מפת הסוגיא — חולין ל״זSugya map — Chullin 37

משנה. השוחט בהמה מסוכנת — הנוטה למות — שחיטתהּ כשרה רק אם הראתה סימן חיים בשעת השחיטה. רבן שמעון בן גמליאל: עד שתפרכס ביד וברגל; רבי אליעזר: די אם קילח הדם בכוח; וחכמים: עד שתפרכס ביד או ברגל, או שתכשכש בזנבהּ.

MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal that is in danger of imminent death, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The slaughter is valid only in a case where after the slaughter it convulses with its foreleg and with its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: It is sufficient if blood spurted from the neck. Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who slaughters at night and the next day he awoke and found walls full of blood, the slaughter is valid, as it is clear that the blood spurted, and this is in accordance with the rule of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: It is valid only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg, or in a case where it wags its tail.

רבי שמעון מביא ראיה לדברי רבי אליעזר: השוחט בלילה, והשכים בבוקר ומצא את הכתלים מלאים דם — כשרה, שהרי קילח הדם בכוח (זינקה), כשיטת רבי אליעזר.

MISHNA: In the case of one who slaughters an animal that is in danger of imminent death, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The slaughter is valid only in a case where after the slaughter it convulses with its foreleg and with its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: It is sufficient if blood spurted from the neck. Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of one who slaughters at night and the next day he awoke and found walls full of blood, the slaughter is valid, as it is clear that the blood spurted, and this is in accordance with the rule of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: It is valid only in a case where it convulses with its foreleg or with its hind leg, or in a case where it wags its tail.

דין זה שווה בבהמה דקה ובגסה. בהמה דקה שבשעת שחיטה פשטה את רגלהּ הכפופה ולא החזירה — פסולה, שאין פשיטה זו אלא חלק מיציאת הנשמה ולא סימן חיים.

This is the halakha with regard to both a small animal, e.g., a sheep, and a large animal, e.g., a cow, that is in danger of imminent death. The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the presumptive status of the animal was that it was in danger of imminent death. But if its presumptive status was that it was healthy, then even if there were none of these indicators, the slaughter is valid.

במה דברים אמורים? בבהמה שהוחזקה מסוכנת. אבל אם הוחזקה בריאה — כשרה אף אם לא נראה בה אף אחד מן הסימנים הללו.

This is the halakha with regard to both a small animal, e.g., a sheep, and a large animal, e.g., a cow, that is in danger of imminent death. The slaughter of a small animal that when being slaughtered extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where the presumptive status of the animal was that it was in danger of imminent death. But if its presumptive status was that it was healthy, then even if there were none of these indicators, the slaughter is valid.

גמרא. מניין שבשר המסוכנת מותר באכילה לאחר שחיטה? וממה היה עולה בדעתנו לאוסרהּ? מן הכתוב ׳זאת החיה אשר תאכלו׳ — ׳חיה אֱכוֹל׳, ושאינה חיה (כמסוכנת) אל תאכל; והרי מסוכנת אינה ׳חיה׳.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where is it known that the flesh of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted by means of slaughter? The Gemara responds with a question: And from where would it enter your mind that it is prohibited? The Gemara explains that one may have thought it is prohibited, as it is written: “These are the living beings [haḥayya] that you may eat among all the animals that are on the earth” (Leviticus 11:2). One might have thought that the verse is saying: Eat an animal that is fit to live [ḥayya], but do not eat an animal that is not fit to live. And this animal in danger of imminent death is not fit to live.

ראיה ראשונה: מדאמרה התורה ׳נבלה לא תאכל׳ — מכלל שהמסוכנת מותרת; שאם תאמר שהמסוכנת אסורה כבר מחיים, מה צורך לאוסרהּ במפורש לאחר מיתה?

The fact that its meat is permitted is derived from the fact that the Merciful One states that you shall not eat an unslaughtered animal carcass, as it is written: “You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21); one learns by inference that eating the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted. As, if it enters your mind that eating the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is prohibited, now if an animal is prohibited while alive, is it necessary to state that it is prohibited after death?

ושמא דין נבלה ודין מסוכנת אחד הם? אין לומר כן, שנאמר ׳וכי ימות... הנוגע בנבלתה׳ — רק לאחר מיתה קראתהּ התורה ׳נבלה׳, ומחיים אינה קרויה נבלה.

The Gemara rejects that proof. And that is not a legitimate inference, as perhaps the halakhic status of an unslaughtered carcass is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death, and the prohibition: “You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass,” includes both. The Gemara answers: It would not enter your mind to say so, as it is written: “And if any animal of which you may eat dies, one who touches its carcass shall be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 11:39). This indicates that it is after death that the Merciful One calls the animal a carcass; while alive, the animal is not called a carcass.

ודוחים את הראיה: ושמא לעולם דין נבלה ומסוכנת אחד — אלא שמחיים האיסור בעשה ולאחר מיתה בלאו; ונמצא שאין ראיה מנבלה.

The Gemara questions that understanding. And perhaps, actually I will say to you: The halakhic status of an unslaughtered carcass is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death, but if one slaughters the animal in danger of imminent death while alive, he would be in violation of a positive mitzva: “These are the living beings that you may eat” (Leviticus 11:2), whereas after its death, he would be in violation of a prohibition: “You shall not eat any unslaughtered carcass” (Deuteronomy 14:21).

ראיה שנייה: מדאמרה התורה ׳טרפה לא תאכל׳ — מכלל שהמסוכנת מותרת; שאם המסוכנת, שאינה חסרה אבר, אסורה — קל וחומר לטרפה החסרה, ולמה לי לאוסרהּ?

Rather, the fact that its meat is permitted is derived from the fact that the Merciful One states you shall not eat an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], as it is written: “And you shall not eat any animal that was mauled in the field [tereifa]” (Exodus 22:30). From here, one learns by inference that eating the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted. As, if it enters your mind that eating the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is prohibited, now that an animal in danger of imminent death that is not lacking any limb is prohibited, is it necessary to state that a tereifa, an animal that was mauled and lacking body parts, is prohibited?

ושמא דין טרפה ומסוכנת אחד, ובא ללמד שעובר עליו בעשה ובלאו? אם כן, ׳נבלה׳ שכתבה התורה למה לי — והרי תילמד בקל וחומר ממסוכנת?

The Gemara rejects that proof. And that is not a legitimate inference, as perhaps the halakhic status of a tereifa that is lacking body parts is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death that is not lacking body parts, and both are included in the category of tereifa. This would render one who slaughters either to be in violation of both a positive mitzva: “These are the living beings that you may eat,” and a prohibition: “And you shall not eat any animal that was mauled in the field [tereifa].” The Gemara questions that understanding: If so, why do I need the prohibition that the Merciful One writes with regard to an unslaughtered carcass? If while an animal is alive one stands in violation of a prohibition and a positive mitzva, is it necessary to state that it is prohibited after death?

ושמא דין נבלה, טרפה ומסוכנת אחד הוא, והכל לעבור עליו בשני לאוין ועשה; ונמצא שגם ראיה זו נדחתה.

The Gemara objects: And that is not a legitimate question, as perhaps the halakhic status of an unslaughtered carcass is the same as a tereifa that is lacking body parts, and is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death that is not lacking body parts. Therefore, when the Torah writes the word “carcass,” it is the same as though it had written tereifa and the same as though it had written an animal in danger of imminent death. The Torah prohibits each, and the result will be that he will violate two prohibitions and a positive mitzva.

ראיה שלישית: ׳וחֵלב נבלה וחֵלב טרפה יֵעשה לכל מלאכה ואָכֹל לא תאכלֻהו׳ — ואמר מר: בא איסור נבלה לחול על איסור החֵלב (שכבר אסור), וכן בא איסור טרפה לחול על איסור החֵלב.

Rather, the fact that the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted is derived from here: “And the fat of a carcass and the fat of a tereifa may be used for any purpose; but you shall not eat it” (Leviticus 7:24). And the Master says: In order to derive what halakha is this verse written? Would one imagine that because it is an unslaughtered carcass or a tereifa its fat would be permitted for consumption? The Torah states: Let the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered carcass come and take effect upon the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, which already exists. One who eats the forbidden fat of an unslaughtered carcass is liable for violation of both prohibitions. Likewise, the word “tereifa” in the verse teaches: Let the prohibition against eating a tereifa come and take effect upon the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, which already exists, so that one who eats the forbidden fat of a tereifa is liable for transgressing both prohibitions.

ואם תאמר שדין טרפה ומסוכנת אחד — היה לתורה לכתוב רק ׳וחֵלב טרפה לא תאכלוהו׳, ונלמד נבלה בקל וחומר: ומה מחיים חל איסור טרפה על החֵלב, לאחר מיתה לא כל שכן?

And if it enters your mind to say that the halakhic status of a tereifa lacking body parts is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death, let the Merciful One write: And the fat of a carcass may be used for any purpose, and the fat of a tereifa you shall not eat. The prohibition against eating the forbidden fat should have been written exclusively with regard to a tereifa, and I would say: If while an animal is alive and in danger of imminent death the prohibition against eating a tereifa takes effect upon the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, is it necessary to state that after its death the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered carcass takes effect upon the prohibition against eating forbidden fat?

אלא, מדכתבה התורה ׳נבלה׳ במפורש — מכלל שטרפה אינה כמסוכנת; נמצא שהמסוכנת מותרת באכילה לאחר שחיטה.

The Gemara concludes: Rather, from the fact that the Merciful One writes that the prohibition against eating an unslaughtered carcass takes effect upon the prohibition against eating forbidden fat, one learns by inference that the tereifa in the verse is not the same as an animal in danger of imminent death. Rather, the tereifa in the verse is an animal that was mauled and is lacking body parts, and it is only that animal that is prohibited after slaughter. Eating an animal in danger of imminent death after slaughter is permitted.

מתקיף מר בר רב אשי: שמא לעולם טרפה כמסוכנת, ו׳נבלה׳ נכתבה לנבלה שאינה באה מחמת סכנה — כגון שחתכהּ לשניים (גיסטרא). ודוחים: אף שם אי אפשר שלא היתה מסוכנת מעט קודם שנחתך רובהּ.

Mar bar Rav Ashi objects to this: And perhaps, actually I will say to you that the halakhic status of a tereifa is the same as that of an animal in danger of imminent death, and with regard to that which you said: Why do I need the prohibition with regard to an unslaughtered carcass that the Merciful One writes, one can explain that it is necessary for that unslaughtered carcass that does not come as a result of danger of imminent death. And what are the circumstances of that unslaughtered carcass? It is in a case where one rendered the animal like a shard, by cutting it into two widthwise. The Gemara rejects that distinction: There too, in the case where one rendered the animal like a shard, it is impossible that the animal was not at least somewhat in danger of imminent death before he cut the majority of the animal.

ואם תרצה אמור: מכפל הלשון ׳חֵלב׳ ׳חֵלב׳ — ללמד שיש בהמה שחֶלבהּ אינו חלוק מבשרהּ (טרפה), ויש שחֶלבהּ (האסור) חלוק מבשרהּ (המותר) — וזו המסוכנת; הרי שהמסוכנת מותרת.

And if you wish, say instead that there is a different source for the fact that the meat of an animal in danger of imminent death is permitted. If it is so that an animal in danger of imminent death is included in the category of tereifa, let the verse say: The fat of an unslaughtered carcass and a tereifa. Why do I need it to be written: “Fat of a carcass and the fat of a tereifa”? The term “fat” is repeated to teach that it is this case where the status of its fat is not distinct from the status of its meat, and both are prohibited; but you have another case where the status of its fat, which is forbidden, is distinct from the status of its meat, which is permitted. And which case is that? That is the case of an animal in danger of imminent death.

ואם תרצה אמור ראיה מיחזקאל: ׳ונבלה וטרפה לא אכלתי מנעורי ועד עתה, ולא בא בפי בשר פיגול׳.

And if you wish, say instead that it is derived from here: “Then I said: Ah, Lord God, my soul has not become impure; and from my youth until now I have not eaten an unslaughtered carcass or a tereifa, and no piggul flesh came into my mouth” (Ezekiel 4:14).

ביאור הכתוב: ׳ונבלה וטרפה לא אכלתי׳ — שלא אכלתי בשר בהמה שמיהרו לשוחטהּ באומרם ׳כּוֹס כּוֹס׳ (שחֹט מהר) מפני שהיא מסוכנת; ׳בשר פיגול׳ — מבהמה שהורה בה חכם להתיר מספק; ומשום רבי נתן: שלא הורמו ממנה מתנות כהונה.

The Gemara explains: “My soul has not become impure” means that I did not consider any sinful thoughts during the day that would cause me to come to impurity due to a seminal emission at night. “And from my youth until now I have not eaten an unslaughtered carcass or a tereifa” means that I never ate the flesh of an animal that was in danger of imminent death, leading one to say: Slaughter it, slaughter it quickly, before it dies. “And no piggul flesh came into my mouth” means that I never ate from an animal with regard to which there was uncertainty whether it is forbidden and a Sage issued a ruling to permit it. They said in the name of Rabbi Natan that the last portion of the verse means: That I never ate from an animal whose gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, i.e., the foreleg, the jaw, and the maw, were not already separated.

וזו הראיה: אם בשר מסוכנת מותר — מובנת גדולתו של יחזקאל שנמנע מן המותר; אבל אם אסור, מה גדולה יש בכך שנמנע? אלא ודאי מותר.

The proof is: Granted, if you say that it is permitted to slaughter and eat an animal in imminent danger of death, then that is the greatness of Ezekiel, as, although eating it is permitted, he refrained from doing so. But if you say that it is forbidden to slaughter and eat that animal, what in that action attests to the greatness of Ezekiel? Apparently, it is permitted to slaughter and eat an animal in danger of imminent death.

מהי מסוכנת? רב יהודה אמר רב: כל שמעמידים אותה על רגליה ואינה עומדת מעצמהּ. רב חנינא בר שלמיה משום רב: אפילו אוכלת בקעיות (פיסות עץ) — אם אינה עומדת, מסוכנת. רמי בר יחזקאל: אפילו אוכלת קורות.

§ The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of an animal in danger of imminent death? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is any animal with regard to which one stands it on its feet but it does not stand unaided. Rav Ḥanina bar Shelamya in the name of Rav said: That indicator is so clear that even if that animal maintains sufficient strength in its jaw and eats pieces of wood, if it is unable to stand, its status is that of an animal in danger of imminent death. Rami bar Yeḥezkel said: That is the case even if that animal eats beams.

בסורא שנו את הדברים בנוסח אחד, ובפומבדיתא בנוסח הפוך — למי מיוחס ׳אפילו אוכלת בקעיות׳ ולמי ׳אפילו אוכלת קורות׳.

In Sura, they would teach the exchange in that manner. In Pumbedita, they would teach the exchange in this manner: What are the circumstances of an animal in danger of imminent death? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: It is any animal with regard to which one stands it on its feet but it does not stand unaided, even if that animal maintains sufficient strength in its jaw and eats pieces of wood. Rami bar Yeḥezkel said: That indicator is so clear that even if that animal maintains sufficient strength in its jaw and eats beams, if it is unable to stand its status is that of an animal in danger of imminent death.

שמואל מצא את תלמידי רב (לאחר פטירתו) ושאלם: מה אמר רב בעניין מסוכנת? אמרו לו: כך אמר רב—

Shmuel found students of Rav after Rav’s death. He said to them: What did Rav say with regard to an animal in danger of imminent death? They said to him: This is what Rav said:

אם גָּעֲתָה (השמיעה קול), או הטילה רעי, או כשכשה באוזנהּ — הרי זה פירכוס המתיר. אמר להם שמואל: וכי הוצרך רב (אבא) לסימן של תנועת אוזן? אני אומר: כל תנועה שאין המתה עושה כמותהּ — הרי זו פירכוס.

If the animal lows, or excreted excrement, or wiggled its ear during the slaughter, that is a convulsion, and the slaughter renders eating the flesh of the animal permitted. Shmuel said to them: Is it necessary according to Abba, i.e., Rav, for the animal to move its ears during the slaughter, which requires a considerable life force? As I say: Any movements of the animal that are not matters that the death of the animal engenders are convulsions sufficient to render the slaughter valid.

ומהם ׳דברים שהמתה עושה׳? אמר רב ענן, כך נתפרש לי משמואל: היתה ידהּ כפופה ופשטתהּ — דבר שהמתה עושה (אינו פירכוס); היתה פשוטה וכפפתהּ — דבר שאין המתה עושה, והרי זה פירכוס.

The Gemara asks: What are matters that the death of the animal engenders? Rav Anan said: This was explained to me from Master Shmuel himself: If the animal’s foreleg was bent, and the animal straightened it, that is a matter that the death of the animal engenders. But if its foreleg was straight and the animal bent it, that is among the matters that the death of the animal does not engender and is a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid.

מה חידש שמואל? הרי כבר שנינו במשנה: דקה שפשטה ידהּ ולא החזירה — פסולה, שאינה אלא הוצאת נפש; מכלל שאם החזירה — כשרה!

The Gemara asks: What is Shmuel teaching us with that statement? We already learn in the mishna: The slaughter of a small animal that during its slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is nothing other than part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. But one may infer that if the animal does restore its foreleg to the bent position, that indicates life and the slaughter is valid.

אילו מן המשנה בלבד, הייתי אומר: דווקא כשהיתה כפופה, פשטתהּ וחזרה וכפפתהּ — כשרה; אבל פשוטה שכפפתהּ — לא. לכן השמיענו שמואל שאף פשוטה שכפפתהּ — פירכוס.

The Gemara answers: If the halakha is learned from the mishna alone, I would say that it is specifically in a case where the animal’s foreleg had been bent, and the animal now straightens it and then bends it, that the slaughter is valid. But if the foreleg had been straight and the animal bent it, the slaughter is not valid. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that if its foreleg was straight and the animal bent it; that is a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid.

מיתיבי מברייתא: רבי יוסי אמר שרבי מאיר היה אומר — געייה בשעת שחיטה אינה פירכוס; ורבי אלעזר ברבי יוסי אמר משמו — אף הטלת רעי וכשכוש זנב אינם פירכוס. וקשה: געייה על געייה (כנגד רב), ורעי על רעי!

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita to Rav’s statement cited earlier. Rabbi Yosei says that Rabbi Meir would say: If an animal lows during its slaughter, that is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, says in the name of Rabbi Yosei: Even if the animal excreted excrement or wagged its tail, that is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid. The Gemara now clarifies: Rabbi Yosei’s statement in the baraita that if an animal lows it is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav that if an animal lows it is a convulsion. And Rabbi Elazar’s statement in the baraita that if an animal excreted excrement it is not a convulsion sufficient to render the slaughter valid is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav that if an animal excreted excrement it is a convulsion.

תירוץ: געייה על געייה אינה קשה — כאן בקול עָבֶה וחזק (פירכוס), כאן בקול דק וחלוש (אינו פירכוס). ורעי על רעי אינו קשה — כאן כשמטילה בכוח (פירכוס), כאן כשהרעי שותֵת מאליו (אינו פירכוס).

The Gemara answers: The apparent contradiction between the opinion that when an animal lows it is a convulsion and the opinion that when an animal lows it is not a convulsion is not difficult. This opinion, that it is a convulsion, is referring to a case where the animal’s voice is rich and powerful, a clear indication of life; that opinion, that it is not a convulsion, is referring to a case where the animal’s voice is muted, which is not an indication of life. The apparent contradiction between the opinion that when an animal excreted excrement it is a convulsion and the opinion that when an animal excreted excrement it is not a convulsion is also not difficult. Here, the opinion that it is not a convulsion is referring to a case where the animal expels the excrement in a trickle. That is not an indication of life. There, the opinion that it is a convulsion is referring to a case where the animal expels the excrement with force. That is an indication of life.