואם לדעת רבי יהודה: מדלאו כלי לטומאה — אף לשבת לאו כלי, אבל לחליצה כלי הוא — וקשה.

And we discussed this issue: In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan? If you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the baraita is explained as follows: From the fact that it is a utensil with regard to ritual impurity, it is also a utensil with regard to Shabbat, but it is not considered a utensil with regard to ḥalitza. However, didn’t we learn in a mishna: If she removed the left shoe, which was on the right foot of her brother-in-law, her ḥalitza is valid? Apparently, a woman can perform ḥalitza even when the shoe is on the wrong foot, and it is not deemed unfit for ḥalitza. Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and is saying the following: From the fact that with regard to impurity it is not a utensil, with regard to Shabbat it is also not a utensil. However, that is not the case with regard to ḥalitza, for which it is a utensil.

והוינן בה (הקשינו): רבי יוחנן — לדעת מי? אם לדעת חכמים: מדהוי כלי לטומאה — אף לשבת כלי, אבל לא לחליצה (דלאו כלי) — והרי שנינו ׳חלצה של שמאל בימין חליצתהּ כשרה׳! ואם לדעת רבי יהודה: מדלאו כלי לטומאה — אף לשבת לאו כלי, אבל לחליצה כלי הוא — וקשה.

And we discussed this issue: In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan? If you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the baraita is explained as follows: From the fact that it is a utensil with regard to ritual impurity, it is also a utensil with regard to Shabbat, but it is not considered a utensil with regard to ḥalitza. However, didn’t we learn in a mishna: If she removed the left shoe, which was on the right foot of her brother-in-law, her ḥalitza is valid? Apparently, a woman can perform ḥalitza even when the shoe is on the wrong foot, and it is not deemed unfit for ḥalitza. Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and is saying the following: From the fact that with regard to impurity it is not a utensil, with regard to Shabbat it is also not a utensil. However, that is not the case with regard to ḥalitza, for which it is a utensil.

והוינן בה (הקשינו): רבי יוחנן — לדעת מי? אם לדעת חכמים: מדהוי כלי לטומאה — אף לשבת כלי, אבל לא לחליצה (דלאו כלי) — והרי שנינו ׳חלצה של שמאל בימין חליצתהּ כשרה׳! ואם לדעת רבי יהודה: מדלאו כלי לטומאה — אף לשבת לאו כלי, אבל לחליצה כלי הוא — וקשה.

And we discussed this issue: In accordance with whose opinion is the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan? If you say that it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, and the baraita is explained as follows: From the fact that it is a utensil with regard to ritual impurity, it is also a utensil with regard to Shabbat, but it is not considered a utensil with regard to ḥalitza. However, didn’t we learn in a mishna: If she removed the left shoe, which was on the right foot of her brother-in-law, her ḥalitza is valid? Apparently, a woman can perform ḥalitza even when the shoe is on the wrong foot, and it is not deemed unfit for ḥalitza. Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion must be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and is saying the following: From the fact that with regard to impurity it is not a utensil, with regard to Shabbat it is also not a utensil. However, that is not the case with regard to ḥalitza, for which it is a utensil.

אימר דאמרינן ׳חלצה של שמאל בימין כשרה׳ — היכא שלמילתיה (לתשמישו הרגיל) הוא כלי; כאן לתשמישו לאו כלי הוא, שהרי אמר רבי יהודה ׳נפסקה החיצונה טהור׳ — אלמא לאו כלי! לעולם אליבא דרבי יהודה, ואימא (תקן דבריו): ׳וכן לחליצה׳. וזהו שהשמיענו: כשאמרנו ׳חלצה של שמאל בשל ימין כשרה׳ — היכא

The Gemara asks: Say that we said that if she removed the left shoe which was on the right foot, her ḥalitza is valid, that applies only in a case where it is fit as a utensil for its usual purpose, i.e., it can be used as footwear. However, here it is not fit as a utensil for its usual purpose, as Rabbi Yehuda said: If the outer strap of the sandal tore, the sandal is rendered ritually pure. Apparently, according to Rabbi Yehuda, it is not a utensil. Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement is difficult according to both opinions. The Gemara answers: Actually, his opinion is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; however, emend his statement and say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And this is the halakha with regard to ḥalitza as well. And this teaches us that when we say that if she removed the left shoe that was on the right foot her ḥalitza is valid, that is only in a case where

ומי אמר רבי יוחנן הכי (שהלכה כרבי יהודה)? והרי אמר רבי יוחנן: הלכה כסתם משנה, ושנינו: סנדל (טמא מדרס) שנפסקה אחת מאוזניו ותיקנהּ — טמא מדרס; נפסקה השנייה ותיקנהּ — טהור מלטמא מדרס, אבל טמא מגע מדרס. מאי לאו — לא שנא פנימית ולא שנא חיצונה (ובכל אופן טמא)? וזו סתירה לרבי יהודה.

The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan in fact say that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who says that if the outer strap broke the sandal becomes pure? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: The halakha is in accordance with an unattributed mishna? And we learned in a mishna: A sandal that became ritually impure with impurity imparted by the treading of a zav, and one of its ears broke and he repaired it, this sandal is still impure with ritual impurity imparted by treading, since a broken ear does not render the sandal useless and it remains a utensil. If the second ear broke and he repaired it, it is ritually pure in the sense that it no longer renders other objects ritually impure in the same way a vessel that became a primary source of ritual impurity by means of impurity imparted by treading does, since when both ears tear it is no longer a utensil. However, it is itself ritually impure with ritual impurity imparted by treading due to contact with a vessel that is impure, i.e., contact with itself. Since the sandal now has only one torn ear, it is still considered a utensil which is capable of contracting impurity, and it is as if it contracted impurity from itself in its previous state. Is this statement not an indication that there is no difference whether it was the inner strap or the outer strap that broke, as no single ear that breaks terminates the sandal’s use? This contradicts Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.

ומי אמר רבי יוחנן הכי (שהלכה כרבי יהודה)? והרי אמר רבי יוחנן: הלכה כסתם משנה, ושנינו: סנדל (טמא מדרס) שנפסקה אחת מאוזניו ותיקנהּ — טמא מדרס; נפסקה השנייה ותיקנהּ — טהור מלטמא מדרס, אבל טמא מגע מדרס. מאי לאו — לא שנא פנימית ולא שנא חיצונה (ובכל אופן טמא)? וזו סתירה לרבי יהודה.

The Gemara asks: Did Rabbi Yoḥanan in fact say that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who says that if the outer strap broke the sandal becomes pure? Didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say: The halakha is in accordance with an unattributed mishna? And we learned in a mishna: A sandal that became ritually impure with impurity imparted by the treading of a zav, and one of its ears broke and he repaired it, this sandal is still impure with ritual impurity imparted by treading, since a broken ear does not render the sandal useless and it remains a utensil. If the second ear broke and he repaired it, it is ritually pure in the sense that it no longer renders other objects ritually impure in the same way a vessel that became a primary source of ritual impurity by means of impurity imparted by treading does, since when both ears tear it is no longer a utensil. However, it is itself ritually impure with ritual impurity imparted by treading due to contact with a vessel that is impure, i.e., contact with itself. Since the sandal now has only one torn ear, it is still considered a utensil which is capable of contracting impurity, and it is as if it contracted impurity from itself in its previous state. Is this statement not an indication that there is no difference whether it was the inner strap or the outer strap that broke, as no single ear that breaks terminates the sandal’s use? This contradicts Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.

דוחה הגמרא: לא, המשנה בפנימית דווקא. ומקשים: אבל חיצונה מאי — טהור? אם כן, במקום ׳נפסקה השנייה … טהור מן המדרס אבל טמא מגע מדרס׳ — יפלוג בדידהּ (יחלק בתוך הבבא): במה דברים אמורים — שנפסקה הפנימית, אבל חיצונה — טהור! אמר רב יצחק בן יוסף: תהא משנתנו בסנדל שיש לו ארבע אוזניים וארבע תרסיות, כדי שלא לשבור (לסתור) את דברי רבי יוחנן.

The Gemara rejects this: No, this mishna is referring specifically to the inner strap. When the inner strap breaks, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the sandal remains ritually impure. The Gemara asks: However, if the outer strap breaks, what is the halakha? Is it that the sandal is pure? If so, instead of teaching: If the second ear broke and he repaired it, it is ritually pure in the sense that it no longer renders other objects ritually impure as a vessel that became a primary source of ritual impurity by means of impurity imparted by treading; however, it is itself ritually impure due to contact with a vessel that is impure due to contact with an object that became ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading, let him make a distinction within the case itself: In what case was this statement said? In a case where the inner strap breaks. However, if the outer strap breaks, the sandal becomes ritually pure. Rav Yitzḥak ben Yosef said: Let our mishna be interpreted as referring to a sandal that has four ears and four straps, and it can be explained that when it says that the second one broke, it was referring to the second outer one. It is worthwhile to interpret it this way so as not to break, i.e., contradict, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.

דוחה הגמרא: לא, המשנה בפנימית דווקא. ומקשים: אבל חיצונה מאי — טהור? אם כן, במקום ׳נפסקה השנייה … טהור מן המדרס אבל טמא מגע מדרס׳ — יפלוג בדידהּ (יחלק בתוך הבבא): במה דברים אמורים — שנפסקה הפנימית, אבל חיצונה — טהור! אמר רב יצחק בן יוסף: תהא משנתנו בסנדל שיש לו ארבע אוזניים וארבע תרסיות, כדי שלא לשבור (לסתור) את דברי רבי יוחנן.

The Gemara rejects this: No, this mishna is referring specifically to the inner strap. When the inner strap breaks, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the sandal remains ritually impure. The Gemara asks: However, if the outer strap breaks, what is the halakha? Is it that the sandal is pure? If so, instead of teaching: If the second ear broke and he repaired it, it is ritually pure in the sense that it no longer renders other objects ritually impure as a vessel that became a primary source of ritual impurity by means of impurity imparted by treading; however, it is itself ritually impure due to contact with a vessel that is impure due to contact with an object that became ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading, let him make a distinction within the case itself: In what case was this statement said? In a case where the inner strap breaks. However, if the outer strap breaks, the sandal becomes ritually pure. Rav Yitzḥak ben Yosef said: Let our mishna be interpreted as referring to a sandal that has four ears and four straps, and it can be explained that when it says that the second one broke, it was referring to the second outer one. It is worthwhile to interpret it this way so as not to break, i.e., contradict, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement.

כשבא רבין (מארץ ישראל) אמר: רב חנן בר אבא אמר רב — הלכה כרבי יהודה; ורבי יוחנן אמר — אין הלכה כרבי יהודה. ומקשים: ומי אמר רבי יוחנן הכי? והרי מדמתרץ רבי יוחנן אליבא דרבי יהודה משמע שכמותו סבר! מתרצת: אמוראים הם החלוקים — שניהם מסרו את דבריהם אליבא דרבי יוחנן.

When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he related that Rav Ḥanan bar Abba said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara asks: And did Rabbi Yoḥanan actually say this? From the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan provided an explanation in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, conclude from it that he holds that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara answers: They are different amora’im who made their statements in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan.

שנינו שם (במסכת כלים): כל כלי בעלי בתים (של עץ) שיעורם להיטהר בנקב כרימונים. בעי רבי חזקיה: ניקב כמוציא זית וסתמו, וחזר וניקב כמוציא זית וסתמו, עד שהשלים נקביו כמוציא רימון — מהו? האם מצטרפים הנקבים לטהרו, או שמא כיוון שכל נקב נסתם בטרם נעשה הבא — נשאר טמא?

The Gemara cites another discussion related to the previous halakha. We learned there in a mishna in tractate Kelim: All ritually impure wooden utensils belonging to ordinary homeowners become pure through breaking the utensil if they have holes the size of pomegranates. Ḥizkiya asked: What is the halakha when a utensil was perforated with a hole large enough for an olive to emerge, and he sealed it, and then it was perforated again with a hole large enough for an olive to emerge, and he sealed it, and this went on until the total area of all the holes completed a space large enough for a pomegranate to emerge? In other words, do we say that because the sum of the areas of all the holes adds up to the size of a pomegranate, the utensil is pure, or do we say that since the previous hole was filled before the next hole was formed, the utensil remains ritually impure?

שנינו שם (במסכת כלים): כל כלי בעלי בתים (של עץ) שיעורם להיטהר בנקב כרימונים. בעי רבי חזקיה: ניקב כמוציא זית וסתמו, וחזר וניקב כמוציא זית וסתמו, עד שהשלים נקביו כמוציא רימון — מהו? האם מצטרפים הנקבים לטהרו, או שמא כיוון שכל נקב נסתם בטרם נעשה הבא — נשאר טמא?

The Gemara cites another discussion related to the previous halakha. We learned there in a mishna in tractate Kelim: All ritually impure wooden utensils belonging to ordinary homeowners become pure through breaking the utensil if they have holes the size of pomegranates. Ḥizkiya asked: What is the halakha when a utensil was perforated with a hole large enough for an olive to emerge, and he sealed it, and then it was perforated again with a hole large enough for an olive to emerge, and he sealed it, and this went on until the total area of all the holes completed a space large enough for a pomegranate to emerge? In other words, do we say that because the sum of the areas of all the holes adds up to the size of a pomegranate, the utensil is pure, or do we say that since the previous hole was filled before the next hole was formed, the utensil remains ritually impure?

אמר לו רבי יוחנן (לרבי חזקיה): רבי, שנית לנו — סנדל שנפסקה אחת מאוזניו ותיקנהּ, טמא מדרס; נפסקה השנייה ותיקנהּ, טהור מן המדרס אבל טמא מגע מדרס. ואמרנו לך: מאי שנא הראשונה — שהשנייה קיימת? אף בשנייה הרי הראשונה כבר תוקנה (ושוב יש רק אוזן פגומה אחת)!

Rabbi Yoḥanan, his student, said to him: Master, you taught us that with regard to a sandal that became ritually impure by impurity imparted by the treading of a zav, and one of its ears broke and he repaired it, this sandal remains ritually impure with impurity imparted by treading. If the second ear broke and he repaired it, the sandal is ritually pure in the sense that it no longer renders other objects ritually impure in the same way a vessel that became a primary source of ritual impurity by means of impurity imparted by treading does. However, it is itself ritually impure with ritual impurity imparted by treading due to contact with a vessel that is impure, i.e., contact with itself. And we said to you: What is different when the first ear breaks that the sandal remains impure? It is because the second one is intact. So too, when the second ear breaks, the first one is repaired, and there is only one torn ear.

ואמרת לנו עליו: ׳פנים חדשות באו לכאן׳ (הסנדל המתוקן הוא ישות חדשה ולכן טהור). אף כאן (בכלי שניקב ונסתם פעמים רבות) — פנים חדשות באו לכאן (וטהור).

And you said to us in this regard that the reason the sandal is pure is because a new face has arrived here. The legal status of the sandal with the two repaired ears is not that of the original sandal; it is a new sandal. Here too, with regard to a utensil that was perforated several times and sealed each time, let us say with regard to the sandal as well that a new face has arrived here, and it is ritually pure because the repaired sandal is a new entity and not the original sandal.

קרא עליו (חזקיה על רבי יוחנן): ׳לית דין בר אינש׳ (אין זה בן אדם, אלא מלאך). איכא דאמרי: ׳כגון דין בר אינש׳ (אדם מושלם כזה). אמר רבי זירא אמר רבא בר זימונא: אם הראשונים בני מלאכים — אנו בני אנשים; ואם הראשונים בני אנשים — אנו כחמורים, ולא כחמורו של רבי חנינא בן דוסא ושל רבי פנחס בן יאיר (שהיו מופלגים), אלא כשאר חמורים.

Ḥizkiya was so impressed by Rabbi Yoḥanan’s comment that he exclaimed about him: This is not a human being, but an angel. Some say that he said: This is an ideal human being. On a similar note, Rabbi Zeira said that Rava bar Zimuna said: If the early generations are characterized as sons of angels, we are the sons of men. And if the early generations are characterized as the sons of men, we are akin to donkeys. And I do not mean that we are akin to either the donkey of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa or the donkey of Rabbi Pinḥas ben Yair, who were both extraordinarily intelligent donkeys; rather, we are akin to other typical donkeys.

׳ונודות יין ושמן׳ — פשיטא! לא נצרכה אלא שיש לנוד שתי אוזניים (שני פתחים). מהו דתימא: אחת מהן הוא מבטל (ונעשה קשרהּ קבע) — קא משמע לן שאין כך.

And we learned in the mishna: It is permitted to tie the spouts of wine or oil jugs. The Gemara says: This is obvious. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach this halakha in a case where it, the jug, has two ears, i.e., two spouts. Lest you say: One of them, he voids it consequently defining the knot on that opening permanent and therefore prohibited, it teaches us that this is not the case.

׳ונודות יין ושמן׳ — פשיטא! לא נצרכה אלא שיש לנוד שתי אוזניים (שני פתחים). מהו דתימא: אחת מהן הוא מבטל (ונעשה קשרהּ קבע) — קא משמע לן שאין כך.

And we learned in the mishna: It is permitted to tie the spouts of wine or oil jugs. The Gemara says: This is obvious. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach this halakha in a case where it, the jug, has two ears, i.e., two spouts. Lest you say: One of them, he voids it consequently defining the knot on that opening permanent and therefore prohibited, it teaches us that this is not the case.

׳ונודות יין ושמן׳ — פשיטא! לא נצרכה אלא שיש לנוד שתי אוזניים (שני פתחים). מהו דתימא: אחת מהן הוא מבטל (ונעשה קשרהּ קבע) — קא משמע לן שאין כך.

And we learned in the mishna: It is permitted to tie the spouts of wine or oil jugs. The Gemara says: This is obvious. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach this halakha in a case where it, the jug, has two ears, i.e., two spouts. Lest you say: One of them, he voids it consequently defining the knot on that opening permanent and therefore prohibited, it teaches us that this is not the case.

׳קדירה של בשר׳ — פשיטא! לא נצרכה אלא שיש לה שלאכא (פתח/לולאה שדרכו אפשר לרוקן). מהו דתימא: מבטל הוא את הפתח (ונעשה קשר הבגד קבע) — קא משמע לן שאין כך.

We also learned in the mishna that it is even permitted to tie a garment to cover a pot of meat. The Gemara says: This is obvious. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach this halakha a case where it has a string with which one could open a flap and empty the food. Lest you say that since a single opening usually suffices he voids the knot with which he ties the garment, it teaches us that this is not the case.

׳קדירה של בשר׳ — פשיטא! לא נצרכה אלא שיש לה שלאכא (פתח/לולאה שדרכו אפשר לרוקן). מהו דתימא: מבטל הוא את הפתח (ונעשה קשר הבגד קבע) — קא משמע לן שאין כך.

We also learned in the mishna that it is even permitted to tie a garment to cover a pot of meat. The Gemara says: This is obvious. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach this halakha a case where it has a string with which one could open a flap and empty the food. Lest you say that since a single opening usually suffices he voids the knot with which he ties the garment, it teaches us that this is not the case.

׳קדירה של בשר׳ — פשיטא! לא נצרכה אלא שיש לה שלאכא (פתח/לולאה שדרכו אפשר לרוקן). מהו דתימא: מבטל הוא את הפתח (ונעשה קשר הבגד קבע) — קא משמע לן שאין כך.

We also learned in the mishna that it is even permitted to tie a garment to cover a pot of meat. The Gemara says: This is obvious. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach this halakha a case where it has a string with which one could open a flap and empty the food. Lest you say that since a single opening usually suffices he voids the knot with which he ties the garment, it teaches us that this is not the case.

׳רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר: קושרהּ וכו׳׳ — פשיטא! לא נצרכה אלא שיש לפתח שני חבלים. מהו דתימא

We also learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: One may tie a rope across an entrance before an animal so that it will not go out. The Gemara says: This is obvious. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach this halakha in a case where the entrance has two ropes. Lest you say

׳רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר: קושרהּ וכו׳׳ — פשיטא! לא נצרכה אלא שיש לפתח שני חבלים. מהו דתימא

We also learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: One may tie a rope across an entrance before an animal so that it will not go out. The Gemara says: This is obvious. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach this halakha in a case where the entrance has two ropes. Lest you say

׳רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר: קושרהּ וכו׳׳ — פשיטא! לא נצרכה אלא שיש לפתח שני חבלים. מהו דתימא

We also learned in the mishna that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: One may tie a rope across an entrance before an animal so that it will not go out. The Gemara says: This is obvious. The Gemara explains: It is only necessary to teach this halakha in a case where the entrance has two ropes. Lest you say

שאחד מהם הוא מבטל (ומשאיר קשר קבע, שהרי בהתרת חבל אחד אפשר להוציא את הבהמה בדוחק) — קא משמע לן ששניהם ארעיים ומותר לקושרם. אמר רב יוסף אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: הלכה כרבי אליעזר בן יעקב. אמר לו אביי: ׳הלכה׳ — מכלל שנחלקו? אמר לו: מאי נפקא לך מינהּ (בין כך הלכה כמותו)? אמר לו: ׳גמרא גמור זמורתא תהא?!׳ (וכי תלמד הלכה כשיר בעלמא, בלא להבין טעמהּ?).

that one of the knots one voids, because he can enable the animal to go out, albeit with difficulty, after untying one knot, therefore, it teaches us that both are considered temporary knots, and it is permitted to tie them. Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If you rule the halakha in accordance with his opinion, does that mean, by inference, that the Rabbis disagree, or perhaps is there no dispute and everyone accepts the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov? Rav Yosef said to him: What difference is there to you whether or not the Rabbis disagree? In either case, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Abaye answered Rav Yosef using a folk expression: Is it simply learn the lesson, let it be like a song? In other words, is it sufficient to simply parrot the halakhic ruling? Rather, it is necessary to examine the issue to understand it, even if it does not yield a practical halakhic difference.

שאחד מהם הוא מבטל (ומשאיר קשר קבע, שהרי בהתרת חבל אחד אפשר להוציא את הבהמה בדוחק) — קא משמע לן ששניהם ארעיים ומותר לקושרם. אמר רב יוסף אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: הלכה כרבי אליעזר בן יעקב. אמר לו אביי: ׳הלכה׳ — מכלל שנחלקו? אמר לו: מאי נפקא לך מינהּ (בין כך הלכה כמותו)? אמר לו: ׳גמרא גמור זמורתא תהא?!׳ (וכי תלמד הלכה כשיר בעלמא, בלא להבין טעמהּ?).

that one of the knots one voids, because he can enable the animal to go out, albeit with difficulty, after untying one knot, therefore, it teaches us that both are considered temporary knots, and it is permitted to tie them. Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If you rule the halakha in accordance with his opinion, does that mean, by inference, that the Rabbis disagree, or perhaps is there no dispute and everyone accepts the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov? Rav Yosef said to him: What difference is there to you whether or not the Rabbis disagree? In either case, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Abaye answered Rav Yosef using a folk expression: Is it simply learn the lesson, let it be like a song? In other words, is it sufficient to simply parrot the halakhic ruling? Rather, it is necessary to examine the issue to understand it, even if it does not yield a practical halakhic difference.

שאחד מהם הוא מבטל (ומשאיר קשר קבע, שהרי בהתרת חבל אחד אפשר להוציא את הבהמה בדוחק) — קא משמע לן ששניהם ארעיים ומותר לקושרם. אמר רב יוסף אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: הלכה כרבי אליעזר בן יעקב. אמר לו אביי: ׳הלכה׳ — מכלל שנחלקו? אמר לו: מאי נפקא לך מינהּ (בין כך הלכה כמותו)? אמר לו: ׳גמרא גמור זמורתא תהא?!׳ (וכי תלמד הלכה כשיר בעלמא, בלא להבין טעמהּ?).

that one of the knots one voids, because he can enable the animal to go out, albeit with difficulty, after untying one knot, therefore, it teaches us that both are considered temporary knots, and it is permitted to tie them. Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If you rule the halakha in accordance with his opinion, does that mean, by inference, that the Rabbis disagree, or perhaps is there no dispute and everyone accepts the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov? Rav Yosef said to him: What difference is there to you whether or not the Rabbis disagree? In either case, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Abaye answered Rav Yosef using a folk expression: Is it simply learn the lesson, let it be like a song? In other words, is it sufficient to simply parrot the halakhic ruling? Rather, it is necessary to examine the issue to understand it, even if it does not yield a practical halakhic difference.

שאחד מהם הוא מבטל (ומשאיר קשר קבע, שהרי בהתרת חבל אחד אפשר להוציא את הבהמה בדוחק) — קא משמע לן ששניהם ארעיים ומותר לקושרם. אמר רב יוסף אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל: הלכה כרבי אליעזר בן יעקב. אמר לו אביי: ׳הלכה׳ — מכלל שנחלקו? אמר לו: מאי נפקא לך מינהּ (בין כך הלכה כמותו)? אמר לו: ׳גמרא גמור זמורתא תהא?!׳ (וכי תלמד הלכה כשיר בעלמא, בלא להבין טעמהּ?).

that one of the knots one voids, because he can enable the animal to go out, albeit with difficulty, after untying one knot, therefore, it teaches us that both are considered temporary knots, and it is permitted to tie them. Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: If you rule the halakha in accordance with his opinion, does that mean, by inference, that the Rabbis disagree, or perhaps is there no dispute and everyone accepts the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov? Rav Yosef said to him: What difference is there to you whether or not the Rabbis disagree? In either case, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov. Abaye answered Rav Yosef using a folk expression: Is it simply learn the lesson, let it be like a song? In other words, is it sufficient to simply parrot the halakhic ruling? Rather, it is necessary to examine the issue to understand it, even if it does not yield a practical halakhic difference.