מפת הסוגיא — חולין ע״גSugya map — Chullin 73

חכמים נימקו את שיטתם (במשנה ס״ח): כשם שמצינו בטריפה ששחיטתה מטהרת אותה מטומאת נבלה, אף ששחיטה זו אינה מתירתה באכילה — כך תטהר שחיטת האם את אבר העובר שיצא מן הרחם, אף שהוא אסור באכילה.

§ The mishna states: And the Rabbis say: The flesh of a fetus that extended its foreleg outside the mother’s womb and whose mother was subsequently slaughtered has ritual impurity due to having been in contact with a tereifa that was slaughtered. The Gemara asks: Does a slaughtered tereifa impart impurity? The Gemara answers: Yes, and this is in accordance with the statement of Shmuel’s father, as Shmuel’s father says: The Sages decreed that a tereifa that one slaughtered imparts impurity to sacrificial animals, i.e., it will disqualify them if it comes in contact with them.

סיום נימוק חכמים: כשם שמצינו בטריפה ששחיטתה מטהרת אותה מטומאת נבלה — אף שחיטת הבהמה תטהר את אבר העובר שיצא.

§ The mishna cites the Rabbis’ rationale for their opinion: Just as we found in the case of a tereifa that its slaughter renders it ritually pure according to Torah law, i.e., it prevents it from having the ritual impurity of a carcass, despite not rendering the animal permitted for consumption, so too, the slaughter of the mother animal should render the limb of its fetus that left the womb ritually pure, despite the fact that it is prohibited for consumption.

בברייתא נשנתה תשובת ר׳ מאיר: וכי מי טיהר אבר זה מטומאת נבלה? שחיטת אמו! ואם שחיטה זו פועלת — אם כן תתיר אותו אף באכילה!

The mishna itself proceeds to cite Rabbi’s Meir’s response to this claim. The Gemara here cites a different version of his response based on that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: But what renders this limb pure from the impurity of a carcass? You might say it is the slaughter of its mother, but if so, the act of slaughter should also permit it even for consumption.

השיבו לו חכמים: שחיטה מצלת (מגינה) יותר על מה שאינו גוף הבהמה מאשר על גופה — שהרי שנינו: החותך מן העובר שבמעיה ושחט — מותר באכילה; אך חתך מן הטחול ומן הכליות ושחט — אסור באכילה.

The Rabbis said to him: The slaughter of an animal has a greater effect in shielding that which is not part of its body from having the ritual impurity of a carcass than that which is part of its body, as is apparent from that which we learned in the mishna (68a): If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one severs pieces from a fetus that is in its womb, leaving those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughtered it, then even if those pieces were left inside the animal, their consumption is prohibited.

מה כוונת הברייתא? אמר רבא (ויש אומרים בלא שם): הברייתא חסרה, וכך יש לשנותה — ר׳ מאיר: מי טיהר אבר זה מנבלה? שחיטת אמו, ואם כן תתירנו באכילה! השיבו חכמים: טריפה תוכיח — ששחיטתה מטהרתה מטומאת נבלה ואינה מתירתה באכילה.

The Gemara clarifies the response of the Rabbis: What are the Rabbis saying? Rava said, and some say it unattributed [kedi] to any particular Sage, that the baraita is incomplete, and this is what it is teaching: Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: But what renders this limb pure from the impurity of a carcass? You might say it is the slaughter of its mother, but if so, it should also permit it even for consumption. In response the Rabbis said to him: Let the halakha of a tereifa prove the point, as its slaughter renders it pure from the impurity of a carcass but it does not permit it for consumption. Similarly, the slaughter of the mother animal should render pure even the foreleg of its fetus, even if it does not permit it for consumption.

השיב ר׳ מאיר: לא! אם טיהרה שחיטת הטריפה אותה — דבר שהוא גופה — וכי תטהר אף את האבר שאינו גופה? חזרו חכמים: שחיטה מצלת יותר על שאינו גופה, שהרי שנינו: החותך מן העובר שבמעיה — מותר; מן הטחול ומן הכליות — אסור.

Rabbi Meir said to them: No, even if the slaughter of a tereifa renders the animal itself pure from having the impurity of a carcass, that is true with regard to something that is part of its own body. Does it necessarily follow that it should also render pure the limb of its fetus, which is something that is not part of its own body? The Rabbis said to him: The slaughter of an animal has a greater effect in shielding that which is not part of its body from having the impurity of a carcass than that which is part of its body, as is apparent from that which we learned in the mishna at the beginning of the chapter: If one severs pieces from a fetus that is in an animal’s womb and then slaughters the mother animal, their consumption is permitted. By contrast, if one severs pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughters it, their consumption is prohibited.

וכן שנינו בברייתא: אמר ר׳ מאיר: מי טיהר אבר זה מנבלה? אמרו לו: שחיטת אמו. אם כן תתירנו באכילה! אמרו לו: טריפה תוכיח — ששחיטתה מטהרתה מנבלה ואינה מתירתה באכילה.

The Gemara notes that this clarification of Rava is also taught explicitly in a baraita: Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: But what renders this limb pure from the impurity of a carcass? The Rabbis said to him: It is the slaughter of its mother. Rabbi Meir responded: But if so, it should also permit it even for consumption. In response the Rabbis said to him: Let the halakha of a tereifa prove the point, as its slaughter renders it pure from the impurity of a carcass but it does not permit it for consumption. Similarly, the slaughter of the mother animal should render pure even the foreleg of its fetus, even if it does not permit it for consumption.

הוסיף ר׳ מאיר: אם טיהרה שחיטת הטריפה אותה ואת האבר המדולדל בה — דבר שהוא גופה — וכי תטהר את העובר, שאינו גופה?

Rabbi Meir said to them: Even if the slaughter of a tereifa renders the animal itself pure, and likewise the slaughter of any animal renders the limb that was partially cut from it but still hangs from it pure from imparting the impurity of a carcass despite being prohibited for consumption, that is the halakha with regard to something that is part of its own body. Does it necessarily follow that it should also render pure the limb of its fetus, which is something that is not part of its own body?

חזרו חכמים: שחיטה מצלת יותר על מה שאינו גופה — שהרי שנינו: החותך מן העובר שבמעיה — מותר באכילה; מן הטחול ומן הכליות — אסור באכילה.

The Rabbis said to him: The slaughter of an animal has a greater effect in shielding that which is not part of its body from imparting the ritual impurity of a carcass than that which is part of its body, as is apparent from that which we have learned in the mishna above: If one severed pieces from a fetus that was in an animal’s womb and then slaughtered the mother animal, their consumption is permitted. But if one severed pieces of the spleen or of the kidneys of an animal and then slaughtered it, their consumption is prohibited.

ריש לקיש: כשם שנחלקו ר׳ מאיר וחכמים באבר עובר שיצא (אם שחיטת האם מצילתו מטומאת נבלה), כך נחלקו באבר בהמה המדולדל (אם שחיטת הבהמה מצילתו).

§ Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Just as there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis with regard to fetuses, concerning whether the slaughter of the mother prevents a limb that emerged from the womb from having the impurity of a carcass, so too, they have a parallel dispute with regard to limbs of an animal that were partially cut from it but still hanging from it, whether the slaughter of the animal prevents such limbs from having the impurity of a carcass.

ר׳ יוחנן חולק: המחלוקת היא רק באבר העובר; אבל באבר בהמה המדולדל — דברי הכל ששחיטה ״עושה ניפול״ (רואים את האבר כאילו נפל קודם השחיטה), ולכן אינה מצילתו מטומאת נבלה.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Their dispute is only with regard to a limb of a fetus that emerged from the womb, but with regard to a limb hanging from an animal, everyone agrees that the slaughter of the animal renders such a limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and the slaughter does not prevent the limb from having the impurity of a carcass.

ר׳ יוסי ב״ר חנינא ביאר את טעם ר׳ יוחנן לשיטת חכמים: אבר העובר יש לו תקנה בחזרה (אפשר להחזירו לרחם וייכשר בשחיטת האם), ולכן השחיטה מצילתו; אבל אבר בהמה מדולדל אין לו תקנה בחזרה.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the reason for the distinction made by Rabbi Yoḥanan concerning the opinion of the Rabbis that the slaughter of an animal renders pure the limb of its fetus, but does not render pure a limb hanging from the animal itself? The reason is that this limb of the fetus that emerged from its womb has a means of rectification by returning back inside the womb, in accordance with the opinion that it will then be permitted for consumption by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But this hanging limb does not have a means of rectification by returning, as it cannot be reattached to the animal’s body.

מיתיבי לר׳ יוחנן מן הברייתא: ר׳ מאיר אמר — אם טיהרה שחיטת הטריפה אותה ואת האבר המדולדל בה (דבר שהוא גופה), וכי תטהר את העובר שאינו גופה? משמע שר׳ מאיר עצמו סובר ששחיטה מטהרת אבר מדולדל — וזה כנגד גרסת ר׳ יוחנן.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion from the baraita cited above: Rabbi Meir said to them: No, even if the slaughter of a tereifa renders pure the animal itself and similarly the slaughter of any animal renders pure the limb that is hanging from it from having the impurity of a carcass, this is true with regard to something that is part of its own body. Does it necessarily follow that it should also render pure the limb of its fetus, which is something that is not part of its own body?

בשלמא לריש לקיש (שגם באיברין נחלקו): ר׳ מאיר אמר לחכמים ״לדבריכם״ — לדידי אין הבדל בין אבר עובר לאבר בהמה, שניהם שווים (שחיטה אינה מצילה); ולכן דבריו מתיישבים.

Rabbi Meir’s statement appears inconsistent with his opinion, as he holds that a hanging limb is not rendered pure by slaughtering the animal. The Gemara suggests that this difficulty can be resolved only according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish’s version of the Rabbis’ opinion, but not according to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s version. Granted, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, one can explain that Rabbi Meir was speaking in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis, as follows: According to my own opinion, there is no difference with regard to the limb of a fetus, and there is no difference with regard to a limb hanging from an animal; they are the same in that the slaughter of the animal does not render either of them pure. Accordingly, Rabbi Meir must have been speaking in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis that a limb hanging from an animal is rendered pure by the animal’s slaughter.

אלא לר׳ יוחנן (שבאיברין הכל מודים) — קשה, שהרי לפי דבריו ר׳ מאיר היה צריך לומר ששחיטה אינה מצילה אף אבר מדולדל.

But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that both the Rabbis and Rabbi Meir agree that a limb hanging from an animal is not rendered pure by the animal’s slaughter, Rabbi Meir’s statement is difficult, as it is inconsistent with both his opinion and the Rabbis’ opinion. The Gemara concedes the challenge.

אלא אם נאמרה המחלוקת — כך נאמרה: ריש לקיש — כמחלוקת בעוברין כך באיברין; ור׳ יוחנן — המחלוקת רק באבר עובר, אבל באבר בהמה דברי הכל שאין שחיטה עושה ניפול (היפך הגרסה הראשונה) — ולכן דברי ר׳ מאיר מתיישבים.

Rather, if such a dispute was stated, it was stated like this: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Just as there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis with regard to fetuses whose limbs emerged from the womb, so too, they have a parallel dispute with regard to limbs hanging from an animal. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Their dispute is only with regard to the limb of a fetus that emerged from the womb; but with regard to a limb hanging from an animal, everyone agrees that the slaughter of the animal does not render such a limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and does not impart the impurity of a carcass. According to this version of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s understanding of the dispute, Rabbi Meir’s statement is consistent even with his own opinion.

ר׳ יוסי ב״ר חנינא ביאר את טעם ר׳ יוחנן לשיטת ר׳ מאיר (בגרסה החדשה): אבר בהמה מדולדל הוא גופה (חלק מן הבהמה), ולכן שחיטה מצילתו; אבל אבר העובר אינו גופה.

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the reason for the distinction made by Rabbi Yoḥanan concerning the opinion of Rabbi Meir, that the slaughter of an animal does not render pure the limb of its fetus, but it does render pure a limb hanging from the animal itself? It is that this hanging limb is part of the animal’s body, but that, the limb of the fetus, is not part of its body.

רב יצחק בר יוסף בשם ר׳ יוחנן: הכל מודים שמיתת הבהמה (שלא בשחיטה) ״עושה ניפול״ — רואים את האבר המדולדל כאילו נפל קודם המיתה, ולכן יטמא משום אבר מן החי ולא משום נבלה; ואין שחיטה עושה ניפול.

§ The Gemara continues to elucidate the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Everyone agrees that the death of an animal by means other than slaughter renders a limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the animal’s death. Therefore, it will not have the impurity of a carcass, but it will have the impurity of a limb taken from a living animal. And likewise, everyone agrees that the slaughter of the animal does not render a limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and therefore it will not have the impurity of a carcass.

במה עוסקת אמירת ר׳ יוחנן? אם באבר עובר — הרי ר׳ מאיר וחכמים נחלקו בו בפירוש! אלא באבר בהמה מדולדל — אך גם דין מיתה כבר שנינו, וגם דין שחיטה כבר שנינו; אם כן מה חידש?

The Gemara clarifies: What are we dealing with here? If we say we are dealing with a limb of its fetus that emerged from its womb, Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis explicitly disagree with regard to this case. Rather, we are dealing with a limb hanging from an animal. But if so, Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement is unnecessary. With regard to a hanging limb, we already learn about the effect of the death of the animal in a mishna elsewhere, and we already learn about the effect of the slaughter of the animal in a mishna elsewhere.

דין מיתה שנינו (במשנה קכ״ז): מתה הבהמה — הבשר התלוי צריך הכשר (מגע משקה) כדי לקבל טומאה, והאבר המדולדל מטמא משום אבר מן החי ואינו מטמא משום אבר מן הנבלה; דברי ר׳ מאיר — משמע שמיתה עושה ניפול.

The Gemara elaborates: We already learn about the effect of the death of an animal in the mishna (127b): If the animal died without slaughter, any hanging flesh needs to be rendered susceptible to contracting ritual impurity in order to become impure. This is accomplished by coming in contact with liquid, with the owner’s approval. The reason is that its halakhic status is that of flesh severed from a living animal, which is ritually pure and does not have the status of an unslaughtered carcass. And a hanging limb imparts impurity as a limb severed from a living animal, but does not impart impurity as a limb from a carcass; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Evidently, Rabbi Meir holds that upon the animal’s death, anything hanging from the animal is considered as though it had already fallen off before the animal’s death. Since the mishna does not record that the Rabbis disagree, it would appear that they agree.

אף דין שחיטה שנינו (שם): נשחטה הבהמה — האבר והבשר התלויים הוכשרו לקבל טומאה בדמיה; דברי ר׳ מאיר. ר׳ שמעון אומר: לא הוכשרו בדם אלא במשקה אחר. ומכאן שאין שחיטה עושה ניפול.

Likewise, we already learn about the effect of the slaughter of an animal in the same mishna: If the animal is slaughtered, they, the limb and the flesh hanging from it, are thereby rendered susceptible to impurity, by coming in contact with its blood. Blood is one of the seven liquids that render foods susceptible to impurity and its presence is considered to be with the approval of the owner, as it makes the meat look redder and fresher; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: They were not rendered susceptible to impurity through the animal’s own blood, but only once they were wet with another liquid, with the owner’s approval. It is apparent that both opinions in that mishna agree that the limb does not have the impurity of a limb severed from a living animal. Evidently, they hold that the slaughter does not render the hanging limb as though it had already fallen off beforehand.

תשובת הגמרא: אילו רק מן המשנה ההיא, היינו אומרים שאמנם שחיטה כן עושה ניפול; ומה ש״הוכשרו בדמיה״ מוסב על הבשר בלבד (שאין לו טומאה עצמית), ולא על האבר — לכן הוצרך ר׳ יוחנן לחדש שאין שחיטה עושה ניפול.

Given that the mishna has already taught both halakhot, what was the necessity of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement? The Gemara answers: If these halakhot were derived only from that mishna, I would say that actually, slaughter does render a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off beforehand, and such a limb would have the impurity of a limb severed from a live animal. If so, what does the mishna mean when it states: They are rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with its blood? Ostensibly, the intention is that both the limb and the flesh must be rendered susceptible to impurity, which indicates that the limb does not have any impurity of its own. The Gemara explains: One would have explained that the need to be rendered susceptible to impurity is referring only to the flesh, as flesh severed from a living animal does not have any impurity of its own.

קושיא: והרי שנינו ״הוכשרו״ בלשון רבים, המשמע אף על האבר! יישוב: לשון הרבים בא לשני סוגי בשר — אחד הבשר הפורש מן הבהמה, ואחד הבשר הפורש מן האבר המדולדל; שניהם צריכים הכשר, ולא בא ללמד על האבר עצמו.

The Gemara objects: But the mishna teaches: They are rendered susceptible, in the plural, which is apparently referring to both the flesh and the limb, which were mentioned previously in the mishna. The Gemara explains: You might say that the plural is used because the statement is referring to two types of hanging flesh that upon slaughter are considered to have been separated from a living animal: One is for flesh that separates from the body of the animal, and the other one is for flesh that separates from the hanging limb. Neither type has its own impurity, so they must be rendered susceptible to impurity by coming in contact with liquid.

ומה כוחו של בשר זה (הפורש מן האבר) על האחר, שהוצרך ללמדו? סלקא דעתך אמינא: הואיל ובהיותו מחובר לאבר היה מטמא טומאה חמורה ״אגב אביו״ (האבר), אֵימא שאינו צריך הכשר — לכך קמ״ל שאף הוא צריך הכשר.

The Gemara asks: But in what way is it more compelling to apply the halakha to this type of flesh than to that type, making it necessary to state the halakha with regard to both? The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that since flesh that is attached to a limb severed from a living animal imparts the same severe form of ritual impurity as the limb on account of being a part of it, one might say that once the flesh is separated from the limb it does not need to then be rendered susceptible to impurity. To reject this possibility, the mishna uses the plural form to teach us that this type of flesh does need to be rendered susceptible to impurity.

רב יוסף: אחוז בדברי רב יצחק בר יוסף (שאין שחיטה עושה ניפול), שאף רבה בר בר חנה סובר כמותו. שכן שנינו בברייתא: ״ובשר בשדה טריפה לא תאכלו״ — לרבות האבר והבשר המדולדלים בבהמה, בחיה ובעוף, ושחטן, שהם אסורים; ואמר רבה בר בר חנה בשם ר׳ יוחנן:

§ Rav Yosef said: Take the statement that Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, i.e., that the slaughter of an animal does not render a hanging limb as though it had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, in your hand, i.e., accept it as correct, as Rabba bar bar Ḥana also holds in accordance with this opinion. As it is taught in a baraita: “And flesh that is torn in the field, you shall not eat” (Exodus 22:30). This serves to include the case of the limb or the flesh that was partially cut off but was still hanging on a domesticated animal or on an undomesticated animal or on a bird, and one slaughtered them; it is derived that they are prohibited as limbs severed from a living animal. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says with regard to the ruling of this baraita:

המשך דברי רבה בר בר חנה בשם ר׳ יוחנן: אין באבר ובבשר המדולדלים אלא מצות ״פרוש״ בלבד — איסור מדרבנן להיפרש מאכילתם, ולא איסור תורה; שכן הדרשה מן הפסוק אינה אלא אסמכתא.

In fact, such limbs and flesh are not prohibited by Torah law, as the slaughter does not render them as though they had already fallen off prior to the slaughter, and the verse cited in the baraita is not a true derivation but a mere support. Accordingly, with regard to them, there is nothing other than a rabbinic mitzva to separate oneself from consuming them.