מפת הסוגיא — חולין ל״חSugya map — Chullin 38

אמר רב חסדא: הפירכוס שאמרו חכמים שהוא סימן חיים — צריך שיהיה בסוף השחיטה. ומהו ׳סוף שחיטה׳? אף באמצע השחיטה כשר; ולא אמרו ׳בסוף׳ אלא להוציא פירכוס שבתחילת השחיטה, שאינו סימן.

§ The Gemara continues its definition of convulsion that indicates life. Rav Ḥisda said: I was taught that the convulsion that the Sages said is an indication of life is a convulsion at the conclusion of the act of slaughter. Rav Ḥisda elaborates: What is the meaning of: At the conclusion of the act of slaughter? It means even in the midst of the slaughter. The Sages said that it must be at the conclusion of the slaughter only to exclude convulsions at the beginning of the act of slaughter, which are not an indication of life.

מניין לו לרב חסדא שפירכוס באמצע השחיטה מכשיר? מן המשנה: בהמה דקה שפשטה את ידהּ ולא החזירה — פסולה. מתי? אם בסוף השחיטה — וכי תמשיך לחיות כל כך הרבה שתחזיר? אלא ודאי באמצע השחיטה; ומכאן שאם החזירה — פירכוס המכשיר.

Rav Ḥisda said: From where do I say that a convulsion in the midst of the act of slaughter is an indication of life? It is from the mishna, as we learned: The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. Rav Ḥisda elaborates: When did the animal extend its foreleg but not restore it? If we say that it occurred at the conclusion of the slaughter, must the animal continue living for so extended a period that it restores its leg to its bent position after the slaughter is complete? Is the slaughter truly not valid otherwise? Rather, is it not that the mishna is referring to a case where the animal extends its foreleg in the middle of the slaughter? If so, then when it restores its leg as well, it is considered a convulsion that indicates life.

דחה רבא: אין מכאן ראיה. אפשר לפרש שהמשנה עוסקת בסוף השחיטה — שכל בהמה שאינה מחזירה את רגלהּ בסוף השחיטה, בידוע שנשמתהּ ניטלה ממנה עוד קודם לכן, ולכן פסולה.

Rava said to Rav Ḥisda: That is no proof. Actually, one could explain that the mishna is referring to a case where the animal extends its foreleg but did not restore it to the bent position at the conclusion of the slaughter, as I say with regard to any animal that does not do so at the conclusion of the slaughter, it is known that its soul was taken from it before that moment, and it was not alive.

רב נחמן בר יצחק חולק ואומר: הפירכוס שאמרו חכמים שהוא סימן חיים — מכשיר אף אם היה בתחילת השחיטה.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The convulsion that the Sages said is an indication of life is a convulsion even at the beginning of the act of slaughter.

מניין לרב נחמן בר יצחק? מן המשנה: ר׳ שמעון אמר ששוחט בלילה ולמחר מצא כתלים מלאי דם — כשרה, שזינקה, כר׳ אליעזר; ואמר שמואל שמדובר בכותלי בית השחיטה (הצוואר). אם הפירכוס מכשיר אף בתחילת השחיטה — מובן; אך אם רק בסופה, יש לחשוש שמא קילח הדם דווקא בתחילת השחיטה.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak explained further and said: From where do I say that this is so? It is from the mishna, as we learned that Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who slaughters at night and the next day he awoke and found walls full of blood, the slaughter is valid, as it is clear that the blood spurted, and this is in accordance with the rule of Rabbi Eliezer. And Shmuel said with regard to the walls mentioned in the statement of Rabbi Shimon: It is the walls of the place of the slaughter, i.e., the walls of the neck, not the walls of the house, that we learned. Granted, if you say that a convulsion even at the beginning of the act of slaughter is an indication of life, this works out well. But if you say that a convulsion is an indication of life only at the conclusion of the act of slaughter, let us be concerned that perhaps the blood spurted onto the walls of the neck at the beginning of the act of slaughter, and there was no indication of life.

דוחים את הראיה: ושמא זינוק הדם שונה, שהוא סימן חיים עדיף — ולכן אף שפשיטת רגל מכשירה רק בסוף השחיטה, זינוק מכשיר אף בתחילתה.

The Gemara rejects that proof. But perhaps spurting is different, as it is superior as an indication of life to extending or bending a foreleg, and therefore, although extending or bending a foreleg is a sufficient indicator of life only at the conclusion of the act of slaughter, spurting is a sufficient indicator even at the beginning of the act of slaughter.

וכי זינוק עדיף? והרי שנינו במשנה שר׳ אליעזר אומר ׳דיה אם זינקה׳ — משמע שזינוק סימן קל יותר מדרישת רבן גמליאל (יד ורגל). ומתרצים: קל מרבן גמליאל, אך עדיף מדרישת חכמים (יד או רגל).

The Gemara asks: And is spurting superior? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says it is sufficient if blood spurted from the neck, indicating that spurting of blood is a less substantive indication of life than those indications mentioned in the statement of Rabban Gamliel, who requires that the animal convulse with its foreleg and with its hind leg? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer’s requirement of spurting is less substantive than the requirements of Rabban Gamliel as an indication of life, but superior to the requirement of the Rabbis as an indication of life, where the Rabbis require that the animal convulse either with its foreleg or with its hind leg.

אמר רבינא בשם אחרים שהקשו: וכי זינוק עדיף אפילו מדרישת חכמים? והרי שנינו ׳וחכמים אומרים עד שתפרכס או ביד או ברגל׳ — לשון ׳עד׳ מורה על דרישה מחמירה יותר מזינוק.

Ravina said: Samma bar Ḥilkai said to me that the father of bar Abuveram, and some say that it was the brother of bar Abuveram, raises a difficulty: And is blood spurting superior to the requirement of the Rabbis as an indication of life? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: It is permitted only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg, or in a case where it wags its tail?

על דברי מי חולקים חכמים? אם על רבן גמליאל (הדורש יד ורגל) — היה להם לומר ׳כיון שפירכסה (ביד או ברגל)׳, להקל; ולא ׳עד שתפרכס׳ בלשון מחמירה.

Ravina elaborates: To which statement of the tanna’im in the mishna do the Rabbis stand and respond? If we say that they are responding to the statement of Rabban Gamliel, who requires that the animal convulse with its foreleg and with its hind leg, the Rabbis should have said: Once the animal convulsed with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wagged its tail, indicating that this is sufficient.

אלא ודאי חולקים חכמים על ר׳ אליעזר; ואם זינוק עדיף משלהם, מהו לשון ׳עד שתפרכס׳ המחמיר? אלא מוכח שזינוק קל יותר — וממילא ראיית רב נחמן בר יצחק קיימת: אם זינוק מכשיר בתחילה, כל שכן פשיטת אבר.

Rather, it is obvious that the Rabbis are responding to the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And if Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is superior to that of the Rabbis as an indication of life, what is the meaning of: It is permitted only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wags its tail? In that case too, the Rabbis should have said: Once the animal convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg or it wags its tail. Apparently, blood spurting is a less substantive indication of life, and the proof of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak remains valid: If spurting at the beginning of the act of slaughter is a sufficient indication of life to render the slaughter valid, then all the more so, extending and bending a limb are also sufficient indications of life.

רבא אומר: הפירכוס שאמרו — בסוף השחיטה. מניין לו? מברייתא הדורשת את הכתוב ׳שור או כשב או עז כי יִוָּלֵד … תחת אמו׳ (ויקרא כב), הפותחת ב׳שור׳.

Rava said: The convulsion that the Rabbis said is an indication of life is a convulsion at the conclusion of the act of slaughter. Rava said: From where do I say that this is the case? It is as it is taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “When a bull or a sheep or a goat is born, it shall be seven days under its mother; and from the eighth day and onward it may be accepted for an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 22:27). The phrase “a bull

המשך הברייתא: ׳או כשב׳ — למעט כלאים; ׳או עז׳ — למעט נדמה (הדומה למין אחר); ׳כי יִוָּלֵד׳ — למעט יוצא דופן; ׳שבעת ימים׳ — למעט מחוסר זמן; ׳תחת אמו׳ — למעט יתום.

or a sheep” is to the exclusion of an animal born to parents of diverse kinds, which may not be brought as an offering. The phrase “or a goat” is to the exclusion of an animal that resembles another species of animal. “When it is born”; this is to the exclusion of an animal born by caesarean section. “It shall be seven days”; this is to the exclusion of an animal whose time has not yet arrived. “Under its mother”; this is to the exclusion of an animal that is an orphan.

רבא מבאר: מהו ׳יתום׳ זה? אם שילדתו אמו ואחר כך מתה — וכי תחיה לעולם? אלא שמתה ואחר כך ילדתו; ולזה אין צורך בכתוב, שכבר נתמעט מ׳כי יִוָּלֵד׳ (כיוצא דופן). אם כן למה צריך מיעוט נוסף?

Rava elaborates: What are the circumstances of this orphan? If we say that its mother gave birth to it and then died, this is unreasonable. Will the mother continue living forever? Rather, perhaps the reference is to a case where the mother died and then gave birth to it. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as the fact that this animal is disqualified from sacrifice is derived from the phrase: “When it is born,” since after the mother’s death the newborn animal can emerge from the womb only by means of caesarean section.

אלא ודאי מדובר שמתה האם בסוף הלידה — זו פירשה למיתה וזה הוולד פירש לחיים. אם צריך חיוּת בסוף הלידה, מובן שצריך כתוב למעט; אך אם אין צריך חיוּת בסוף, למה לי המיעוט? אלא מכאן שצריך חיוּת בסוף התהליך — וכן בשחיטת המסוכנת, צריך סימן חיים בסוף השחיטה.

Rather, it is obvious that the reference is to a case where the mother died at the conclusion of the birth, at which point this mother withdrew for death and that newborn withdrew for life. Granted, if you say that we require life at the conclusion of the birth, that is why a verse was necessary to exclude the orphan. But if you say that we do not require life at the conclusion of the birth, and the verse is excluding only an animal that was born after its mother’s death, why is this verse necessary to exclude it? It can be derived from the phrase: “When it is born.” It may be derived from here that in any situation where the animal must be alive, it must remain alive until the end of the process. That is the case with regard to the slaughter of an animal in danger of imminent death as well. The slaughter is valid only if there is an indication of life at the end of the act of slaughter.

אמר רבא: ההלכה כברייתא זו — בהמה דקה שבשעת השחיטה פשטה את ידהּ הכפופה ולא החזירהּ, שחיטתהּ פסולה, שאין זו אלא הוצאת נפש ולא סימן חיים.

§ The mishna teaches: The slaughter of a small animal in danger of imminent death that during the slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. Rava says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion expressed in this baraita: The slaughter of a small animal that extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid.

המשך הברייתא: במה דברים אמורים? ביד; אבל ברגל — בין שפשטה ולא כפפה ובין שכפפה ולא פשטה — כשרה. במה דברים אמורים? בבהמה דקה; אבל בגסה — בין ביד בין ברגל, בכל אופן — כשרה. ובעוף, אפילו ריפרף רק בכנפו או כשכש רק בזנבו — הרי זה פירכוס.

The baraita continues: In what case is this statement said? It is with regard to the foreleg. But with regard to the hind leg, whether the animal extended it and did not restore it to the bent position or the animal bent it but did not extend it, the slaughter is valid. In what case is this statement, about extending the foreleg, said? It is with regard to a small animal. But with regard to a large animal, whether the convulsion involves its foreleg or its hind leg, and whether the animal extended it and did not restore it to the bent position or the animal bent it but did not extend it, the slaughter is valid. And with regard to a bird, even if it fluttered [rifref] only its wing or wagged only its tail, that is a convulsion and an indication of life.

מה חידש רבא בפסיקתו? והרי כל פרטי הברייתא כבר שנינו במשנה: דקה שפשטה ידהּ ולא החזירה פסולה; מכלל שיד — לא סימן, רגל — כן; דקה — לא, גסה — כן. ומשיבים: העוף הוצרך, שלא נשנה במשנה — וזה חידושו.

The Gemara asks: What is Rava teaching us in ruling in accordance with the baraita? He is teaching us all of those halakhot we learned in the mishna: The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. It may be inferred from the mishna that with regard to movement of a foreleg alone, yes, it is not an indication of life, but movement of a hind leg, no, it is an indication of life. With regard to a small animal, yes, this is the halakha; with regard to a large animal, no, this is not the halakha, and extending a hind leg does indicate life. The Gemara answers: It was necessary for Rava to teach the halakha in the baraita with regard to a bird, as we did not learn it in the mishna.

משנה. ישראל השוחט בהמת נכרי לצורך נכרי — שחיטתו כשרה, ורבי אליעזר פוסל.

MISHNA: In the case of a Jew who slaughters the animal of a gentile for a gentile, his slaughter is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it not valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if the Jew slaughtered the animal with the intent to feed the gentile from its diaphragm [meḥatzar kaved], its slaughter is not valid, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is to slaughter the animal for idol worship, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

אמר רבי אליעזר: אפילו שחטהּ ישראל כדי להאכיל לנכרי מחצר הכבד שלהּ (בשר רגיל לאכילה) — פסולה, שסתם מחשבת נכרי היא לעבודה זרה, ואסור ליהנות ממנה.

MISHNA: In the case of a Jew who slaughters the animal of a gentile for a gentile, his slaughter is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it not valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if the Jew slaughtered the animal with the intent to feed the gentile from its diaphragm [meḥatzar kaved], its slaughter is not valid, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is to slaughter the animal for idol worship, and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.

אמר רבי יוסי: קל וחומר הוא. אם בקודשים — שבהם מחשבה פסולה (כגון מחשבת חוץ לזמנו) פוסלת — בכל זאת הכל הולך רק אחר מחשבת הכהן העובד, ולא אחר הבעלים; בחולין, שאין מחשבה פוסלת כלל, אינו דין שילך הכל רק אחר השוחט ולא אחר מחשבת הבעלים הנכרי?

Rabbi Yosei says: The matter of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case, as can be derived by means of an a fortiori inference. If in a place where intent while slaughtering the animal invalidates the slaughter, i.e., in sacrificial animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, everything follows only the intent of the priest performing the service and not the intent of the owner, then in a place where intent does not invalidate the slaughter, i.e., in non-sacred animals, is it not right that everything should follow only the intent of the one who slaughters the animal?

גמרא. תנאי המשנה (השוללים את מחשבת הבעלים בחולין) אוחזים בדעת רבי אליעזר ברבי יוסי, ששנינו עליה בברייתא: אמר רבי אליעזר ברבי יוסי — שמעתי שאף הבעלים, ולא רק הכהן, מפגלין את הקרבן במחשבתם הפסולה.

GEMARA: In explanation of the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer, the Gemara explains: These tanna’im hold in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that the owners, and not only the priest, render an offering piggul by means of improper intent. The same is true with regard to non-sacred slaughter, where the owners’ intent for idol worship invalidates the slaughter, even if the slaughterer has no intent for idol worship.

לשון ראשון: תנא קמא סובר — אם שמענו את הנכרי מחשב לעבודה זרה, פסולה; ואם לא — כשרה, שאין אומרים סתם מחשבת נכרי לעבודה זרה. רבי אליעזר סובר — אף בלא ששמענוהו, אומרים סתם מחשבת נכרי לעבודה זרה. ורבי יוסי בא לומר — אף ששמענוהו מחשב, כיוון שהבעלים מחשב והשוחט (הישראל) עובד — ׳זה מחשב וזה עובד׳, ואין מחשבתו פוסלת.

But the first tanna holds that if we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, yes, his intent invalidates the slaughter, and if the gentile did not voice his intent before us, his intent does not invalidate the slaughter, as we do not say that the unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Eliezer holds: Although we did not hear the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, the slaughter is not valid, as we say the unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even though we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship, in a case where this owner has intent for idol worship and that other person is performing the slaughter, we do not say that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.

לשון שני (איכא דאמרי): דווקא במקרה ששמענו את הנכרי מחשב נחלקו. תנא קמא סובר — כשאומרים ׳זה מחשב וזה עובד׳ שהמחשבה פוסלת, זה דווקא בפנים (בקודשים שבמקדש); אבל בחוץ (בחולין) לא, שאין למדים דין חוץ מדין פנים…

There are those who say an alternative explanation of the mishna. It is with regard to a case where we heard the gentile say that he intends the animal for idol worship that the tanna’im disagree. The first tanna holds that when we say in a case where this owner has improper intent and that other person is performing the slaughter that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter, this statement applies only inside the Temple, in the slaughter of offerings. But with regard to non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple, the intent of the owner does not invalidate the slaughter, as with regard to deriving the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple,

…אין למדים. ורבי אליעזר בא לומר — כן למדים דין חוץ מדין פנים, ולכן מחשבת הנכרי פוסלת אף בחולין. ורבי יוסי בא לומר — אף בפנים (בקודשים) אין אומרים ׳זה מחשב וזה עובד׳ שתפסול מחשבת הבעלים.

we do not derive in this manner. And Rabbi Eliezer comes to say that we derive the halakhot of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple from the halakhot of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, and therefore the intent of the gentile invalidates non-sacred slaughter. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say that even inside the Temple, in a case where this owner has improper intent and that other person is performing the slaughter, we do not say that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.