מפת הסוגיא — בבא קמא ע״אSugya map — Bava Kamma 71

גמרא (על מה שנינו ׳גנב וטבח ביום הכיפורים — משלם ארבעה וחמשה׳): אמרו, מדוע משלם? אמת שאין כאן עונש מיתה, אך מלקות יש (השוחט ביום הכיפורים לוקה) — והרי קיימא לן שאין אדם לוקה ומשלם על מעשה אחד!

§ The mishna teaches: If one stole an animal and slaughtered it on Yom Kippur he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. The Sages say, questioning this ruling: Why is he liable to pay it? Although there is no penalty of execution for slaughtering on Yom Kippur, nevertheless there is the penalty of lashes; and we maintain that one is not sentenced to be flogged and obligated to pay for the same act.

אמרו (בתירוץ): כדעת מי המשנה? רבי מאיר היא, הסובר: אדם לוקה ומשלם (שני העונשים יחד) על מעשה אחד.

The Sages say in response: In accordance with whose opinion is this mishna taught? It is taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: One is sentenced to be flogged and obligated to pay for the same action.

מקשים: אם המשנה כרבי מאיר, אם כן אפילו טבח בשבת (שחייב מיתה) יתחייב בתשלומי ארבעה וחמשה — והרי שנינו (עד ע״ב) שפטור! ושמא תאמר: רבי מאיר סובר ׳לוקה ומשלם׳ אך אינו סובר ׳מת ומשלם׳ —

The Gemara asks: If the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, then even if he slaughtered the animal on Shabbat, which is a capital offense, he should be obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, whereas the mishna (74b) states that in this case he is exempt. And if you would say that Rabbi Meir holds that one is sentenced to be flogged and obligated to pay for the same act, but he does not hold that one is sentenced to the death penalty and obligated to pay for the same act, this is incorrect.

וכי לא?! והרי שנינו בברייתא: גנב וטבח בשבת, גנב וטבח לעבודה זרה, גנב שור הנסקל וטבחו — משלם ארבעה וחמשה, דברי רבי מאיר; וחכמים פוטרין! (משמע שרבי מאיר מחייב תשלומין אף במקום חיוב מיתה.)

And is it correct to say that Rabbi Meir does not maintain that one can be sentenced to the death penalty and to pay for the same act? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If one stole an animal and slaughtered it on Shabbat, or if he stole an animal and slaughtered it for idol worship, or if he stole an ox that is sentenced to be stoned, from which it is prohibited to derive any benefit, and he slaughtered it, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis exempt him from this payment. Apparently Rabbi Meir maintains that one can be held liable for monetary payment and for capital punishment for the same act, e.g., slaughtering on Shabbat or slaughtering for idol worship.

אמרו: הוצא ברייתא זו מן הכלל (אל תפרשה כפשוטה), שהרי נאמר עליה משום רבי יוחנן (ויש אומרים משום ריש לקיש), רבי אבין ורבי אלעא וכל החבורה משמו של רבי יוחנן: מדובר בטובח על ידי אחר — שהגנב שילח אחר לשחוט, והשליח שחט בשבת או לעבודה זרה; הגנב משלם, שהוא עצמו לא עבר עבירה שחייבין עליה מיתה.

The Sages say in response: Stand apart from this baraita, i.e., this baraita should not be understood in a straightforward manner, as it was stated concerning it: Rabbi Ya’akov says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says, and some say it was Rabbi Yirmeya who says that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says, and Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Ela and the entire group of disciples of Rabbi Yoḥanan also say in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The baraita is speaking of a thief who slaughters the stolen animal through the agency of another person, i.e., he instructed another to slaughter it, and that agent did so on Shabbat or for idolatrous purposes. The thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment because he himself did not commit a capital offense.

מקשים: וכי זה (השליח) חוטא וזה (הגנב) מתחייב בתשלומין?!

The Gemara asks: How can it be that a thief is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment if another person slaughters the stolen animal for him? But is it so that this one sins and that one becomes liable?

אמר רבא: שאני הכא, שאמר הכתוב ׳וטבחו או מכרו׳ — מה מכירה נעשית על ידי אחר (הקונה), אף טביחה שעל ידי אחר מחייבת.

The Gemara provides several reasons why in the case of fourfold or fivefold payment it is possible for the thief to be liable for another’s actions. Rava said: It is different here, as the verse states: “And slaughter it or sell it” (Exodus 21:37), thereby juxtaposing the two acts of slaughtering and selling. It is derived that just as there is liability for the fourfold or fivefold payment through selling, which by definition is performed by means of another party, so too, there is liability for slaughtering when it is performed by means of another party.

דבי רבי ישמעאל תָנא: ׳או׳ (בפסוק ׳וטבחו או מכרו׳) — לרבות את השליח. דבי חזקיה תָנא: ׳תחת׳ (בפסוק ׳חמשה בקר תחת השור׳) — לרבות את השליח.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael teaches: The word “or” in the phrase: “And slaughter it or sell it,” serves to include a case in which the agent slaughters or sells the animal at the behest of the thief. The school of Ḥizkiyya teaches: The separate word “for” [taḥat] in the phrase: “He shall pay five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep,” which could have been avoided by using the mere prefix of the letter beit, serves to include a case in which the agent slaughters the animal on behalf of the thief.

מתקיף לה מר זוטרא: וכי יש דבר שאילו עשהו הוא עצמו אינו מתחייב, ואילו עשהו שלוחו — מתחייב? (וכי יש כוח לשליח יותר מן המשלח?)

Mar Zutra objects to this explanation of the baraita: Is there anything with regard to which if one performs it himself he is not liable, and if his agent performs it on his behalf one is liable? How is it possible for an agent to have more power than the one who appointed him? Can it be that if the thief himself slaughtered the animal on Shabbat he would be exempt, whereas if he has it slaughtered by another he is liable?

אמר לו רב אשי: שם (כשהגנב טובח בעצמו בשבת) אין הפטור משום שאינו מתחייב, אלא משום ׳קם ליה בדרבה מיניה׳ (חיוב המיתה החמור פוטרו מן הממון); אך כששלח אחר — אין עליו חיוב מיתה, ולכן משלם.

Rav Ashi said to him: There, in the case of the thief who slaughters a stolen animal on Shabbat, it is not because he is not liable that he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment; rather, he is liable but he is excused from payment because he receives the greater of the two punishments, i.e., execution, for desecrating Shabbat. When he appoints an agent he has no liability for desecrating Shabbat, and therefore he pays for the slaughter.

מקשים: ואם הברייתא עוסקת בטובח על ידי אחר, מהו טעמם של חכמים הפוטרין (הרי הגנב עצמו לא עשה מעשה שחייבין עליו מיתה)?

The Gemara asks: But if the baraita is speaking about a thief who slaughters through the agency of another person, what is the reason of the Rabbis, who exempt the thief from payment? The thief did not himself do any act for which he is liable to receive the death penalty.

אמרו: מאן ׳חכמים׳ — רבי שמעון, שאמר: שחיטה שאינה ראויה (להתיר את הבשר באכילה) — אינה נחשבת שחיטה; ולכן (בשבת ובעבודה זרה, ששם הבשר אסור) אין חיוב תשלומין.

The Sages say in explanation: Who are these Rabbis of the baraita? It is Rabbi Shimon, who said: The legal status of an act of slaughter that is not fit for accomplishing its full ritual purpose is not considered an act of slaughter. Since slaughtering on Shabbat or slaughtering for idolatrous purposes does not render the meat fit for consumption, Rabbi Shimon rules that there is no liability for the fourfold or fivefold payment.

מקשים: בשלמא עבודה זרה ושור הנסקל — שחיטה שאינה ראויה היא (הבשר אסור בהנאה); אבל שבת — שחיטה ראויה היא! שהרי שנינו (חולין יד): השוחט בשבת וביום הכיפורים, אף על פי שמתחייב בנפשו — שחיטתו כשרה (והבשר מותר)!

The Sages say, questioning this explanation: Granted, slaughtering for idol worship and slaughtering an ox that is sentenced to be stoned are cases of slaughter that is not fit, as in both of these cases it is prohibited to derive any benefit from the animal’s flesh. But slaughtering on Shabbat is a fit slaughter. As we learned in a mishna (Ḥullin 14a): In the case of one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, although he is liable to receive the death penalty for desecrating Shabbat, his slaughter is valid and the meat may be eaten.

אמרו: רבי שמעון סובר כרבי יוחנן הסנדלר (החולק על אותה משנה ואוסר באכילה בשר שנשחט בשבת).

The Sages say in response: Rabbi Shimon holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar, who disagrees with that mishna and prohibits eating the meat of an animal slaughtered on Shabbat.

שהרי שנינו: המבשל בשבת — בשוגג ייאכל, במזיד לא ייאכל; דברי רבי מאיר. רבי יהודה אומר: בשוגג ייאכל במוצאי שבת, במזיד לא ייאכל לעולם (לו, אך לאחרים מותר).

As we learned in a mishna (Terumot 2:3): In the case of one who cooks food on Shabbat, if he acted unwittingly he may eat the food, but if he acted intentionally he may not eat it; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he acted unwittingly he may eat the food only upon the conclusion of Shabbat, and if he acted intentionally he may not eat it ever, although others may partake of it.

רבי יוחנן הסנדלר אומר: בשוגג — ייאכל במוצאי שבת לאחרים אך לא לו; במזיד — לא ייאכל לעולם, לא לו ולא לאחרים. (אם כן שחיטה במזיד בשבת לעולם אסורה באכילה — ולרבי שמעון אין בה חיוב ארבעה וחמשה.)

Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar says: If he cooked the food unwittingly it may be eaten upon the conclusion of Shabbat by others only, but not by him; and if he acted intentionally it may not be eaten ever, neither by him nor by others. Slaughter, like cooking, is a desecration of Shabbat that entails the death penalty. It follows that Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar maintains that the meat of an animal intentionally slaughtered on Shabbat may never be eaten. If so, this is a slaughter that does not render the meat fit for consumption, and therefore according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon there is no fourfold or fivefold payment.

מהו טעמו של רבי יוחנן הסנדלר? כפי שדרש רבי חייא בפתח בית הנשיא: ׳ושמרתם את השבת כי קדש היא לכם׳ — מה קודש אסור באכילה, אף מעשה שבת (מה שנעשה באיסור בשבת) אסור באכילה.

The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan HaSandlar? The Gemara explains: This is as Rabbi Ḥiyya taught at the entrance to the house of the Nasi. It is written: “And you shall observe Shabbat, for it is holy [kodesh] to you; one who profanes it shall be put to death” (Exodus 31:14). Just as it is prohibited to eat a sacred item consecrated to the Temple [kodesh], so too is it prohibited to eat food produced though action that desecrates Shabbat.

ואם תאמר: מה קודש אסור אף בהנאה, אף מעשה שבת ייאסר בהנאה? — תלמוד לומר ׳לכם׳: שלכם יהא (מותר בהנאה).

The Gemara asks: If so, perhaps the analogy should be extended: Just as it is prohibited to derive benefit from a sacred item, so too should it be prohibited to derive benefit from a product of an action that desecrates Shabbat. The Gemara answers: The verse states: “It is holy to you” (Exodus 31:14), indicating that it shall be yours for deriving benefit. Although food cooked on Shabbat may not be eaten, it is permitted to benefit from it in other ways.

יכול אפילו בשוגג ייאסר? — תלמוד לומר ׳מחלליה מות יומת׳: במזיד (החייב מיתה) אמרתי לך, ולא בשוגג.

The Gemara further asks: Based on the analogy between a sacred item and the product of an action that desecrates Shabbat, one might have thought that even if the action were performed unwittingly it should be prohibited to consume the product, like a sacred item. To counter this, the verse states: “One who profanes it shall be put to death” (Exodus 31:14), indicating that it is with regard to one who desecrates Shabbat intentionally that I said this analogy to you, as the verse clearly is referring to one who is liable to receive the death penalty, but not one who desecrates Shabbat unwittingly, who is not executed.

נחלקו בה רב אחא ורבינא: אחד אמר — איסור מעשה שבת (באכילה) מן התורה, ואחד אמר — מדרבנן.

The Gemara comments: Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to this matter. One said that the product of an action that constitutes a desecration of Shabbat is forbidden by Torah law, and one said that the product of an action that constitutes a desecration of Shabbat is forbidden by rabbinic law.

מאן דאמר מן התורה — כפי שאמרנו (מדרשת רבי חייא). ומאן דאמר מדרבנן — דורש ׳קדש הוא׳: הוא (היום) קדש, ואין מעשיו קדש (ולכן מן התורה מותר באכילה, ורק חכמים אסרו).

The Gemara elaborates: The one who says it is forbidden by Torah law explains as we said, that the prohibition is based on the verse as interpreted by Rabbi Ḥiyya. And the one who says it is forbidden by rabbinic law would say that the verse states: “It is holy,” from which he infers: It, the day itself, is holy but the products of its prohibited actions are not holy, and therefore they are not compared to sacred items and may be eaten by Torah law.

מקשים: בשלמא למאן דאמר (איסור מעשה שבת) מן התורה — משום כך

The Gemara asks: Granted, according to the one who said that products of a prohibited act are prohibited by Torah law, it is for

פוטרין חכמים (את הטובח בשבת על ידי אחר, שהבשר אסור מן התורה ושחיטה שאינה ראויה היא); אלא למאן דאמר מדרבנן (והבשר מותר מן התורה) — מדוע פוטרין חכמים?

this reason that the Rabbis exempt the thief from the fourfold or fivefold payment when he slaughters the animal on Shabbat, as slaughter on Shabbat does not render the meat permitted for consumption. But according to the one who says that the product of a prohibited act on Shabbat may be eaten by Torah law but is forbidden by rabbinic law, why do the Rabbis exempt the thief when he appoints an agent to slaughter the animal for him and the agent performs this action on Shabbat?

מתרצים: כשפוטרין חכמים — אין כוונתם לשבת, אלא לשאר המקרים שבברייתא: לעבודה זרה ולשור הנסקל (ששם הבשר אסור בהנאה ממש).

The Gemara answers: When the Rabbis exempt him from the fourfold or fivefold payment, they are not referring to the case where the thief’s agent slaughters the animal on Shabbat. Rather, they were speaking of the rest of the cases listed in the baraita, namely, an agent who slaughters the animal for idol worship and one who slaughters an ox that is sentenced to be stoned.

מקשים על רבי מאיר: נהי שסובר ׳שחיטה שאינה ראויה שמה שחיטה׳ — אך מדוע מחייב את הטובח לעבודה זרה (הרי הבהמה נאסרה בהנאה תוך כדי השחיטה)?

The Gemara asks another question with regard to the interpretation of the baraita presented above: And with regard to Rabbi Meir, granted he maintains that the legal status of an act of slaughter not fit for accomplishing its full ritual purpose is nevertheless considered an act of slaughter. But why is the thief liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment when his agent slaughters the animal for idol worship?

שהרי כיון ששחט בה מעט — כבר אסרהּ (כתקרובת עבודה זרה); וכשגומר את השחיטה כבר היא אסורת הנאה — ׳ולא דמריה קא טבח׳ (אין זו בהמת בעליה ששוחט, ואף לא שלו)!

Once he slaughtered the animal a bit, at the very start of the act of slaughter, he has prohibited the animal, with regard to deriving benefit, as an animal sacrificed to idolatry. When he slaughters the other part it is already prohibited with regard to deriving benefit, which means that it is not an animal that belongs to its owner that he slaughters, and it is not an animal that belongs to him that he slaughters. Since deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, it has no value; therefore, there is no ownership.

אמר רבא: מדובר באומר ׳בגמר זביחה אני עובדהּ׳ (מקדישהּ לעבודה זרה רק בסיום השחיטה) — ולכן האיסור חל רק בסוף, יחד עם חיוב התשלומין.

Rava said: This is referring to one who says prior to the slaughter that only with the completion of the slaughter does he worship the idolatry. Therefore, the prohibition does not take effect until that stage, which is also when the liability to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment is incurred.

מקשים על שור הנסקל: אסור הנאה הוא; ׳לאו דמריה קא טבח ולאו דידיה קא טבח׳ (אין זו בהמת בעליה ולא בהמתו) — מדוע מחייב רבי מאיר?

The Gemara raises a question with regard to another of the cases of the baraita: An ox that is sentenced to be stoned is an item from which deriving benefit is prohibited. Consequently, when a thief or his agent slaughters this animal, it is not an animal that belongs to its owner that he slaughters, and it is not an animal that belongs to him that he slaughters. Why does Rabbi Meir obligate him to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment?

אמר רבא: הכא במאי עסקינן — כגון שמסרו הבעלים לשומר, והזיק השור בבית השומר, והועד בבית השומר, ונגמר דינו בבית השומר (ואז גנבו הגנב מבית השומר); ורבי מאיר סובר כרבי יעקב וסובר כרבי שמעון.

Rava said: With what are we dealing here? This is a case where the owners entrusted the ox to a bailee and the ox fatally injured someone while in the bailee’s house, and it was forewarned while in the bailee’s house, and it was sentenced to be stoned while in the bailee’s house, and the thief then stole it from the bailee’s house and slaughtered it. Rava continues: And Rabbi Meir holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, and he also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

סובר כרבי יעקב — שאמר: אף משנגמר דינו (להיסקל), אם החזירו השומר לבעלים — מוחזר (יצא השומר ידי חובת ההשבה, אף שהשור חסר ערך).

He holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ya’akov, who says: Even after the ox was sentenced to be stoned, if the bailee returned it to its owners before it was killed, it is considered returned. Although the ox is now worthless, as no benefit may be derived from it, since the bailee returned a physically intact ox, the owner has no claim against him.

וסובר כרבי שמעון — שאמר: דבר הגורם לממון, כממון דמי (אף שהשור עצמו חסר ערך, מאחר ששחיטתו מחייבת את השומר לשלם לבעלים — יש לו ערך לגבי השומר).

And Rabbi Meir also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says: An item whose elimination causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value. With regard to an item that is otherwise worthless, if its elimination causes monetary loss due to the fact that it must be replaced, it is considered to be of value. In this case, although the ox is worthless in and of itself, when the thief slaughters it he prevents the bailee from returning it intact to the owner and causes him to be obligated to pay the owner the value of the ox before it was sentenced to be stoned. Consequently, the thief must reimburse the bailee, as the ox effectively has value for that bailee.

שהרי שנינו: רבי שמעון אומר — קדשים שחייב באחריותן (להחליפם אם אבדו), הגונב ושוחט אותם חייב ארבעה וחמשה; אלמא דבר הגורם לממון, כממון דמי.

As we learned in a mishna (74b): Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of sacrificial animals for which the owner bears financial responsibility to replace any of them with another animal if it is lost or it dies, the thief is obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment if he slaughters the animal. Although one is generally not liable to pay the double payment for stealing consecrated items, Rabbi Shimon maintains that this case is different, since as a result of the animal’s theft the owner sustains a loss by being required to substitute another animal for it. Since the animal’s loss has financial ramifications for the owner apart from any inherent value it has, it has value for him. Apparently, Rabbi Shimon holds that an item whose elimination causes financial loss is considered to have monetary value.

אמר רב כהנא: אמרתי שמועה זו (שהמשנה כרבי מאיר ולא כרבי שמעון) לפני רב זביד מנהרדעא; וכי יכול אתה להעמיד את המשנה כרבי מאיר ולא כרבי שמעון? והרי שנינו בסיפא: ׳רבי שמעון פוטר בשני אלו׳ — מכלל שבכל שאר המשנה מודה (שמשלם)!

Rav Kahana said: I recited this halakha, according to which the mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir, in front of Rav Zevid of Neharde’a, and I asked him: Is it correct to say that you can establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? But isn’t it taught in the last clause of the mishna: Rabbi Shimon exempts the thief from the fourfold or fivefold payment in these last two cases. One can learn by inference that in all the rest of the cases in the mishna, apart from these two, Rabbi Shimon concedes that the thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment.

אמר לו: לא; מכלל הדבר אין ללמוד אלא שמודה רבי שמעון בטבח ומכר לרפואה ולכלבים (המקרים הסמוכים שם), ולכן אפשר להעמיד את המשנה כרבי מאיר.

Rav Zevid said to him: No; that is not the correct inference from the mishna. Rather, by inference one can learn only that Rabbi Shimon concedes that the thief pays the fourfold or fivefold payment in the cases mentioned immediately prior to this one, specifically in a case where the thief slaughtered or sold the animal in order that it should be used for medicinal purposes or for feeding to dogs. Therefore, it can be correct to establish the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

גמרא (על ׳גנב משל אביו וטבח ומכר׳): בעא מיניה רבא מרב נחמן — גנב שור של שני שותפין וטבחו, והודה לאחד מהם (ובכך נפטר מתשלום ארבעה וחמשה כלפיו, שמודה בקנס פטור) — מהו לגבי השותף האחר?

§ The mishna teaches: If one stole an animal of his father’s and then slaughtered or sold it, and afterward his father died, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment to his father’s other heirs. Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: If one stole an ox belonging to two partners and slaughtered it, and subsequently admitted the theft to one of the partners, which means that he is exempt from paying the fourfold or fivefold payment to that partner, in accordance with the principle that one who admits his own guilt is exempt from fines, what is the halakha with regard to payment to the other partner?

צדדי הספק: ׳חמשה בקר׳ אמר הכתוב — ולא חמשה חצאי בקר (ולכן פטור אף כלפי השני)? או דלמא ׳חמשה בקר׳ — ואפילו חמשה חצאי בקר (וישלם לשני את חלקו)? אמר לו (רב נחמן): ׳חמשה בקר׳ — ולא חמשה חצאי בקר.

The Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: The Merciful One states in the Torah: “He shall pay five oxen for an ox” (Exodus 21:37), which indicates five full oxen, but not five half-oxen. Or perhaps when the Merciful One states “five oxen,” this means that even five half-oxen must be paid in a case of this kind. Rav Naḥman said to Rava: The Merciful One states: “Five oxen,” which means five full oxen, but not five half-oxen.

איתיביה (רבא) מן המשנה: גנב משל אביו וטבח ומכר ואחר כך מת אביו — משלם תשלומי ארבעה וחמשה. והרי כאן, כיון שמת אביו (וירש חלק), הוא כמי שקדם והודה לאחד מהם — ובכל זאת שנינו שמשלם ארבעה וחמשה (חצאי בקר)!

Rava raised an objection to him from the mishna: If one stole an animal of his father’s and then slaughtered or sold it, and afterward his father died, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. But here, since his father died and the thief has inherited part of the stolen animal himself, it is similar to the case of one who stole from two partners and went ahead and admitted the theft to one of them, i.e., to himself. In the case of the mishna he is exempt from paying the portion of the fine that is for himself, and yet the mishna teaches that he pays the other heirs their portion of the fourfold or fivefold payment.

אמר לו: הכא במאי עסקינן — כגון שעמד אביו בדין (בעוד אביו חי נגמר הדין לחיוב, ואז התחייב בחמשה בקר שלמים).

Rav Naḥman said to Rava: With what are we dealing here? With a case where his father stood against his son the thief in his trial, and the son was convicted for the theft and slaughter of his father’s animal. In this case, the liability to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment was established before the father’s death, and at that time the payment was five full oxen.

מקשה רבא: אבל אם לא עמד בדין מאי — אינו משלם? אם כן, במקום ששנה הסיפא ׳גנב משל אביו ומת ואחר כך טבח ומכר — אינו משלם׳, יפלוג ויתני בדידיה (באותו מקרה עצמו): במה דברים אמורים — כשעמד בדין, אבל לא עמד בדין — אינו משלם!

Rava asked him: And if the thief had not yet stood trial before the father’s death, what would be the halakha, according to your opinion? Would he not be required to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment? If so, rather than teaching in the latter clause of the mishna (74b): If one stole his father’s animal and the father died, and afterward he slaughtered or sold it, he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment; let the mishna make a distinction within the same type of case, as follows: In what case is this statement, i.e., that the thief is required to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, said? It is when the thief stood trial in his father’s lifetime; but if he did not stand trial in his father’s lifetime he does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

אמר לו: הכי נמי (אכן יכול היה לחלק כך); אלא אגב שנקט ברישא ׳גנב משל אביו וטבח ומכר ואחר כך מת אביו׳, נקט אף בסיפא בלשון דומה: ׳גנב משל אביו ומת אביו ואחר כך טבח ומכר׳.

Rav Naḥman said to him: Indeed, the mishna could have mentioned that case. However, since the tanna of the mishna has to cite the first clause, which discusses one who stole an animal of his father’s and slaughtered or sold it, and afterward his father died, he cites the latter clause as well, by means of a similar case: If one stole his father’s animal and his father died, and afterward he slaughtered or sold the animal.

לצפרא (למחרת בבוקר) אמר לו (רב נחמן, חזר בו): ׳חמשה בקר׳ אמר הכתוב — ואפילו חמשה חצאי בקר; וזה שלא אמרתי לך כן אמש —

This discussion between Rava and Rav Naḥman occurred in the evening. On the following morning, Rav Naḥman retracted his statement and said to Rava: The Merciful One states: “Five oxen,” and this means that even five half-oxen are included. Rav Naḥman explained his change of mind: And the reason that I did not say this to you last night

משום שלא אכלתי בשר שור (כלומר צמתי אתמול ולא יכולתי לכוון דעתי כראוי).

is because I had not eaten ox meat. In other words, I was fasting yesterday and was unable to concentrate properly.

ואם כן (אם משלם אף חצאי בקר), מאי שנא רישא (שמשלם) ומאי שנא סיפא (שפטור)?

Rava responded to him: But if the Torah requires even a partial payment of the fourfold or fivefold payment, what is different in the first clause, in which the son must pay, and what is different in the latter clause, where he is exempt?

אמר לו: ברישא (גנב וטבח בחיי אביו) קורא אני בו ׳וטבחו׳ — כולו נשחט באיסור; בסיפא (שמת אביו ואז טבח) אין אני קורא בו ׳וטבחו׳ כולו באיסור, שהרי חלקו שלו כבר היה, וחלק זה נשחט בהיתר.

Rav Naḥman said to him: In the first clause, where the father’s animal was stolen and slaughtered in his lifetime, I read about this case the verse: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep, and slaughter it” (Exodus 21:37), which indicates that the thief slaughtered the ox or the sheep entirely in a prohibited manner. In the latter clause, where the animal was slaughtered after the father’s death, I do not read about this case the verse: “And slaughter it,” which describes a slaughter that was performed entirely in a prohibited manner, because the animal already partially belonged to him, and his own portion of the ox was slaughtered in a permitted manner.