מפת הסוגיא — חולין ל״טSugya map — Chullin 39

נאמר: השוחט בהמה כדי לזרוק את דמה לעבודה זרה או להקטיר את חלבה לעבודה זרה — רבי יוחנן אומר שחיטתה פסולה (ואסורה בהנאה), וריש לקיש אומר מותרת.

§ It was stated that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to one who slaughtered an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or to burn its fat for idol worship. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The slaughter is not valid, and benefit from the animal is forbidden. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: The slaughter is valid and deriving benefit from the animal is permitted.

רבי יוחנן הפוסל סובר: מחשבים (מעבירים מחשבת פסול) מעבודה אחת לעבודה אחרת, ולומדים דין שחיטת חולין שבחוץ מדין הקודשים שבפנים.

The Gemara elaborates. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The slaughter is not valid and benefit from the animal is forbidden. He holds that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. If, while slaughtering a sacrificial animal, one intends to perform one of the other sacrificial rites in an improper manner the offering is invalidated. And Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that we derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Since that intent invalidates the slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, it invalidates the slaughter of non-sacred animals outside the Temple as well.

ריש לקיש המתיר סובר: אין מחשבים מעבודה לעבודה (מחשבה בעבודה אחת אינה פוסלת עבודה אחרת), ואין לומדים דין החוץ מדין הפנים.

Reish Lakish says: The slaughter is valid, and deriving benefit from the animal is permitted. He holds that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. Therefore, while slaughtering the animal, only intent to perform the slaughter improperly invalidates the offering, but intent to perform another sacrificial rite improperly does not invalidate the offering. And Reish Lakish holds that we do not derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple.

והם הולכים לשיטתם, שכן נאמר: שחט חטאת לשמה אך בכוונה לזרוק את דמה שלא לשמה — רבי יוחנן אומר פסולה, וריש לקיש אומר כשרה.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish follow their standard line of reasoning, as it was stated: If one slaughtered a sin offering for its own sake, but with intent to sprinkle its blood not for its own sake but for the sake of another type of offering, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the offering is fit.

רבי יוחנן פוסל כי מחשבים מעבודה לעבודה, ולומדים זאת ממחשבת פיגול. ריש לקיש מכשיר כי אין מחשבים מעבודה לעבודה, ואין לומדים ממחשבת פיגול.

The Gemara elaborates: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the offering is unfit. He holds that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and the reason is that we derive the halakha of slaughter of a sin offering not for its sake from the halakha of intent for piggul, i.e., performance of one of the sacrificial rites with the intent to sprinkle the blood of the offering beyond its appointed time. And Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says that the offering is fit because he holds that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and the reason is that we do not derive the halakha of any other improper intent from the halakha of intent for piggul.

וצריך להשמיע את שתי המחלוקות: אילו נאמרה רק בעבודה זרה, היינו אומרים שדווקא שם מתיר ריש לקיש מפני שאין לומדים חוץ מפנים, אבל בפנים מפנים אולי יודה לרבי יוחנן.

The Gemara notes: And it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases. As, if it were stated only with regard to that case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically in that case that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish states his opinion that the slaughter is valid, due to the fact that we do not derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. But in the case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, where we would be deriving the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the halakhot of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, say that Reish Lakish concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that the offering is unfit.

ואילו נאמרה רק בקודשים, היינו אומרים שדווקא שם פוסל רבי יוחנן, אבל בעבודה זרה אולי יודה לריש לקיש — לכן צריך את שתיהן.

And if their dispute was stated with regard to this case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically in this case that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the offering is unfit, because he holds that one derives the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the halakhot of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. But in that case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, say that Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish that the offering is fit due to the fact that the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple are not derived from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Therefore, it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases.

רב ששת מקשה ממשנתנו: רבי יוסי אומר בקל וחומר — אם במקום שמחשבה פוסלת (בקודשים) הכל הולך רק אחר העובד (הכהן) ולא אחר הבעלים, מקום שאין מחשבה פוסלת (בחולין) — אינו דין שהכל ילך רק אחר השוחט?

Rav Sheshet raises an objection to both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish from the statement in the mishna with regard to one who slaughters for a gentile when the intent of the gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?

מה פירוש ״אין מחשבה פוסלת בחולין״? אם נאמר שאינה פוסלת כלל — אם כן שחיטה לעבודה זרה שאוסרת, כיצד תיתכן?

Rav Sheshet elaborates: What is the meaning of: Intent does not invalidate the slaughter in non-sacred animals? If we say that it means that intent does not invalidate the slaughter of non-sacred animals at all, but then how can you find a case of slaughter with intent for idol worship where the animal is forbidden?

אלא ודאי שכוונת רבי יוסי היא ״מעבודה לעבודה״, וכך אמר: ומה בקודשים שמחשבה פוסלת מעבודה לעבודה הכל אחר העובד, בחולין שאין מחשבה פוסלת מעבודה לעבודה אלא רק באותה עבודה — אינו דין שהכל אחר השוחט?

Rather, it is obvious that the meaning of that phrase in the statement of Rabbi Yosei is that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, and this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying: If in a place where intent invalidates, i.e., in sacrificial animals, from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite, everything follows only the intent of the one performing the slaughter, and the intent of the owners is irrelevant, in a place where intent does not invalidate, i.e., in non-sacred animals, from one rite to another rite but it does so only within the same rite, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?

לפי הבנה זו: דין הפנים (קודשים) קשה לריש לקיש, שהרי רבי יוסי אומר שמחשבים מעבודה לעבודה; ודין החוץ (חולין) קשה לרבי יוחנן, שהרי רבי יוסי אומר שאין מחשבים שם מעבודה לעבודה.

According to this understanding of the contention of Rabbi Yosei in the mishna, the case of the slaughter of a sacrificial animal inside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. The case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan, as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one does not transfer intent from one rite to another rite.

בשלמא דין הפנים אינו קשה לריש לקיש — אפשר לומר שדבריו (שאין מחשבים) נאמרו לפני ששמע ממשנת רבי יוחנן, ואחר ששמע חזר בו. אבל דין החוץ עדיין קשה לרבי יוחנן.

Rav Sheshet continues: Granted, the case of inside the Temple is not difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, because one can explain that he stated this statement that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite before he heard the mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan, his teacher, and he stated that one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite after he heard the mishna from Rabbi Yoḥanan. His dispute with Rabbi Yoḥanan is limited to transfer of intent for idol worship from rite to rite. But the case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal outside the Temple is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan.

רב ששת בעצמו מקשה ומתרץ: כוונת רבי יוסי היא לארבע עבודות (לא להעברה מעבודה לעבודה), וכך אמר — ומה בקודשים שמחשבה פוסלת בכל אחת מארבע העבודות, הכל הולך רק אחר העובד,

Rav Sheshet raises the objection, and he resolves it. That which Rabbi Yosei said, that intent inside the Temple disqualifies the slaughter of a sacrificial animal but intent outside the Temple does not disqualify the slaughter of a non-sacred animal, is unrelated to transfer of intent from one rite to another. Rather, Rabbi Yosei is referring to a case where one performed any of the four sacrificial rites with improper intent, e.g., to eat the offering beyond its appointed time. And this is what Rabbi Yosei is saying: If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter in sacrificial animals, if that intent was during performance of any of the four sacrificial rites, i.e., slaughter, receiving the blood, conveying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling the blood on the altar, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner,

מקום שאין מחשבה פוסלת בחולין אלא בשתי עבודות בלבד (שחיטה וזריקה) — אינו דין שהכל ילך רק אחר השוחט? כך נדחית הקושיה משתי הדעות.

then in a place where intent invalidates the slaughter in non-sacred animals slaughtered with intent for idol worship during performance of only two sacrificial rites, slaughter and sprinkling the blood, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?

ברייתא כרבי יוחנן: השוחט לזרוק דמה או להקטיר חלבה לעבודה זרה — הרי אלו זבחי מתים (פסולה). שחט ורק אחר כך חישב עליה — זה היה מעשה בקיסרי, ולא אמרו בו לא איסור ולא היתר.

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan: With regard to one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship or to burn its fat for idol worship, the status of these animals is that of offerings to the dead, i.e., to idols, and the slaughter is not valid. If one slaughtered the animal and thereafter intended in its regard to sprinkle its blood or burn its fats for idol worship, that was the incident in Caesarea, and the Sages did not say anything with regard to the animal, neither prohibition nor permission.

רב חסדא: לא אמרו איסור מפני כבוד חכמים (שסתם מחשבה אינה לעבודה זרה), ולא היתר מפני כבוד רבי אליעזר (שסתם מחשבה לעבודה זרה).

Rav Ḥisda says in explanation of the conduct of the Sages that they did not say prohibition, due to the honor of the Rabbis in the mishna, who hold that the unspecified intent of a gentile, and presumably likewise of a Jew who worships idols, is not presumed to be directed to idol worship, and therefore his slaughter is valid. Nor did the Sages say permission, due to the honor of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that the unspecified intent of a gentile, and presumably likewise of a Jew who worships idols, is presumed to be directed to idol worship.

מניין? אולי חכמים מתירים שם רק מפני שלא שמענו שחישב, אבל כאן ששמענו שחישב — הוכיח סופו על תחילתו (שכוונתו מתחילה הייתה לעבודה זרה)!

The Gemara asks: From where is that conclusion drawn? Perhaps the Rabbis say that the slaughter is permitted only there in the mishna, because we did not hear explicitly that the gentile intends the slaughter for idol worship. But here in the case in the baraita, where we hear thereafter that he intends to sprinkle the blood or burn the fats for idol worship, perhaps his ultimate statement proves the nature of his original intent while performing the slaughter.

או להפך: רבי אליעזר אוסר שם רק בבהמת נכרי, שסתם מחשבתו לעבודה זרה, אבל בישראל איננו אומרים ׳הוכיח סופו על תחילתו׳ — וממילא אין ראיה לדברי רב חסדא.

Alternatively, perhaps when Rabbi Eliezer states there in the mishna that slaughter performed on behalf of a gentile is not valid, this applies only with regard to an animal that is owned by a gentile, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is directed to idol worship. But in the case in the baraita where the animal belongs to a Jew, we do not say that his ultimate statement proves the nature of his original intent.

אלא אמר רב שיזבי: לא אמרו היתר מפני כבוד רבן שמעון בן גמליאל (הסובר ׳הוכיח סופו על תחילתו׳). שואלת הגמרא: באיזה רשב״ג מדובר?

Rather, Rav Sheizevi said that the Sages did not state permission with regard to the animal in the baraita due to the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who holds that one’s ultimate actions prove the nature of his original intent. The Gemara asks: Which statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel indicates that this is his opinion?

אם נאמר שזה רשב״ג שבגיטין — ששנינו: בריא שאמר ׳כתבו גט לאשתי׳ (ולא אמר ׳ותנו׳) — רצה רק לשחק בה ואין זה גט.

If we say that the reference is to the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to bills of divorce, this is difficult. As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 66a) that if a dying man said to the people present: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, those people should write and deliver the bill of divorce to his wife. Although the delivery was not included in his command, that is clearly his intent. But a healthy man who says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say: Deliver it to her, presumably sought to mock her and not to designate his listeners as agents of delivery.

ומעשה בבריא שאמר ׳כתבו גט לאשתי׳, עלה לגג ונפל ומת. אמר רשב״ג: אם מעצמו נפל (התאבד) הרי זה גט, שהוכיח שכוונתו הייתה לגרש; ואם הרוח דחתו — אינו גט.

The mishna continues: And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If he fell at his own initiative, taking his own life, it is a valid bill of divorce, as it is clear that he anticipated his death, thereby rendering his halakhic status like that of a dying man. But if the wind forced him to fall and he died, it is not a valid bill of divorce, as there was no clear intent to give her the bill of divorce.

ודנו בכך: וכי הביא התנא מעשה לסתור את דבריו? תחילה אמר שאינו גט, ובמעשה משמע שלעיתים כן גט.

And we discussed the mishna: Did the tanna cite an incident to contradict that which was stated previously in the mishna? The tanna states unequivocally that when a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is not valid. The tanna then cites an incident indicating that under certain circumstances, when a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is valid.

המשנה חסרה וכך יש לשנותה: אם הוכיח סופו על תחילתו — הרי זה גט; וגם מעשה בבריא שאמר ׳כתבו גט׳ ועלה לגג ונפל ומת, ואמר רשב״ג: מעצמו נפל — גט, דחתו הרוח — אינו גט.

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: The healthy man who says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say: Deliver it to her, presumably sought to mock her. But if his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent, that he seeks to give the bill of divorce because he is about to die, it is a valid bill of divorce. And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell at his own initiative, it is a valid bill of divorce, but if the wind forced him to fall, it is not a valid bill of divorce.

ודחייה: אולי שם שונה, שהרי אמר ׳כתבו גט׳ — והדיבור עצמו מורה על כוונתו; מה שאין כן בשחיטה, שאין שום סימן לכוונתו הראשונה.

The Gemara explains why this is not a proof: But perhaps the case cited there is different, as the husband initially says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, indicating that he originally intended to fall from the roof. By contrast, in the case of slaughter, there is no indication of his original intent.

אלא אמר רבינא: מפני כבוד רשב״ג שכאן, שכן שנינו: הכותב נכסיו לאחרים ובהם עבדים, ואמר המקבל ׳איני רוצה בהם׳ — אם רבו השני כהן, אוכלים בתרומה; רשב״ג אומר: כיוון שאמר ׳איני רוצה בהם׳ כבר זכו בהם היורשים.

Rather, Ravina said that the Sages did not state permission in the incident in Caesarea with regard to the animal due to the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, to avoid contradicting the opinion that is cited here, as it is taught in a baraita: In a case of a person on his deathbed who wrote a document transferring his property to others, and there were slaves among his property, and that intended recipient says: I do not want to assume ownership of the slaves, if their second master, the intended recipient, was a priest, these slaves may partake of teruma, and his protest is ignored. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Once that intended recipient says: I do not want to assume ownership of the slaves, heirs of the original owner already acquired them.

ודנו בכך: לדעת תנא קמא, וכי המקבל זוכה בעבדים אפילו אם הוא עומד וצווח שאינו רוצה? אין זה מסתבר.

And we discussed the baraita: And according to the first tanna, does the intended recipient acquire the slaves even if he stands and shouts in protest that he does not want to assume ownership of the slaves? That is not reasonable.

אמר רבה (ויש אומרים רבי יוחנן): אם צווח מתחילה — הכל מודים שלא קנה; אם שתק ולבסוף צווח (בזמן רחוק) — הכל מודים שקנה.

Rabba said, and some say it was Rabbi Yoḥanan who said: In a case where he shouts in protest at the outset, while the owner is giving him the gift, everyone agrees that he did not acquire the slaves. In a case where he was silent at that moment and ultimately shouted his protest at a later opportunity, everyone agrees that he acquired the slaves.

במה נחלקו? כשזיכה לו על ידי אחר, ושתק ולבסוף צווח. תנא קמא סובר: כיוון ששתק קנה, וצעקתו עכשיו היא חזרה בעלמא (שאינה מועילה).

When they disagree it is in a case where the owner transferred ownership of the slaves to him through another person, and at that point the recipient was silent, and ultimately, when he actually received the slaves, he shouted in protest. The first tanna holds: Since he was initially silent, he acquired the slaves, and the fact that he is ultimately shouting indicates that he is retracting his initial acceptance of the gift. That retraction is ineffective, as acquisitions cannot be nullified in that manner.

ורשב״ג סובר: הוכיח סופו על תחילתו (מעולם לא רצה בהם), ומה שלא צווח מתחילה — סבר: כל עוד לא הגיעו לידי, למה אצעק? — ומכאן שרשב״ג מחזיק בעקרון ׳הוכיח סופו׳.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: His ultimate actions prove the nature of his original intent. He never wanted the slaves and always intended to avoid assuming ownership of them. And the fact that he did not shout initially is because he thought: As the situation is that they did not yet enter my possession, why would I shout?

אמר רב יהודה בשם שמואל: הלכה כרבי יוסי — כששוחט ישראל בהמת נכרי, אף אם ידוע שכוונת הנכרי לעבודה זרה, השחיטה כשרה, שהכל הולך אחר השוחט בלבד.

§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the dispute in the mishna where Rabbi Yosei says that when a Jew slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile, even if it is known that the intent of the gentile is for idol worship, the slaughter is valid, as it is only the intent of the slaughterer that is relevant. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei.

טייעים (סוחרים נכרים) שבאו לציקוניא נתנו אילים לטבחים ישראלים ואמרו: הדם והחלב לנו (לעבודה זרה), והעור והבשר לכם. שלח רב טובי בר רב מתנה לרב יוסף: בכהאי גוונא מה דינו? השיב לו: כך אמר רב יהודה בשם שמואל — הלכה כרבי יוסי (וכשרה).

The Gemara relates: There were these Arabs who came to Tzikuneya, and they gave rams to Jewish slaughterers. The Arabs said to them: The blood and the fat are for us, for use in our idol worship, and the hide and the flesh are for you. Rav Tuvi bar Rav Mattana sent a question to be asked before Rav Yosef: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Rav Yosef sent to him: This is what Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and it is the intent of the slaughterer and not the intent of the owner that determines the validity of the slaughter.

אמר רב אחא בריה דרב אויא לרב אשי: לדעת רבי אליעזר (ששוחט עבור נכרי פסול), אם נתן הנכרי זוז לטבח ישראל לקנות מעט בשר — מהו? השיב לו: בודקים — אם אדם אלם הוא שאי אפשר לדחותו, אסור; ואם לא, יכול לומר לו ׳ראשך והר׳ (לך והכה ראשך בהר) — ומותר.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: According to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer in the mishna, that if a Jew slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile the slaughter is not valid, if the gentile gave a dinar to a Jewish slaughterer in order to purchase a small amount of the meat, what is the halakha? Does that small amount invalidate the entire slaughter? Rav Ashi said to him: We examine the situation. If this gentile is a violent man, and the Jew is unable to repudiate his offer and tell him to take his money, the entire animal is forbidden, because the slaughter was partially on behalf of the gentile. And if the gentile is not violent, the Jew can say to him: Go and arrange a collision between your head and a mountain, as I will not slaughter an animal on your behalf.

משנה: השוחט לשם (כלומר לעבוד) הרים, גבעות, ימים, נהרות או מדברות — שחיטתו פסולה.

MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal for the sake of, i.e., to worship, mountains, for the sake of hills, for the sake of seas, for the sake of rivers, or for the sake of wildernesses, his slaughter is not valid.

שניים האוחזים יחד בסכין ושוחטים, אחד מתכוון לשם אחד מכל אלו (הרים וכו׳) והשני לשם דבר כשר — שחיטתם פסולה.

If there were two people grasping a knife together and slaughtering an animal, one slaughtering for the sake of one of all those enumerated in the first clause of the mishna and one slaughtering for the sake of a legitimate matter, their slaughter is not valid.